Network Horizon and the Dynamics of Network Positions: A Multi-Method Multi-Level Longitudinal Study of Interfirm Networks by Liere, D.W. (Diederik) van
Network Horizon and the Dynamics of Network Positions
A Multi-Method Multi-Level Longitudinal Study of Interfirm Networks
Why does the network position of a firm change? Which firm, partner
firm, and network factors accelerate or slow down this change
process? This is the central theme of this dissertation. The causal
mechanisms behind the benefits of network positions have received
considerable attention in academic research on interfirm networks.
However, in most cases this research assumes a more or less static
network. In today’s world of advanced communications, interfirm
networks are not static but highly dynamic where firms pursue
beneficial network positions. A particular beneficial position is the
bridging position that puts the bridging firm in-between its partner
firms. Taking the bridging position as point of departure, this study
investigates the strengthening, weakening and longevity of this posi-
tion. A rigorous triangulation method has been used combining net-
work experiments, simulation, and field data analysis with formal
tools that have been specifically designed – as part of this study – to
study interfirm networks (the Business Network Engine and LINKS).
The concept of network horizon is being introduced to define the
degree of information which a firm holds on the structure of its inter-
firm network at a given point in time. The size of a firm's network
horizon is shown to be a critical determinant of the firm's ability to
strengthen and keep its bridging position. This does not mean that a
firm should always try to expand its network horizon as the study
indicates a passing point: expanding the network horizon beyond this
point gives rapidly diminishing returns. Interfirm differences in their
network horizons, i.e. network horizon heterogeneity, is found to be
an important predictor of the intensity of competition for network
positions. Resource similarity between partner firms weakens the
bridging position; and resource dependence strengthens the bridging
position. In summary, it is being proposed that the most valuable
network positions are ones that will not last long. This study has
provided important tools and methods for rigorous future research
that will be highly relevant for managers to develop successful
network strategies to win the best position in a networked world.
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Summary 
The substantive purpose of this study is to address the dynamics of network 
positions in interfirm networks. While the benefits of network positions have received 
considerable attention in the interfirm network literature, the dynamics of network 
positions are less well understood. Network positions confer an advantage to a firm by 
providing access to valuable and scarce resources. The configuration of the set of 
interfirm relationships with other firms determines the network position that a firm 
occupies. Two well known and often studied network positions are the bridging position 
and the closed or dense position. A firm occupies a bridging position when its partner 
firms are not directly connected to each other, i.e. there are structural holes between the 
partner firms. By contrast, a firm occupies a closed position when its partner firms are 
directly connected to each other, i.e. there are no structural holes between the partner 
firms. The mechanisms by which these two types of network positions create value are 
orthogonal. The bridging firm creates value by exploiting information asymmetries 
between its partner firms such as information and control benefits while a firm 
occupying a closed position creates value by reducing information asymmetries and 
thereby creating effective sanction mechanisms, shared mental maps that facilitate 
knowledge transfer and effective reputation mechanisms. Changes in network positions, 
through establishing new or disbanding old ties, cascade through the network and may 
trigger counter partnering actions. These constant changes in relationships are the engine 
behind network position dynamics. Taking the bridging position as point of departure, 
this study investigates the strengthening, weakening and longevity of this position. We 
employ a multi-method, multi-level longitudinal research design using network 
experiments, computational modeling, and a field study. 
Strengthening a bridging position requires information about the network 
structure in order to enable a firm to locate brokerage opportunities. The concept of 
network horizon is being introduced to define the degree of information which a firm holds 
on the structure of its interfirm network at a given point in time. Using network 
experiments and computational modeling, we demonstrate that firms which have a more 
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extended network horizon are better able to identify brokerage opportunities and hence 
capable of strengthening their bridging position. Furthermore, we find that there are 
diminishing returns to network horizon. It is not worthwhile to collect more information 
about the network structure after a certain level of information. However, not just the 
focal firm has a network horizon but the other firms in a network have this type of 
information as well although it is very likely that different firms have different types of 
information. Hence, we introduce a second concept called network horizon heterogeneity. 
Network horizon heterogeneity refers to the interfirm differences in the completeness of 
information about the network structure. We demonstrate, using a computational model, 
that network horizon heterogeneity is an important predictor of the sustainability of a 
bridging position. An interfirm network with a heterogeneous distribution of network 
horizon leads to less intense competition for bridging positions and hence a firm can 
benefit longer from such a position. In contrast, interfirm networks that are characterized 
by more homogenous distributions experience increased levels of competition for 
bridging positions and hence the sustainability of a bridging position is shortened.  
Finally, we demonstrate, using network experiments and a field study, that 
resource similarity and resource dependence are important drivers of the dynamics of a 
bridging position. Resource similarity refers to the extent that partner firms have similar 
capabilities and resource dependence refers to how dependent one firm is on another 
firm. Both studies demonstrate that as resource similarity increases firms try to reduce 
the competitive pressure by establishing new interfirm relationships to reduce the 
competition between partner firms. The field study demonstrates that dependent firms 
strengthen their relationship with the firm that holds the bridging position, by severing 
interfirm relationships, and hence become even more dependent on the bridging firm.  
Overall, this dissertation contributes to the interfirm network literature by 
offering insights why bridging positions strengthen, endure, and weaken. In summary, it 
is being proposed that the most valuable network positions are ones that will not last 
long. Such knowledge is important for both scholars and practitioners. Scholars may 
benefit from this study because it demonstrates why network positions change which is 
important to understand network-based competitive advantage. Practitioners may benefit 
from this study because it has provided important tools and methods for rigorous future 
research that will be highly relevant for managers to develop successful network 
strategies to win the best position in a networked world. 
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 1 
1 Why Does a Firm’s Network Position Shift? 
The world of businesses has become a dense interwoven web of relationships in 
which firms collaborate and compete simultaneously. Friedman (2005) calls it the “flat 
world”, technological developments have erased the notion of geographic distance and 
have made it much easier to become part of this connected world. A number of trends 
have triggered the creation of the flat world. Among the more important trends are the 
increased interaction capabilities of companies (Chatterjee, Segars, & Watson, 2006; 
Holland & Lockett, 1997), lower communication costs (Butler et al., 1997) and the 
modularization of products (Hoogeweegen, 1997; Hoogeweegen, Teunissen, Vervest, & 
Wagenaar, 1999; Sanchez, 1995; Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996), processes and value chains 
(Wolters, 2002). The organizational capabilities to interact with and monitor other firms 
have been greatly improved because of modern information and communications 
technologies. Nowadays, a firm can maintain more relationships with more companies at 
much lower transaction costs than before. In addition, firms are increasingly focusing on 
a smaller part of the value chain and specializing their activities and thereby fueling the 
trend of flexible specialization (Piore & Sabel, 1984). The trends of specialization and 
focusing on core activities means that a firm needs an extensive network of suppliers to 
organize its production. Burt (2005: 2-3) describes the transformation as follows:  
 
“Technology has expanded our ability to communicate across geographic and social 
distance. We removed layers of bureaucracy and laid in fast, flexible communication 
systems. Ask the leader of any large organization about the most difficult barriers he 
or she has to manage to harvest the coordination potential of our communication 
capabilities. They inevitable talk about people issues, culture issues. People continue to 
work the way they learned in legacy organizations, in  yesterday’s organization silos. 
We are capable of coordinating across scattered markets of human endeavor. We are 
not yet competent in how to take advantage of these capabilities.”  
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This study tries to narrow the gap, as noted by Burt, between, on the one hand, 
increased communication capabilities, and, on the other hand, our insufficient 
competence of taking advantage of these capabilities. One needs to understand dynamics 
of networks to do so.  
1.1 Why Should We Study Network Position Dynamics? 
The idea that firms are not self-contained autonomous entities but 
interdependent linked organizations has gained credibility in the field of business 
administration (Granovetter, 1985). Firms are increasingly part of one or multiple 
networks. These networks are so-called interfirm networks and are built around 
collaborations such as alliances, long-term buyer-supplier relationships, and joint 
ventures. Firms use their interfirm networks for different purposes, for example, to share 
resources, transfer knowledge, or minimize risk. We will focus on interfirm networks that 
jointly produce products.  
Interfirm networks increase the interdependence between firms (Gulati & 
Gargiulo, 1999). Although these networks are probably more suitable to respond quicker 
to changing circumstances, the downside is that a firm has less discretion over the 
needed resources because it has become more dependent on its partner firms. This 
increased interdependence means that how a firm is embedded in the overall network 
structure, i.e. its network position, is becoming more important. The network position is 
important because it partly determines the access to resources (Gnyawali & Madhavan, 
2001), information (Burt, 1992) and assets (Dyer, 1996).  
Previous research on interfirm networks has predominantly focused on network 
effects rather than the dynamics of networks. How different network positions create 
different benefits and the contingencies of these benefits has been an important theme in 
the interfirm network literature (Ahuja, 2000a; Burt, 2000). In particular, the debate has 
revolved around the benefits of bridging and closed positions. A bridging position is one 
between two unconnected firms (i.e. a sparse position; a definition will be given in 
Chapter 2) while a closed network position is one in which the partner firms of a firm are 
also connected to each other (i.e. a dense position; a definition will be given in Chapter 
2). However, the dynamics of network positions have received less attention. Do firms 
randomly obtain a beneficial network position or are there rational explanations why 
some firms have stronger network positions than other firms? 
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By network position dynamics, we refer to the changes in the position a firm 
occupies in the interfirm network. A network position is not a static given, rather it is the 
result of a firms’ partnering decisions and the subsequent counter actions from the other 
firms in the network. Does a particular network position grow stronger over time or is it 
weakened by partner firm actions? What triggered these changes? Do we observe 
consistent patterns that predict these changes? Gulati, Nohria and Zaheer (2000: 210) 
observed that “the ties formed or disbanded by any actor influence not only their own 
behavior in subsequent periods but also those of others to whom the actor is connected. 
One actor forms an alliance. Others match this action.” Networks are by definition 
relational, thus firms react to each other’s actions, and hence the actions of one firm in 
the network have repercussions for other firms in the network. Changes in network 
positions, through establishing new or disbanding old ties, cascade through the network 
and can trigger partnering counter actions. A network position is dynamic, it is the 
cumulative result of partnering decisions through establishing and terminating ties by 
firms (Rowley & Baum, 2002).  
These partnering decisions by the firm and its competitors have both intended 
and unintended consequences for the attractiveness of a network position. These 
constant changes in benefits received from a network position are the engine behind 
network position dynamics. Madhavan, Koka & Prescott (1998: 440) put it as follows: 
“We take the position that managerial action can potentially shape networks so as to 
provide a favorable context for future action. In order to understand how managers may 
do this, research needs to move beyond asking how networks constrain and shape action, 
to examining what factors constrain and shape networks.” Thus, the partnering decisions 
of firms shape the network position of a firm and this position has repercussions for 
future partnering decisions.  
Firms establish interfirm linkages to gain access to knowledge (Powell, Koput, & 
Smith-Doerr, 1996), learn new skills (Baum, Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000), acquire new 
technologies (Stuart, 1998) or manage their interdependencies (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
These interfirm relationships aim at creating a better fit between the firm and its 
environment. The fit between firm and environment will weaken as either the 
environment or the firm changes. These changes are the reason for a firm to adjust its 
portfolio of interfirm relationships and hence it will change its network position. As 
networks become ubiquitous and more important (as we will argue in Chapter 2) so will 
the network position of a firm become more important. Adding a dynamic perspective 
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on network positions increases our understanding of how particular network positions 
evolve, why some firms benefit longer from their network position than other firms do 
and how interfirm networks emerge and evolve over time. In addition, understanding the 
dynamics of a network position helps developing a network strategy (Rowley & Baum, 
2002; Shipilov, 2006). A network strategy guides a firm in partner selection, shifting its 
network position if necessary and turning the network position into a valuable resource. 
Therefore, it is important to understand the mechanisms that are responsible for a firm 
to change its network position.  
1.2 Overall Research Question and Theoretical Issues 
Addressed 
This dissertation raises the following overall research question: 
 
“Why does the network position of a firm change?  
Which firm, partner firm, and network factors accelerate or slow down this change process?” 
 
There are many different network positions in an interfirm network but a 
particular important type of network position is the bridging position. This type of 
position has been often associated with above average performance of both firms and 
individuals (Burt, 2000). However, the process by which firms come to occupy this 
position is less well understood (Salancik, 1995). Because a bridging position is an 
important way to create value (Burt, 2000), it is important to understand why such 
positions become stronger, why these positions last and finally why these positions 
weaken or even disappear. Salancik (1995) even argued that the field of network research 
should move beyond questions about the effects of network positions and raise 
questions that focus on why particular positions exist or do not exist in the first place. 
Salancik (1995: 349) phrased it as follows: “a more telling analysis might explain why the 
hole exists or why it was not filled before.”  
We will draw heavily from three streams of literature to answer the overall 
research question. The first stream of literature is structural hole theory (Burt, 1992; Burt, 
2000), the second stream of literature is resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978) and the third stream is the information processing view of the firm (Daft & Weick, 
1984). The first issue we will explore is the effect of having information about the 
network structure to strengthen a firm’s bridging position. Before a firm can initiate or 
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respond to a change in the network position by its competitors (through a new 
partnering decision), a firm has to be aware of such actions and their effects. This 
requires information about who, how and when the interfirm network changes. 
Acquiring information about the network structure is the first step for a firm to shift its 
network position. An important but not often researched assumption in much of the 
research about interfirm networks is to what extent a firm has information about the 
overall network. Rowley and Baum (2004: 120) phrase it as follows: “The idea that 
managers are aware of their firms’ networks and the types of positions that provide social 
capital advantages – core assumptions underpinning the network strategy perspective – 
remains largely unexplored”. Firms that are unaware of the overall pattern of the network 
structure will not be aware of all the opportunities for establishing new ties and thereby 
strengthening their bridging position. 
The second issue we will explore is how information about the network structure 
enables a firm to shift its network position. Periods of network position changes and 
relative stability succeed each other (Kilduff, Tsai, & Hanke, 2006). The relative 
information advantage or disadvantage a firm has partly determines the competition for a 
network position. Networks that are characterized by firms that have extensive 
information about new opportunities are more likely to compete for such positions than 
networks with firms that have a limited view of the network. This is an important issue 
because recent research suggests that some network positions are not sustainable (Burt, 
2002). If this is the case, then firms who have a strong network position cannot rest on 
their laurels while firms with a weak network position already have the incentive to 
strengthen it.  
The third and final issue we will explore is that the actions of partner firms may 
weaken the bridging position of the focal firm. A bridged firm (i.e. the firm that is 
connected through the bridging firm to a third firm) is being exploited in such a 
situation. This gives the bridged firm the incentive to end this situation and to weaken 
the bridging position of the focal firm. We adopt a resource dependence view (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978) and investigate how resource dependence and resource similarity provide 
the bridged firm the incentive to establish new interfirm relationships and thereby 
weakening the bridging position of the focal firm.  
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1.3 Contribution of the Dissertation 
This dissertation contributes to two bodies of literature. First, we advance 
structural hole theory by adding a dynamic perspective. In particular, we formulate an 
information-based theory of the rise and demise of the bridging position of a firm. This 
is an important contribution because it increases our understanding of the dynamics of 
network positions, which is important because firms will have a greater understanding of 
how to shift their network position in a way that is beneficial for them. We will 
demonstrate that if a firm aims at strengthening its bridging position, it will need to have 
information about the network structure to detect brokerage opportunities. 
Subsequently, we will demonstrate that the relative advantage a firm has in terms of 
having more complete information about the network structure partly determines how 
long a firm benefits from its bridging position.  
Second, we advance resource dependence theory and demonstrate that resource 
dependence is not just an important network formation driver (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999) 
but also an important driver for a firm to change its network position. More specifically, 
when a firm becomes dependent on a partner firm then it is more likely to restructure 
this dependence by forging closer bonds with the bridging firm. This means that the 
bridging position of the focal firm strengthens due to the partnering decisions of its 
partner firms. Furthermore, we demonstrate that high levels of resource similarity (i.e. 
firms possess the same set of capabilities) lead to increased competition and this triggers 
a firm to shift its network position as well. These three factors combined, information 
about the network structure, resource dependence and resource similarity, form the basis 
of a model of the dynamics of network positions.   
1.4 Managerial Relevance 
Increased specialization and developments of information and communication 
technologies (ICT) have facilitated the growth of interfirm networks (as we will discuss in 
Chapter 2). For example, the number of firms and links on the Internet today are a 
multifold of what it was 10 years ago (Kotha, 1998). The simultaneous growth of the 
Internet and the increased interdependence of firms due to developments in ICT make 
the position a firm occupies in a network an increasingly important resource to pay 
attention for decision-makers. As the size of the Internet increases, it is more important 
for firms to know what position they hold - or should hold - in the network.  
Closely coupled to the position a firm currently holds, a firm should also understand how 
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the network develops in order to take a position that is most favorable for its 
performance1.  
Managing a firm’s network position is becoming a concern for firms that are 
increasingly involved in buyer – supplier relationships, alliances and other forms of 
interorganizational contracts, such as licensing and joint ventures; it becomes more and 
more important for organizational decision-makers to understand the factors that 
determine the dynamics of a network position. The reason for this is that the network 
position of a firm is an important determinant of firm performance such as degree of 
innovativeness (Powell et al., 1996), firm growth (Powell, Koput, Owen-Smith, & Smith-
Doerr, 1999), and financial performance (Baum, van Liere, & Rowley, 2006). The 
consequences of a partnering decision become clearer to organizational decision-makers 
as they understand the mechanisms that explain why a network position changes. 
Knowledge about the mechanisms of network position dynamics is a prerequisite for 
sensible managerial network action.  
Finally, organizational decision-makers can improve the quality of their network 
actions by devising a network strategy. Such a strategy can become an important 
component of a supplier or partner selection process. Future suppliers are not just 
selected based on their qualities, but the impact on establishing a relationship with this 
supplier is also assessed. How does the network position of the firm shift when this 
relationship is established? Furthermore, it guides a firm in selecting whom to monitor 
and how to maximize the benefits of the current network position.  
1.5 Research Design: a Multi-Method Multi-Level 
Longitudinal Approach 
We adopt a multi-method (Brewer & Hunter, 1989) multi-level longitudinal 
approach for investigating firm, partner-firm, and network factors that influence network 
position dynamics. Studying the dynamics of network positions implies that network 
positions change. A longitudinal approach is required to observe and study such changes. 
Hence, without longitudinal data it will not be possible to address our overall research 
question.  
                                                 
1 Performance of a firm in a network can be measured at both the firm and network level (Straub, 
Rai, & Klein, 2004). In this study, we will explicitly focus on performance at the firm level. We do 
recognize the potential of studying network performance but we address this topic in the future 
research section of Chapter 7.  
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Mingers (2001) advocates a multi-method approach for five reasons:  
1. A multi-method approach is an effective way of dealing with the full richness 
 of the phenomena studied.  
2. A study is rarely a single event but often a longer process and different 
 methods may yield different insights during the study of the whole process.  
3. Validating data using triangulation increases the internal and external validity 
 of the research.  
4. A multi-method approach encourages creativity of the researcher by 
 “discovering fresh or paradoxical factors that stimulate further work”  
 (2001: 244).  
5. A multi-method approach possibly increases the generalizability of the 
 research.  
These reasons are compelling, and therefore we choose to adopt a multi-method 
methodology for this dissertation. Triangulation is a technique to increase the validity, 
both internal and external, of the research by using different data sources, measurements 
or methods (Scandura & Williams, 2000) to study the same research topic. We adopt a 
method triangulation approach. Method triangulation is the process of using different 
research methods to study the same phenomenon. The three methods we will use are 
network experiments, computational modeling, and a field study. Each research method 
has its strengths and weaknesses.  
The advantage of experiments and simulations is that both methods create a 
tightly controlled environment that allows a researcher to establish causality and increase 
the internal validity (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). Field data have the strength of 
high external validity. Combining these three methods should lead to robust conclusions 
about the dynamics of network positions compared with a single method study. McGrath 
(1982) identifies three dimensions to rate a research method: these are generalizability of 
the results, precision of measurement and realism of context. Table 1-1 shows how our 
three methods score on each of these three dimensions (Scandura & Williams, 2000). 
 Network experiments Computational 
modeling 
Field study 
External validity Low Low High 
Precision of 
measurement 
High High Low 
Realism of context Low Low High 
Table 1-1 Strengths and weaknesses of different research methods 
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Our triangulation of research methods enables us to score high on each of the 
three dimensions of a research design. Furthermore, we respond to the call to use 
triangulation by Scandura et al. (2000) who note a drop of the use of triangulation in 
management research that potentially can impede internal, external and construct validity. 
Replicating the same study using a different research method challenges the 
researcher to assess whether the operationalizations made in one study can be replicated 
or should be refined to accommodate this new setting while staying consistent with the 
previous study. Refining the operationalizations gives more insight about how a 
particular construct operates but this asks for creativity. Finally, generalizability is 
important because it reflects for a large part the benefits of this research to managers and 
decision-makers. By combining analysis from different research methods, we aim at 
giving a fuller and richer understanding of network position dynamics that in turn will 
help organizational decision-makers in formulating a network strategy. 
Interfirm networks are inherently multi-level, firm behavior affects the network 
structure and the network structure gives a firm opportunities and constraints and this 
influences firm behavior. Scholars have often argued that network researchers should 
adopt a multi-level approach (Moldoveanu, Baum, & Rowley, 2003). One of the key 
strengths of network research is that it is multi-level where independently or 
simultaneously firm level, relationship level, and network level analyses can be conducted 
(Contractor, Wasserman, & Faust, 2006). A multi-level approach aims at explaining 
macro level outcomes using micro level inputs or vice versa. Madhavan (2003) stresses 
the importance of multi-level network research by stating “What could be a more 
inherently multi-level phenomenon, and in greater need of multi-level conceptual 
frameworks and empirical strategies, than the evolution of networks?” 
Applying a multi-level approach to this dissertation means that we incorporate 
focal firm, partner firm, and network level variables to account for changes of the 
network position of the focal firm. 
1.6 Structure of the Dissertation 
After this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 provides a review of the antecedents, 
performance implications and processes of network positions and in particular reviews 
the bridging and closed network positions. This chapter finishes with three detailed 
research questions that will be the focus of the empirical chapters. Chapter 3 introduces 
three research methods and describes the data that we will use for conducting our 
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research. Then, three empirical chapters are presented (Chapter 4, Chapter 5, and 
Chapter 6). These chapters are relatively independent of each other: each chapter 
addresses one specific research question but the three chapters jointly cover the whole 
life cycle of a bridging position. Finally, in Chapter 7 we draw our conclusions; discuss 
the generalizability of the studies, highlight the managerial relevance and discuss 
implications for future research. Figure 1-1 illustrates the structure of the dissertation.   
 
Figure 1-1 Structure of the dissertation 
We will now proceed with reviewing the literature on the origins, benefits, and 
dynamics on network positions. 
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2 Network Positions: Origins, Performance, and 
Dynamics 
This chapter will review current knowledge about network positions in order to 
develop the detailed research questions concerning the dynamics of network positions. 
Before we discuss the dynamics of network positions, we will first describe why firms are 
embedded in an interfirm network in the first place and hence why a network perspective 
is essential for understanding firm behavior. Firms enter, increasingly, alliances and long-
term buyer supplier relationships or more informal collaborations (Gomes-Casseres, 
1996; Granovetter, 1985; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). The collection of such interfirm 
relationships creates an interfirm, or business network. This interfirm network is an 
important determinant for access to valuable resources and information (Baum et al., 
2000; Burt, 1992; Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001). Furthermore, we highlight several recent 
developments that increase the salience of the network perspective. Section 2.1 highlights 
the growing importance of interfirm networks and identifies two important drivers for an 
increasing use of interfirm networks: communication and information technology and 
the increased specialization of firms. These two developments are important antecedents 
of interfirm network formation.  
Having established the growing importance of the interfirm network, we then 
focus on how particular network positions in these interfirm networks impact a firm’s 
performance in Section 2.2. The position in the network can have a significant impact on 
firm performance and is an important source of competitive advantage (Dyer & Singh, 
1998; Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001; Podolny, 1993; Powell et al., 1999; van Heck & 
Vervest, 2007; Vervest, van Heck, Preiss, & Pau, 2005). We will argue that some 
positions are more beneficial than other positions. Especially “bridging” (Burt, 1992) and 
“closed” (Coleman, 1988) network positions have often been linked to the improvement 
of firm performance. These two network positions are critical to this study as they define 
two extreme positions in terms of structure and value creation. If some positions are 
more beneficial than other positions then firms will try to improve their current position 
in order to reap more benefits. Thus, beneficial network positions contain the seeds of 
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network position dynamics because firms are triggered to improve their own position. 
And indeed as Sorensen and Ryall (2007) have shown a network position can be a source 
of competitive advantage but it is rarely a source of sustainable competitive advantage. 
Therefore, in Section 2.3 of this literature review, we will focus on the current knowledge 
of network position dynamics. This section analyzes how network positions change over 
time both from the perspective of the networks and from the perspective of the firm. 
Drivers for change as well as stability (“network inertia”) are identified. The final Section 
2.4 develops three detailed research questions subject for detailed research in Chapters 4, 
5 and 6 respectively. These three detailed research questions focus on why bridging 
positions become stronger, why some positions last longer, and why bridging positions 
become weaker.  
2.1 What Drives the Development of Interfirm Networks? 
This section is devoted to highlight some important factors that drive the 
development of interfirm networks. We will focus on three important factors: resource 
interdependence (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Moldoveanu et al., 2003), increased 
specialization of firms, and developments in information and communication 
technology. Before we continue with this discussion, we first define an interfirm network 
used on Podolny and Page (1998: 59).  
 
Definition 1: interfirm network: “a collection of firms (N≥2) that pursue 
repeated, enduring exchange relations with one another and, at the same time, 
lack a legitimate organizational authority to arbitrate and resolve disputes that 
may arise during the exchange”2.   
 
This definition excludes exchange networks within large firms, transaction 
networks that are governed by spot markets, transactions conducted through (reverse) 
auctions, non-repeated transactions, or other transactions that are minimally embedded 
in a social relationship. The following section introduces resource dependence theory 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) as the first important driver of interfirm network formation. 
                                                 
2 A definition between quotation marks (“”) is a literal definition taken from the mentioned 
source while a definition without quotation marks is self-constructed.  
Network Positions: Origins, Performance, and Dynamics 
13 
2.1.1 Interdependence as driver of interfirm networks 
Pfeffer and Salancik have been among the first to make a convincing case in  
The External Control of Organizations that firms are embedded in - and therefore dependent 
on - interfirm networks (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Their resource dependence theory 
assumes that all firms are, to a varying extent, dependent on their environment for 
survival:  This environment contains valuable and scarce resources that the firm needs 
but does not possess. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978: 40) define interdependence as follows: 
 
Definition 2: interdependence: “a firm does not entirely control all of the 
conditions necessary for the achievement of an action or for obtaining the 
outcome desired from the action”.  
 
The level of interdependence between two firms depends on two factors: how 
important a resource is for a firm (resource importance) and who controls the resource 
(resource discretion) (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). For example, a critical resource owned 
by a partner makes a firm highly dependent on this partner. Especially when the reverse 
is not true, (i.e. the partner is not dependent on that firm).  
There are two effects of interdependence: first, the dependent firm becomes 
more uncertain about (access to) the resources it needs because they are under external 
control and therefore more difficult to manage and their availability more difficult to 
forecast and to control. Second, the firm with discretionary control over the resource 
becomes more powerful as it can dictate the terms of the exchange for these resources. 
Such differences in power become even more problematic in the case of asymmetric 
resource dependence between two firms. For example, Firm A is more dependent on 
firm B than firm B is on firm A.  
Symmetric interdependence balances the power of both firms. Asymmetric 
interdependence reduces the ability of the powerless firm to manage its external 
resources and thereby increases its uncertainty. This difference in power constrains the 
powerless firm in the actions it can take.  
Resource importance, uncertainty, and imbalance of power are motives to (try to) 
restructure the interdependence. A firm can change its dependence through unilateral or 
bilateral / multi-lateral actions. Examples of unilateral dependence restructuring are 
efforts to engage new relationships for alternative sources of supply, to form coalitions 
or to reduce the need for a particularly valued resource (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005). 
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Examples of bilateral dependence restructuring are cooptation (the process of socializing 
members of the constraining partner firm, for example to offer them a seat on the board 
of the firm) or joint reduction of dependence by mutual exchange of valuable resources 
(Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005). In this study, we will focus exclusively on the unilateral 
restructuring of resource dependencies. These unilateral changes, like finding an 
alternative supplier of a resource, are the engine of network position dynamics. Unilateral 
restructuring of resource dependencies imply a shift in a firm’s network position, while a 
bilateral restructuring of resource dependence suggests a change in the governance of the 
relationship but it does not imply a change in a firm’s network position.   
The existence and the restructuring actions of interdependence are important 
drivers to establish interfirm networks: it is a way to reduce uncertainty that stems from 
the dependence; and to counter balance differences in power according to Gulati & 
Gargiulo (1999).  
2.1.2 Increased specialization as driver of increased use of interfirm 
networks 
The previous section introduced the notion of interdependence; this section 
argues that interdependence between firms is increasing because of two important 
developments: 1) focus on core capabilities and 2) dissection of the value chain. We will address 
both developments in this section.  
First, increased specialization allows a firm to improve its performance by 
focusing on core capabilities (Prahalad and Hamel refer to “core competencies”), while 
still being able to compose complete products via linking in the value chain (Brusoni, 
2005; Jacobides, 2005; Jacobides & Billinger, 2006). ‘Stick to your knitting’ has become a 
dominant managerial theme and has led to a steady demise of vertical integrated and 
diversified companies. Focusing on core capabilities (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990) has 
propelled firms to downsize and outsource activities that are not on par with a firm’s 
competitors. Amit and Schoemaker (1993: 35) define a capability and resources as  
 
Definition 3: capability: “a firm’s capacity to deploy resources, usually in 
combination, using organizational processes, to effect a desired end”.  
 
Definition 4: resources: “as stocks of available factors that are owned or 
controlled by the firm”. 
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A firm that increasingly specializes on a limited part of the value chain will 
become increasingly interdependent on other firms:  It will control a narrower set of 
resources itself and will become more dependent on resources under external control. 
While a focus on core capabilities may have made companies leaner, it also means that 
network partners becoming increasingly important because firms do not have the 
required resources and capabilities for internal production themselves.  
Second, firms are increasingly specializing their core capabilities and relying on 
their network of firms to complement their own core capabilities. This process leads to 
vertical disintegration: the value chain transforms from an integrated value chain towards 
a modular value network. Two processes fuel this process of vertical disintegration: 
intrafirm specialization and interfirm co-specialization (Jacobides, 2005). Intrafirm 
specialization is the process by which firms focus on a small part of the value chain, 
organize themselves as autonomous sub-units and source to both internal and external 
customers (Jacobides, 2005). An example of this process is the increased use of shared 
service-centers that provide services to different units from the same firm as well as to 
other, sometimes competing, firms. A consequence of specializing on a particular set of 
components is that it becomes inevitable that a firm becomes more dependent on other 
firms for the required components. Interfirm co-specialization is the process by which 
firms learn and mutually adjust to each others offerings and devise institutions for 
effective exchanges (Jacobides, 2005). As firms continue their specialization, they find 
themselves more apt at their role in the value chain. Adaptation between two firms takes 
place to maintain the integrity and functionality of the product because of continued 
innovation: the result of this adaptation is that firms find “mutually complementary 
roles” (Jacobides, 2005: 484). Thus, firms are increasingly embedded in a network of 
firms because the number of firms to collaborate increases as the dissection of the value 
chain progresses.  
2.1.3 Technology as driver of increased use of interfirm networks 
A second important driver for increased use of interfirm networks is the rapid 
development of information and communications technology (ICT). These 
developments have made it easier and more efficient to use interfirm networks for the 
production of services or goods in three ways: 1) a reduction of interaction costs (Butler 
et al., 1997); 2) creation of “quick connect capabilities” (Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996) of 
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actors in the value chain; and 3) the increasing use of modular product architectures 
(Sanchez, 1995) as a way to compose and orchestrate distributed production processes. 
First, there is consensus among scholars that communication technology lowers 
interaction costs both within the firm as between firms (Hitt, 1999; Malone, Yates, & 
Benjamin, 1987) and this leads to lower coordination costs. This reduction of interaction 
costs is due to standardization of communication (Butler et al., 1997). The Internet has 
made an important contribution to standardized communication: a firm can now 
maintain more relationships with fewer resources than ever before. Reduced interaction 
costs make it possible to embed electronic relations within social relations and make 
efficiency gains in maintaining these social relations. Communication and information 
technology have been more often associated with increases in efficiency. For example, 
Brynjolfsson et al. (1994) study of the impact of IT on firm size shows that firm size 
decreases when firms invest in IT. Thus, increased efficiency makes extra resources 
available to initiate new relationships and thereby making the interfirm network more 
important. Summarizing, a reduction of interaction costs makes it cheaper to maintain 
interfirm relationships. 
Second, the ability of a firm to use information and communication technology 
to form interorganizational links is becoming a distinctive capability (Chatterjee et al., 
2006; van Liere, Hagdorn, Hoogeweegen, & Vervest, 2004; van Liere, Hoogeweegen, 
Hagdorn, & Vervest, 2006; Vervest, Preiss, van Heck, & Pau, 2004). We refer to this 
capability as the “quick-connect capability”. A “quick”-connect capability consists of the 
knowledge, standards and information technology to establish an interfirm relationship 
(Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996) in a very short time frame, i.e. without the usually 
cumbersome coordination of processes between different actors. Standardization of 
interfirm communication is an important prerequisite for a quick connect capability (van 
Liere et al., 2004). A quick connect capability consists of two aspects: 1) there is a 
technological infrastructure that facilitates the communication of the exchange of 
information and transactions and 2) there is an interorganizational systems (IOS) link 
that connects the two firms. Creating such a technological infrastructure and IOS links is 
a difficult process of mutual adaptation, making IT systems compatible and standardizing 
communication. While the initial development costs of such a technological 
infrastructure may be quite high, the benefits will increase as more firms adopt a quick 
connect capability. There are network externalities (Katz & Shapiro, 1986; Riggins, 
Kriebel, & Mukhopadhyay, 1994) in the adoption and diffusion of a quick connect 
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capability. The benefits of a quick connect capability (such as reduction of errors, 
increased efficiency through the elimination of re-entering data) are more often realized 
as more firms participate. Once a quick connect capability has been established it can be 
instantaneously activated. The net effect of standardization of communication and 
adopting quick connect capabilities is that the cost to maintain ties are lowered. 
Alternatively, for the same amount of resources more relationships can be sustained. 
Consequently, a firm can expand its network range (Reagans & McEvily, 2003) (its 
diversity of resources, assets, and information) by establishing new ties. Summarizing, 
quick connect capabilities make it easier to establish interfirm relationships. 
Third, modularization of products leads to an increased use of interfirm networks 
(Langlois & Robertson, 1992; Schilling, 2000; Schilling & Steensma, 2001; Sturgeon, 
2002). Modularization is breaking down a product in core blocks of functionality. 
Modular components do not have to be produced by a single firm but can be made by a 
network of firms. Schilling and Steensma (2001: 1151) define modularity as: 
 
Definition 5: modularity: “components can be disaggregated and recombined 
 into new configurations − possibly with new components − with little loss of 
 functionality”.  
 
Thus, modularity allows components to be produced separately and used 
interchangeably in different configurations without compromising system integrity.  
This allows for mixing and matching of components to create customized products. The 
design and production of modular products does not happen sequentially but rather 
concurrently and autonomously (Sanchez, 1995), possibly within a network of firms.  
The first consequence of adopting a modular product architecture is that it becomes 
possible for a firm to decide at a finer level of detail which components of a product it 
will produce itself and which components it will procure. Once a firm adopts a modular 
product architecture it can adjust its firm to mirror the creation and production of these 
components. Modularization of products increases the options to ally with other firms 
(Jacobides & Billinger, 2006). Furthermore, modularization does not only happen at the 
product level but also at the process and value chain level (Wolters, 2002). Therefore, the 
number of firms to choose from with whom to collaborate increases as modularization 
becomes increasingly more important (Brusoni, 2005). Summarizing, a firm will have a 
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more diverse set of firms to choose from when these firms modularize their products 
and processes. 
2.1.4 Summary: interfirm networks are driven by specialization and 
technology  
Thus far, we have been arguing that the emergence of interfirm networks is the 
result from increasing interdependencies between firms through specialization of firms 
within the value chain (Jacobides, 2005; Jacobides & Billinger, 2006) and the adoption of 
new technologies. Figure 2-1 summarizes the technological and specialization 
developments and illustrates how these developments have increased the use of interfirm 
networks. Both technology and specialization lead to an increased interdependence 
between firms. Firms use interfirm networks to manage the increased dependence.   
 
Figure 2-1 How technology and specialization drive the use of interfirm networks 
2.2 Why Bridging and Closed Positions Increase Firm 
Performance 
The interfirm network literature distinguishes different types of network 
positions. The most important network positions are the bridging or structural hole 
Specialization 
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position and the embedded or closure position. A firm occupies a “bridging position” 
when other firms must pass through this firm in order to reach each other. A dense or 
“closed position” is characterized by the existence of many alternative links to firms in 
the ego network. However, in order to understand the antecedents, effects, and processes 
of these two positions, we first need to introduce some basic terminology that underlies 
the structural embeddedness perspective that we use to study the relationship between 
network position and firm performance3,4.  
2.2.1 Introduction: structural embeddedness of network positions 
Organizational and IS scholars are increasingly emphasizing the importance of 
interfirm relationships as a valuable source of firm performance and competitive 
advantage (Barrett & Konsynski, 1982; Burt, 1992; 2000; 2005; Coleman, 1988; Koka & 
Prescott, 2002; Lin, 1999; Malhotra, Gosain, & El Sawy, 2005; Straub et al., 2004). The 
collection of interfirm relationships that a firm maintains is often referred to as a firm’s 
social capital (Maurer & Ebers, 2006). Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998: 243) define social 
capital as:  
 
Definition 6: social capital: “the sum of the actual and potential resources 
embedded within, available through, and derived from the network of 
relationships possessed by an individual or social unit”.  
 
The way a firm is embedded in the overall network of interfirm relationships, (i.e. 
network structure), determines its access, both realized and potential, to other resources. 
                                                 
3 How well a firm operates in a network can be measured at both the firm and network level. 
However, we focus in this study exclusively on performance measured at the firm level because a 
firm is not concerned with network performance as long as its own performance is consistent 
with its competitors or meets its aspiration level. Furthermore, none of the firms in a network is 
responsible for network performance; creating a bigger pie (i.e. increasing the network 
performance) is not a major concern if a firm cannot claim the additional created value (i.e. how is 
the pie going to be split). Finally, measuring network performance is an area of research in its 
infancy stage that makes it harder to operationalize.  
4 Although firm performance will not be an outcome we will directly study in the empirical 
chapters, it refers to ‘how well’ a firm is functioning. Often used measures include financial 
metrics such as return on income, return on assets, margin or market share; non-financial 
measures include patent count or more context specific metrics. See also Table 2-1 for an 
overview of firm performance indicators.  
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Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) distinguish three types of embeddedness of social capital: 
structural, relational and cognitive. Structural embeddedness refers to the quantity (direct 
and indirect relationships) and pattern of interfirm relationships (Granovetter, 1992). 
This perspective emphasizes how the structure of these relationships determines access 
to other firms in the network. The absence or existence of a relationship is important 
from a structural embeddedness perspective (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Relational 
embeddedness refers to the quality of interfirm relationships (Granovetter, 1992). In this 
perspective, the focus is on what actually flows through a relationship rather than the 
existence or absence of a relationship. Relational embeddedness focuses on trust, norms, 
frequency of interaction, and the type of information and resources exchanged. Cognitive 
embeddedness refers to the shared understanding, meaning, and interpretation that 
actors give to their environment. Cognitive embeddedness is a consequence of relational 
and structural embeddedness and is important because it focuses attention on specific 
events in the environment, gives meaning to clues and interprets information that is 
acquired from the environment (Baum, Shipilov, & Rowley, 2003). Although these three 
types of embeddedness are conceptually distinct, in practice they are interrelated.  
For the purpose of this study, the structural embeddedness perspective seems 
appropriate because network position is a structural dimension of networks. The 
structural embeddedness perspective belongs to social network analysis and focuses on 
the quantity and overall connections between firms but does not take into consideration 
the contents of relationships. The consequences of this limitation are that we do not 
‘open’ an interfirm relationship to study the actual contents of interfirm resource flows, 
nor do we investigate how an interfirm relationship is managed. Throughout this study, 
we will use some basic network terms, this section offers a starting vocabulary.  
 
Definition 7: focal firm:  the firm5 being analyzed.  
 
Definition 8: relationship: is a recurrent connection between two firms that can 
be used to transfer both tangible and intangible resources such as assets, 
knowledge, money, and information. Such a relationship can be managed by 
                                                 
5A firm that belongs to an interfirm network is also sometimes referred to as “party”, “actor”, or 
“node”. 
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either formal or informal agreements6. Relationships are also referred to as 
“links” or “ties”. 
 
Definition 9: alter firm: a firm with which the focal firm (definition 7) has a 
direct relationship. We will use alter firm and partner firm interchangeably.  
 
Definition 10: ego network: the network consisting of the focal firm and its 
partner firms, the relationships between the focal and the alter firms (definition 9) 
and relationships among the alter firms themselves.  
 
An indirect link means that two firms do not hold a direct relationship (a direct 
link without a passing node in-between) but have access to each other via other firms. 
We define “network structure” as follows (based on Wasserman & Faust, 1994: 20): 
 
Definition 11: network structure: the collection of actors and their relationships 
(definition 8) at any given point in time.  
 
The definition of network position is based on Burt (1980: 893): 
 
Definition 12: network position: the pattern of relations to and from an actor 
within a network structure (definition 11).  
 
The configuration of a firm’s interfirm relationship portfolio (i.e. how and to 
whom it is connected) determines its network position. The collection of network 
positions of the firms that constitute a network determines the network structure. The 
network position and the network structure determine the length of a path to other 
member firms, or nodes, of the network.  
                                                 
6 Our definition of relationship excludes personal relationships between individuals from different 
companies. Even though such relationships are used to exchange resources such as information, 
in an informal way, between companies and such relationships can be recurring, we do not 
consider these as an interfirm relationship. The reason is that the motive to establish this 
relationship was a personal one between two individuals. However, in theory, such a personal 
informal relationship can evolve into an interfirm relationship if there are appropriate business 
motives to do so.   
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This study restricts itself to discussing how bridging and closed network positions 
improve firm performance. Obviously, there are more types of network positions. 
Examples include the central position (Powell et al., 1996), a firm can quickly reach any 
firm in the network compared to a peripheral firm; the peripheral position (Borgatti & 
Everett, 1999), a firm has a high average distance to any other firm in the network; and, 
the structural equivalent position (Walker, Kogut, & Shan, 1997), a firm has a set of 
common relationships to other firms in the network. However, these positions are not 
grounded in a theory to explain why and when they matter for firm performance; 
therefore, these positions are outside the scope of this study. The implication of this 
restriction is that our findings may not generalize beyond the bridging position but we 
will address this issue in Chapter 7. In the next section we will show how bridging 
positions increase firm performance.  
2.2.2 How bridging positions increase firm performance 
One of the most frequently used theoretical lenses to explain firm performance 
from a network perspective is structural hole theory (Burt, 1992). Burt (1992) argues that 
a firm that has non-redundant ties will create information and control benefits. A non-
redundant tie is a link that when, removed from the ego network, breaks the ego network 
into two or more sub-networks (or components). A component is a part of the network 
that is unreachable from another component because there are no ties connecting the 
components. The lack of relationships between the partner firms of the focal firm gives 
the focal firm more discretion in its actions because partner firms cannot coordinate 
action against the focal firm. Non-redundant partner firms give access to new 
information and resources (McEvily & Zaheer, 1999). We define a structural hole (based 
on Burt, 1992: 18) as:   
 
Definition 13: structural hole: is the absence of a direct relationship between 
two firms who have a third firm in common and these two indirectly connected 
firms are (partially) dependent on each other.  
 
There is some conceptual ambiguity in the literature about what constitutes a 
structural hole. For example, Burt (1992: 18) refers to a structural hole as a non-
redundant tie that connects two actors. In this case, the focus is on the existence of the 
tie. However, the focus is sometimes on the absence of the tie between two indirectly 
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connected firms (1992: 38-43). The absence of a direct tie between two firms that are 
indirectly connected to each other is the structural hole. It is the bridging (or non-
redundant) tie (McEvily & Zaheer, 1999) that spans the structural hole. The structural 
hole contains potential information and control benefits, but the bridging tie unlocks 
these information and control benefits. See also Figure 2-2 for an illustration of these 
different concepts. For the purpose of this study, we define a bridging position and 
bridging tie (based on Friedkin, 1980: 411) as: 
 
Definition 14: bridging tie: the sole relationship by means of which two actors 
(and their direct contacts) are connected in a network. A bridging tie will also be 
referred to as a non-redundant tie.  
 
Definition 15: bridging position: a network position (definition 12) that is 
characterized mainly by bridging ties (definition 14). For example, the central 
node in a star network occupies a bridging position.  
 
When an insurance firm establishes a shared service center and opens it up for 
competitors to use it as well and multiple insurance firms use this shared service center 
then the insurance firm owning the shared service center is occupying a bridging 
position.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-2 Illustration bridging network position, structural hole and bridging ties 
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Character indicates firm. 
  
Firm A occupies a bridging network position 
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2.2.2.1 Bridging positions create information benefits  
Information benefits of a structural hole are access, timing and referrals (Burt, 
1992). Access refers to receiving valuable information and knowing who benefits from 
that information. Timing refers to receiving the valuable information before other firms 
do and thereby having the opportunity to act upon that information itself or pass it 
through to its partner firms. Referrals refer to partners of the focal firm who direct, 
concentrate, and legitimate information about the focal firm to other firms in the 
network. This makes the focal firm more attractive as an ally because partner firms 
legitimize the focal firm. 
Information benefits accrue to a firm spanning structural holes since this 
increases its network range (Reagans & McEvily, 2003). Network range is the diversity of 
firms that the focal firm connects with; a greater diversity means more information 
benefits because different firms are likely to have different information (Koka & 
Prescott, 2002). These information benefits allow a firm to increase its performance 
because the focal firm, which occupies a bridging position, is able to exploit the 
information asymmetry between its partner firms. Figure 2-2 illustrates how firm A 
benefits from the information asymmetry between firm B and firm G. Firm A knows 
what firm B and firm G know but also what they need while this is only partly true for 
firm B and firm G. Firm A has more information and a better understanding of how to 
benefit from this information. However, a firm will only benefit from this information 
when an important assumption in structural hole theory is satisfied. This assumes that 
information benefits of a structural hole only exist when the partner firms have unique 
information, i.e. they are non-substitutable for each other (Reagans & Zuckerman, 2006). 
A non-substitutable firm has unique information that the other firm does not possess. 
What the effect is of substitutable partners is the topic of the next section.  
2.2.2.2 Bridging positions create control benefits  
The control benefit is to execute the tertius gaudens strategy (Burt, 1992), or the 
third party who benefits. Control benefits accrue to a bridging firm if its partner firms 
cannot orchestrate collective action against the bridging firm. The lack of relationships 
between partner firms impedes the coordination of their actions. This gives the bridging 
firm the opportunity to play those firms off against each other. 
For example, suppose that firm B and firm G in Figure 2-2 are buyers for a 
product that only firm A sells. In that case, firm A can leverage its bargaining position to 
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negotiate favorable terms for a deal, because both buyers do not have alternatives and 
cannot coordinate their negotiations due to the  absence of a relationship between firm B 
and firm G. In this case, A can play the tertius gaudens strategy because firm B and G 
cannot coordinate their actions against A. Control benefits make a firm less constrained 
because the partner firms are not aware of each others' demands and cannot develop a 
coalition to counter balance the firm that spans the structural hole. An important 
assumption behind the control benefits of a structural hole is that the partner firms are 
substitutable for each other (Reagans & Zuckerman, 2006). Substitutable partner firms 
create control benefits for the focal firm but this comes at expense of foregoing the 
information benefits, while non-substitutable partner firms create information benefits 
but at the expense of control benefits. 
2.2.2.3 How information and control benefits increase firm performance 
Figure 2-3 illustrates how the information and control benefits lead to increased 
firm performance.  
Figure 2-3 How bridging positions increase a firm’s performance 
Benefits of a structural hole through  
occupying a bridging position 
+ Information benefits 
Access 
Referrals 
Timing 
+ Control benefits: 
Tertius gaudens 
+ Firm performance 
+ Information asymmetry 
between alters (assuming alters are 
non substitutable)  
+ Autonomy of the focal firm 
(assuming alters are substitutable) 
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Both the information and control benefits are based on the assumption that a 
firm is better off if it maximizes both the resource asymmetry and information 
asymmetry between its partner firms. 
2.2.3 How closed positions increase firm performance 
Network closure is a different method to improve firm performance (Coleman, 
1988). Networks with closure are networks in which many alter-alter relationships exist; 
i.e. such networks are dense because many potential relationships in fact exist and thus 
there are many direct links between the members of the network. Closure creates three 
benefits: 1. effective sanction mechanisms; 2. shared mental maps; and 3. reputation 
effects. We will first define network closure more formally and continue with reviewing 
the effects of network closure. Coleman (1988) does not give an explicit definition of 
closure, but closure refers to a situation where information about behavior is easily 
transmitted because there are many relationships between the alters of the focal firm. As 
the number of relationships increases, the likelihood that a single relationship becomes 
the critical path determining whether information can freely circulate diminishes. For the 
purpose of this study, we define network closure and closed position as:  
 
Definition 16: network closure: when the ego network (definition 10) of the 
focal firm consists of at least two partner firms and a minimum of two partner 
firms can be reached through at least two different paths through the ego 
network.  
 
Thus, relationships in an ego network with closure are redundant: removing these 
relationships will not result in the creation of one or more components of the ego 
network.  
 
Definition 17: closed position: a network position (definition 12) that is mainly 
characterized by network closure (definition 16).  
 
A path is a sequence of actors connected to each other with each actor only used 
once (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Our definition of network closure differs from a 
clique. A clique is a maximum complete sub graph (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002). 
This means that the density of a clique is one, thus all potential relationships exist. A 
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clique will automatically have network closure while network closure does not 
automatically imply a clique. Thus, a clique is an example of a pure closed network 
position. See Figure 2-4 for an illustration of the difference between network closure and 
a clique.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-4 Illustration of network closure and a clique 
Not all alters have to be reachable through two different paths: the alters that are 
not reachable through two different paths are not part of the closed network position 
(for example the triad of firm A, C and E does not have network closure in the picture 
left). A firm with an ego network characterized by network closure occupies a closed 
network position. A complete closed network position is the situation where a firm 
belongs to a clique. Figure 2-5 is an illustration of a closed network position. The ego 
network of firm H consists of three partner firms A, E, and G: each of these firms is 
connected to one another as well. Each firm in H’s ego network is reachable through at 
least two different paths. For example, firm A can reach firm E directly, through H or 
through G. 
Closed network positions exists because of the existence of alter – alter 
relationships while bridging positions exist due to the lack of alter – alter relationships. 
These two positions represent the two extremes on a continuum of the density of an ego 
network. A sparse ego network is an indicator for a bridging position while a dense ego 
network is an indicator for a closed position.  
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2.2.3.1 Closed positions create an effective sanctioning mechanism 
The literature on network closure identifies three benefits. The first benefit of 
network closure is that such networks are better able in effective sanctioning (Coleman, 
1988). Free rider problems are less likely to happen in a network with closure because 
firms will be quickly aware of a firm that shirks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-5 Illustration of a closed network position and network closure  
The reason is that many alternative links exist between the various firms and if 
one of the firms shirks then information about the shirking firm will quickly transmit 
through the network. Moreover, these firms can act jointly against the shirking firm. 
Therefore, being able to sanction effectively increase the trustworthiness of firms and 
therefore it is possible to lower transaction costs and create a more efficient coordination 
mechanism that facilitates cooperation. 
2.2.3.2 Closed positions facilitate shared understanding 
The second benefit is that networks with closure are better equipped to reinforce 
shared values (Coleman, 1988) by reducing cognitive distance of the actors through the 
creation of shared mental maps and shared behavioral expectations (Rowley, 1997). 
These shared mental maps facilitate the transfer of tacit or complex knowledge (Hansen, 
1999) and strengthen interorganizational trust. Networks with closure are often 
characterized by frequent interactions because of the existence of many relationships 
between the firms. Frequent interactions increase the richness of communication and 
these rich interactions foster a shared understanding of goals, expectations, and 
behaviors.  
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2.2.3.3 Closed positions create an effective reputation mechanism  
Third benefit: network closure influences a firm’s reputation. Information about 
the behavior of a firm is quickly transmitted through the network. When a firm shirks, 
acts opportunistic or violates the shared expectations in another way then other firms will 
be quickly aware of these facts because information flows easily through a dense network 
because no actor or firm is able to control the flow of information. This will harm the 
reputation of the firm that committed these acts because it has a hard time hiding its 
behavior. The subsequent reputation damage will make such a firm a less attractive 
network partner and therefore is network closure an effective reputation mechanism 
because it increases the shadow of the future (Axelrod, 1984).  
2.2.3.4 How effective sanctioning, shared understanding and effective reputation mechanism 
increase firm performance 
These three network closure benefits (ability to sanction effectively, shared 
mental maps and reputation) are based on reduced information asymmetry between the 
firms through multiple paths in the network. The consequences of the these benefits are 
that it reduces alter-centric uncertainty (Podolny, 2001) as well as opportunistic behavior. 
Alter-centric uncertainty is uncertainty that the focal firm has about the intentions, 
behaviors and performance of its alters (Podolny, 2001). Alter-centric uncertainty is 
reduced because information about firm behavior flows freer through the network and 
hence firms are more aware of each other’s actions. Firms with closed network positions 
have multiple sources to acquire information about a firm and this gives more credibility 
to the information and increases the probability of receiving that information. The effect 
of having multiple sources to acquire information about a firm is that a firm’s behavior 
becomes more transparent and this reduces alter-centric uncertainty. Less alter-centric 
uncertainty creates an environment that is more conducive to sharing of information. 
Opportunism is reduced because the penalties for such behavior become too 
large in the form of effective sanctions and costs of lost of reputation. Because firms 
occupying a closed network position generally cooperate for a longer period with each 
other (see section 2.2.4.2) there is a longer ‘shadow of the future’ (Axelrod, 1984) that 
prevents firms from behaving opportunistic. Interorganizational trust and interfirm 
information transfer increase through the reduction of alter-centric uncertainty and 
smaller chances of opportunistic behavior. Subsequently, increases of interorganizational 
trust reduce interfirm coordination costs (Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998). Finally, 
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increased information transfer and a reduction of interfirm coordination costs increase a 
firms’ performance.    
 
Figure 2-6 How closed network positions increase firm performance 
2.2.3.5 Previous findings of bridging and closed positions on firm performance 
We conclude the section on the relationship between the bridging and closed 
network position and firm performance with an overview of research that has 
investigated this relationship.  
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Study Industry Performance 
measure 
Network position 
(measure used) 
Finding 
Ahuja (2000a) Chemicals Patent count Bridging position 
(effective size measure) 
Negative 
Bae & Gargiulo 
(2004) 
Tele-
communication 
Return on investment 
Return on assets 
Bridging position 
(ego density measure) 
Positive 
Positive 
Baum, Calabrese and 
Silverman (2000) 
Biotechnology Revenue 
Growth patent rate 
Growth R&D 
expenses 
Bridging position 
(efficiency measure) 
Positive 
Positive 
Positive 
Baum, van Liere and 
Rowley (2006) 
Investment 
banking 
Market share Bridging position 
(effective size) 
Closed position 
(ego density measure) 
Positive 
 
Positive 
Echols and Tsai 
(2005) 
Venture capital Number of successful 
IPO’s 
Bridging position 
(effective size measure) 
Positive 
Gnyawali, He & 
Madhavan (2006) 
Steel  Competitive activity 
Competitive variety 
Bridging position 
(inverse constraint 
measure) 
Positive 
Positive 
McEvily and Zaheer 
(1999) 
Regional industrial 
extension centers 
Access to capabilities Bridging position 
(ego density) 
Positive 
Rowley, Behrens and 
Krackhardt (2000) 
Steel and 
semiconductor 
Return on assets Closed position 
(density) 
Negative 
Rowley and Baum 
(2002) 
Investment 
banking 
Market share Bridging position 
(effective size measure) 
Positive 
Rowley and Baum 
(2004) 
Investment bank Market share Bridging position 
(effective size) 
Positive 
Shipilov (2006) Investment bank  Market share Bridging position 
(efficiency measure) 
Positive 
Soda, Usai & Zaheer 
(2004) 
Television 
productions 
Number of viewers 
(log) 
Bridging position 
(constraint measure) 
Closed position 
(density measure) 
Positive 
 
Negative 
Walker, Kogut & 
Shan (1997) 
Biotechnology Establishing a new 
interfirm relationship 
Bridging position 
(structural equivalence 
measure) 
Negative 
Zaheer and Bell 
(2005) 
Mutual fund 
industry 
Market share Bridging position 
(constraint measure) 
Closed position 
(constraint measure) 
Positive 
 
Negative 
Table 2-1 Overview research link between network position and firm performance 
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The conclusion of this table (Table 2-1) is that bridging positions have often been 
found to increase firm performance in transaction type networks like investment 
banking. These findings are robust across different industries using different 
performance measures. 
2.2.4 Differences between bridging and closed positions 
Both structural hole and closure theory have the ego network as the unit of 
analysis. Structural hole theory emphasizes the importance of the lack of alter – alter 
relationships in the ego network while closure theory emphasizes the importance of the 
existence of alter – alter relationships in the ego network. Thus, both structural hole and 
closure theory focus on alter – alter relationships but emphasize either the existence or 
lack of these alter – alter relationships. This section will discuss how bridging and closed 
positions differ in terms of value creation mechanisms, emergence of the position and 
boundary conditions.  
2.2.4.1 Value creation mechanisms: information asymmetry vs. information symmetry 
The first important difference between a bridging and closed network position is 
that information asymmetry in a closed network position is low compared with a 
bridging position. Multiple paths in the ego network facilitate increased diffusion of 
information. This means that none of the firms has complete control of the information 
flow in a network and hence cannot / will not prevent the transfer of information. This 
is in contrast with the bridging position in which a firm is able to control (to a certain 
extent) the flow of information. Asymmetry of information about behavior, 
opportunities (referrals) and access to knowledge is likely to be small because a closed 
position facilitates the communication flow. Furthermore, a closed position eases 
information transfers due to the existence of multiple paths in the ego network and 
hence reduces the probability that a firm stays unaware of specific information and 
increases the trustworthiness of firms because firm behavior is more transparent and 
sanctions are more effective. The coordination costs and the probability that a firm 
behaves in an opportunistic way will decrease as the effectiveness of these mechanisms 
increases. It becomes unfeasible for the focal firm to execute a tertius gaudens strategy 
because the partner firms are well connected. Their well-connectedness gives the partner 
firms the opportunity to coordinate their actions against the focal firm that tries to play 
them off against each other. A firm occupying a bridging position is more likely to 
maintain the information asymmetry to strengthen its information and control benefits. 
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In contrast, a firm occupying a closed position is more likely to reduce the information 
asymmetry in order to increase the effectiveness the reputation and sanction 
mechanisms.  
A firm occupying a bridging position creates value in two distinct ways. First, it 
moves information strategically from one firm to another firm and is able to control this 
information flow. Such a position creates the most value by maximizing the information 
asymmetry between the alter firms. As the information asymmetry between partner firms 
increases there will be a greater need for a broker to orchestrate the information flow. 
This assumes that partner firms are heterogeneous: each firm possesses information that 
the partner firms do not have but each firm would benefit from having it (Reagans & 
Zuckerman, 2006).  
Second, a firm occupying a bridging position holds a stronger bargaining position 
when it acts as a buyer and has unconnected suppliers. The suppliers are not able to 
coordinate their negotiations because of the information asymmetry between them, and 
the bridging firm is able to execute the tertius gaudens strategy to obtain a deal with 
favorable terms. 
2.2.4.2 Emergence of network positions: partner dependence vs. resource dependence 
The second difference between bridging and closed network positions concerns 
the emergence of such networks. Closed network positions take more time to develop 
and the success of a closed network position is highly dependent on the partnering 
actions from the partner firms. Spanning of structural holes is a property of an individual 
firm, but closure is a network property not attributable to one single firm. A closed 
network position exists because there are many alter – alter relationships. Such a network 
position is not quickly established (Soda et al., 2004). More frequently it is the 
consequence of a complex partnering process due to the fact that firms, in order to 
search locally and to avoid uncertainty (Cyert & March, 1963), tend to partner with past 
partners (Gulati, 1995a) or with new partners through referrals (Uzzi, 1996). This means 
that firms tend to ally with firms that can be reached in two steps or less (Baum, Rowley, 
Shipilov, & Chuang, 2005). These two processes lead to the creation of cliques within the 
network (Rowley, Baum, Shipilov, Greve, & Rao, 2004; Rowley, Greve, Rao, Baum, & 
Shipilov, 2005) and therefore it takes time for a closed network position to develop 
because it is dependent on the partnering decisions by its partner firms. An example of 
this process is illustrated in Figure 2-7: 
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1. The network starts with two dyads and one isolate in panel 1 of Figure 2-7 
2. Next, firm A establishes a tie with firm C (panel 2). 
3. In panel 3 firm A introduces firm C to firm B and thereby legitimizes firm C 
 and firm B connects with firm C. In essence, firm A is acting as the tertius 
 iungens, the third who joins (Obstfeld, 2005).  
4. The two separate clusters (cluster A-B-C and cluster D-E) are joined in step 
 four by firm C who establishes a bridging tie with firm D.  
5. Next (panel 5) firm C introduces firm D to firm A and firm D connects with 
 firm A.  
6. Finally, in panel 6, firm D and firm B connect to each other and firm E 
 connects to firm C. Hence, the initial ties of the focal firm are an important 
 determinant of future ties for as long as the focal firm continues establishing 
 local ties based on past partners and referrals.  
Figure 2-7 Emergence of a closed network position through past and referral partnering 
Consequently, it takes time for firm A to develop a closed network position 
because it is partly dependent on the partnering actions of its alters. It is more likely that 
a firm with a closed position aims at stimulating the creation of redundant ties in order to 
strengthen the sanction mechanism and the reputation mechanism. In contrast, a 
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bridging firm is more likely to find new firms to link with that offer new and 
complementary resources.  
A different strategy is to build a bridging network position. Such a network 
position is not dependent on the actions of partner firms. However, maintaining such a 
position is dependent on the partnering actions of partner firms. Partnering decisions of 
alter firms can possibly weaken the bridging position of the focal firm. Establishing a 
bridging tie is the decision of two firms that are directly linked: the focal firm and the 
new partner firm. Being able to find new partners - and link with them - is influenced by 
two important factors: the attractiveness of the focal firm and the information the focal 
firm has about the network to locate brokerage opportunities. A focal firm will be more 
attractive when it possess or has access to valuable resources that are needed by other 
firms in the network. If this is the case, there will be a clear incentive for the new firm to 
link with the focal firm. Thus, a firm trying to create a bridging position is dependent on 
two factors: first it needs to have valuable resources to make it an attractive partner 
(Ahuja, 2000b), second it needs information about the network to be able to locate future 
partner firms.  
2.2.4.3 Boundary conditions: transaction vs. knowledge intensive network contexts 
The third difference between bridging and closed positions is concerned with the 
boundary conditions of each position. Recent research suggests that there are empirical 
settings that do not favor spanning of structural holes. Burt (1992) assumed that the 
information and control benefits are conceptually distinct but that these benefits 
strengthen each other. Burt puts it as follows: (1992: 48) “The information and control 
benefits are multiplicative, augmenting and depending on one another, together emerging 
from the wellspring of structural holes in a network”.  
However, Reagans and Zuckerman (2006) argue that these two benefits make 
conflicting assumptions about the characteristics (homogenous vs. heterogeneous) of the 
partner firms. Information benefits can only accrue to the bridging firm if its partner 
firms are heterogeneous while the control benefits can only accrue to the bridging firm 
its partner firms are homogeneous. These two implicitly different assumptions may have 
been the cause that structural holes have been found to impact innovation negatively 
(Walker et al., 1997). Sometimes it is more beneficial to reduce information asymmetry. 
 For example, innovation is typically achieved by applying knowledge from one 
context in a new context (Hargadon & Sutton, 1997): this is achieved by way of sharing 
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of knowledge. Sharing resources, information, and knowledge becomes a key process for 
the output rate of new products or innovations. Bridging positions in these types of 
environments will result in bottlenecks that adversely affect performance:  The flow of 
information is easily distorted due to the lack of alternative routes through the network. 
Therefore, some studies suggest that structural holes influence innovation negatively 
(Ahuja, 2000a; Walker et al., 1997). Walker et al. (1997), Ahuja (2000a) and Obstfeld 
(2005) suggest that occupying a bridging position in a knowledge intensive context has 
detrimental consequences for firm performance (measured as innovation output). Walker 
et al. (1997) suggest that spanning structural holes is probably most beneficial in 
transaction networks. Transaction networks are networks that focus on the production 
or acquisition of a good or service. Examples of transaction networks include investment 
syndicate networks (Pollock, Porac, & Wade, 2004) and vertical networks (Dyer, 1996; 
Lorenzoni & Lipparini, 1999). The remainder of this study will focus on transaction 
networks. Table 2-2 summarizes the differences between bridging and closed network 
positions.  
 Bridging position Closed position 
Value creation mechanism Information asymmetry Information symmetry 
Emergence of the position Resource dependence Path dependence 
Boundary conditions Transaction networks Knowledge intensive networks 
Table 2-2 Summary of the differences between bridging and closed positions 
So far, we have reviewed the benefits of bridging and closed positions and we 
have discussed how they differ. These positions are an important means to improve a 
firm’s performance and therefore it is important to understand how these positions 
emerge, why these positions last, and why these positions eventually may disappear. 
Therefore, we will discuss the literature on the dynamics of network positions in the next 
section.  
2.3 Dynamics of Network Positions at the Firm Level 
How do firms create and sustain a bridging or closed network position? This 
section reviews how firms improve their network position through partnering decisions - 
and how these decisions are being influenced, or constrained, by network structures. A 
firm can change its network position through two different types of actions: it can 
establish a new relationship or it can disband an existing relationship (Koka, Madhavan, 
& Prescott, 2006). The literature about network change emphasizes that interfirm 
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networks are dynamic (Koka et al., 2006; Moldoveanu et al., 2003; Powell et al., 1996; 
Powell, White, Koput, & Owen-Smith, 2005). Network positions change because firms 
in a network decide to establish new ties or disband current relationships to improve 
their current position (Madhavan et al., 1998; Rowley & Baum, 2002). Firms expand their 
network by creating new interorganizational ties and disbanding old ones. However, 
there is also ample evidence that interfirm networks are characterized by stability (Rowley 
et al., 2005), also referred to as “network inertia” (Kim, Oh, & Swaminathan, 2006). 
Therefore, we review both drivers of change and forces of inertia. Furthermore, scholars 
suggest different motivations for changes in network positions at different levels: 
environmental (Koka et al., 2006), relational (Rowley & Baum, 2002), firm (Shipilov, 
Rowley, & Aharonson, 2006), and cognitive (Baum et al., 2005). Hence, we will 
categorize the motivation to change as well.  
2.3.1 Environmental drivers of network position change 
Madhavan et al. (1998) argue that there are two types of exogenous shocks in a 
firm’s environment: structure loosening and structure reinforcing events. Structure 
loosening events are initiated by peripheral firms and have a negative impact on the 
current network position of the core firms. For example, Google entering the Internet 
search industry was a structure-loosening event because the introduction of a new 
superior search technology made incumbent Internet search firms less attractive and 
Google an attractive alliance partner. Structure reinforcing events are events initiated by 
the current dominant firms to protect or expand their current network position at the 
expense of peripheral firms. Madhavan et al. (1998) present in their empirical study of 
the U.S. alliance industry two exogenous developments: the combined introduction of a 
new production technology and deregulation of institutional barriers to cooperate 
changed the alliance network. The introduction of a new production technology was a 
structure-loosening event that gave peripheral firms the opportunity to improve their 
network positions while the deregulatory changes favored the dominant firms in 
protecting their network positions. These examples are exogenous shocks in the 
environment and do not find their origin in the network itself.    
2.3.2 Relational drivers of network position change 
Resource misfit can occur when partner firms no longer require the resources for 
which they established their relationship in the first place because the need for a 
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particular resource diminishes. This could happen as a partner firm enters a new phase in 
its life cycle (Hite & Hesterly, 2001). For example, in their study of client – auditor 
relationships, Levinthal and Fichman (1988) show that as a client firm matures, its 
specific needs from its auditor change as well. These changing resource needs lead to a 
resource misfit. The auditor cannot offer the services of the client firm and hence the 
client decides to search for another auditor. 
2.3.3 Structural drivers of network position change 
The first structural motivation for network position change is firm-specific 
uncertainty. Firm-specific uncertainty is uncertainty unique to a firm and not in common 
with other firms. Firms establish new ties with firms to alleviate this type of uncertainty 
because these new firms are a source of information through experience or knowledge 
(Beckman, Haunschild, & Phillips, 2004). For example, a firm can collaborate with 
another firm that has experience in entering a particular market, or has experience in 
marketing a particular product. The focal firm can benefit from the experience and 
knowledge of the new partner (Beckman & Haunschild, 2002). 
A second structural cause for a shift in a firm’s network position are the 
partnering decisions of competitors. A firm entering an alliance is likely to benefit from 
the access to new resources, markets, and information. The benefit the focal firm is 
generating from an alliance is likely to affect negatively a competitor (Silverman & Baum, 
2002). For example, resources become scarcer or competition increases. Thus, the 
partnering action of the focal firm is likely to be responded by a partnering action of a 
competitor to defend its own competitive advantage (Gimeno, 2004). This sequence of 
partnering decisions is likely to continue as competitors respond to each others moves 
(Chen, 1996; Gulati, 1998). Concluding, the partnering actions of a competitor may force 
the focal firm to respond by initiating new interfirm relationships to offset the potential 
advantages of the relationship the competitor established.    
2.3.4 Cognitive drivers of network position change 
A cognitive motivation for a firm to shift its network position is its aspiration 
level. As companies engage in monitoring of competitors, they compare differences in 
firm performance. Baum et al. (2005) show that companies whose performance is 
significantly below or above their own aspiration level will engage in establishing non-
local ties. A firm initiating a new tie to a firm that it could not reach in fewer than two 
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steps before the tie was established is called a non-local tie. The rationale is that firms 
performing above their set aspiration level have excess resources to allow for 
experimentation. Hence, firms with additional resources can afford establishing a non-
local tie from which the pay-off is uncertain. The alternative explanation why a firm will 
establish a non-local tie is when a firm performs below its aspiration level. In these cases, 
there will be pressure from stakeholders to improve performance. Alternative paths to 
improve performance have to be explored. Establishing a non-local tie is a means to 
explore and to access new information and resources that can be used to improve 
performance.  
2.4 Inertia of Network Positions at the Firm Level 
Interfirm network research implicitly adopts an adaptation view on interfirm 
network change (Kim et al., 2006) assuming that firms will conduct a cost - benefit 
analysis of interorganizational ties:  If the economic benefits of the tie do not outweigh 
the costs then the tie will be disbanded. However, such an instrumental view may be too 
stylistic on how firms shift their network positions. It may ignore the inertial nature of 
firms and their difficulties to adapt to their environment. Network inertia is defined as 
(Kim et al., 2006: 704): “a persistent organizational resistance to changing inter-
organizational dyadic ties or difficulties that a firm faces when it attempts to dissolve old 
relationships and form new network ties”. Potential causes for network position inertia 
are: environmental, relational, structural, and cognitive (Maurer & Ebers, 2006). Each 
category (environment, relational inertia, structural inertia, and cognitive inertia) has 
distinct motivations identified in literature.  
2.4.1 Environmental forces of network position inertia 
A firm can become network inert from an environmental perspective when it 
deals with high levels of market uncertainty. Market uncertainty is uncertainty that is 
common to all the firms from the same industry (Beckman et al., 2004). Examples 
include (changes in) customer demand, competitive uncertainty and input cost 
uncertainty (Beckman et al., 2004). Beckman et al. (2004) argue that depending on the 
type of uncertainty a firm faces, it will initiate different actions to cope with this 
uncertainty. Firms facing high levels of market uncertainty will strengthen their current 
interfirm relationships. The motive is that market uncertainty is external to the firm and 
shared across all the firms within the same industry. There are no information sources 
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available within the industry that would lessen the market uncertainty and therefore a 
firm will not benefit from establishing new interfirm relationships. Firms seek stability to 
cope with market uncertainty by reinforcing existing relationships because interfirm trust 
has been established (Gulati, 1995a) and a firm is less uncertain about the behavior of its 
past partners.  
2.4.2 Relational forces of network position inertia 
The first account of a relational inert explanation why firms do not change their 
network positions is because significant amounts of resources have been invested in 
partner specific assets (Dyer, 1996; Dyer & Singh, 1998; Gimeno, 2004). Partner specific 
or co-specialized assets are assets that are developed through mutual investment with the 
sole purpose of being used in that particular relationship. Such assets are, for example, 
interorganizational information systems (Bensaou, 1997), joint development facilities or 
joint manufacturing facilities (Santoro & McGill, 2005). There are two effects of this type 
of investments. One, these assets create a lock-in effect in a relationship because of the 
sunk costs and high switching costs that are associated with the development of these 
assets. Investments in partner specific assets will result in procedures that facilitate 
information and knowledge exchange (Santoro & McGill, 2005). Second, over time, these 
procedures will become more institutionalized and hence harder to change. Both the 
costs of partner specific investments and the institutionalization of partner specific 
investments reduce the likelihood that a firm will shift its network position.  
A second explanation of relational inertia is offered by Levinthal and Fichman 
and Fichman and Levinthal (1991; 1988) who show in their studies of auditor-client 
relationships that interorganizational relationships are characterized by a ‘honey-moon’ 
period. At the start of an interorganizational relationship, there is a stock of goodwill and 
resources that make it less likely that one of the firms will terminate the relationship. 
After the honeymoon period, when firms run out of the initial stock of goodwill and 
resources, they enter a period of ‘adolescence’ that is characterized by an increased 
probability of the termination of the interorganizational relationship. The probability that 
one of firms terminates the relationship increases because both firms have learned the 
benefits of the relationship and have a more objective assessment of the success (or lack 
of success) of the relationship. This objective assessment in combination with depletion 
of the initial stock of resources increase the probability that one of the firms will start 
looking for a more suitable partner and hence terminate the current relationship.  
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2.4.3 Structural forces of network position inertia 
Overembeddedness is the situation in which a firm does not have any arm’s 
length or market relationships but only strong and embedded ties. Uzzi (1997) argues 
that the mix of arm’s length and embedded ties is important for a firm’s performance.  
A firm whose portfolio of relationships only exists of arm’s length relationships is more 
likely to experience opportunistic behavior because the firm does not have ex post social 
safeguard mechanisms like a reputation mechanism to prevent such unwanted behavior. 
On the other hand, a relationship portfolio that only consists of embedded ties results in 
overembeddedness (Uzzi, 1997). Overembeddedness causes high dependence on the 
partner firms that in turn decreases access to new and novel information because there 
are no links to other firms outside the ego network of the focal firm. High dependence 
can even result in social obligations becoming more important than the economic 
rationale of the relationship in the first place. These social obligations can result in 
helping out struggling firms which in the end will hurt the helping firm (Uzzi, 1997). 
These strong social obligations and the tendency to focus exclusively on the current 
partner firms increase the likelihood that the focal firm will stick to its current position 
and not look for new partners.  
2.4.4 Cognitive forces of network position inertia 
The institutionalization of a relationship is a cognitive explanation of network 
position inertia. Because partnerships worked in the past, there is little incentive to 
change them. Recurring partnerships increase interfirm trust (Gulati, 1995a), reduce 
behavioral uncertainty (Gulati, 1995b) and create mutual dependence (Holm, Eriksson, & 
Johanson, 1999). The lack of incentives, coupled with the institutionalization of 
partnerships (Osborn & Hagedoorn, 1997) makes it harder to terminate an 
interorganizational relationship: path-dependent processes create lock-in effects and may 
damage the reliability of the firm that severs the relationship.  This lock-in effect and the 
possible reputation damage that may accrue by terminating the relationship prevent a 
firm to search for new partner firms and therefore to stay with its current partner firms.  
A second explanation of cognitive inertia is the existence of shared mental maps. 
Repeated interaction with the same set of partners leads to a shared understanding of the 
environment through the formation of shared mental maps (Rowley et al., 2000). The 
same information about events and developments in the environment is shared:  There is 
a tendency that firms interpret this information similarly (Porac, Thomas, Wilson, Paton, 
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& Kanfer, 1995). Deviating from these shared mental maps may lead to losing legitimacy 
and therefore firms are more likely to stay with the current situation rather than changing 
it.   
A third explanation of cognitive inertia is that a firm is concerned about its 
reputation. The final cause why a firm might not shift its network position is due to loss 
of reputation. Dissolving a relationship with high investments in partner specific assets 
(Williamson, 1975) might signal untrustworthiness or opportunistic behavior to potential 
future partners who in turn will be less inclined to partner with the firm that has 
dissolved the asset intensive relationship. Acting in opportunistic way in a network is 
likely to have reputation effects because of the ease with which information about this 
behavior propagates through the network. A reputation mechanism acts as a voluntary 
restriction on a firm’s behavior. The reputation costs may outweigh the benefits of acting 
opportunistically. This is in contrast with overembeddedness that can be viewed as 
becoming too loyal to a small set of firm and thereby voluntary restricting behavior not 
to jeopardize loyalty.  
2.5 Dynamics of Network Positions at the Network Level  
The previous section discusses the willingness of a firm to change its network 
position. However, even if a firm wants to change, its ability to effect a change in its 
network position is restricted by the structure of the network, i.e. the links (relationships) 
that are close to the firm in question. In the previous section, we focused on the network 
position of the focal firm and reviewed factors that contribute to change or inertia. We 
move our focus from the network position to the network structure as dependent 
variable in this section. This section takes a closer look at some of the network level 
formation processes: how do network structures emerge and how does the emergence 
and evolution of network structures impact the network positions of firms? There are 
two possible consequences that a network formation process can have on the individual 
network position of a firm: 1) the network formation process reinforces current network 
positions or 2) the network formation process weakens current network positions 
(Madhavan et al., 1998). It is important to consider the dominant network formation 
logic because the network formation process has repercussion for the strengthening or 
weakening of network positions. Before we address the different network formation 
processes, we first introduce the concept of network topology, which are “similar” 
network structures, and describe briefly their characteristics. 
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Definition 18: network topology: a family of network structures (definition 11) 
with similar structural properties.  
 
Similar means that network structure properties, such as the degree distribution 
or centralization or average path length, are comparable. A specific network structure can 
be categorized as belonging to a network topology. Well known network topologies are 
“small world” (Milgram, 1967; Watts, 1999), “scale free” (Barabási & Albert, 1999), “core 
/ periphery” (Borgatti & Everett, 1999) and “random graphs” (Erdős & Rényi, 1960a). A 
small world network is characterized by simultaneously high clustering (the presence of 
cliques) and short average path lengths. Cliques are maximally connected sub graphs 
(Borgatti et al., 2002). Scale free networks have a degree distribution that is characterized 
by a power law. The degree distribution of a network is the probability distribution of 
nodal degrees in a network. Due to the power law of the degree distribution is a scale 
free network characterized by a small number of nodes that act as hubs with a 
disproportionate share of the relationships while the majority of the nodes have few 
relationships. A random graph is a network in which each node has the same probability 
of having n relationships. The degree distribution in such a network approximates a 
uniform distribution, which is in contrast with a scale free network. A core / periphery 
structure is a network that can be partitioned in two parts: a set of highly connected 
nodes that form the core of the network and the periphery of the network. Peripheral 
nodes have some ties to the core, but peripheral nodes are weakly connected among 
other peripheral nodes.  
2.5.1 Small worlds and random rewiring  
It has often been observed that two seemingly unrelated actors can reach each 
other in surprisingly few steps. Such networks are often referred to as small worlds 
(Milgram, 1967; Watts, 1999). Watts’ small world (1999) is created by starting with an 
initial network structure in which each node is connected to its neighbors and its 
neighbors’ neighbors and has the shape of a donut. Subsequently, a fraction of the ties is 
randomly rewired creating bridging ties that significantly reduce the average path length. 
The result is a network structure that exhibits both clustering and short average paths. 
Small worlds have often been observed in empirical networks (Baum et al., 2003; Kogut 
& Walker, 2001; Uzzi & Spiro, 2005). The local clustering and short average path length 
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make these network structures effective because they offer both the benefits from 
structural holes and closure and have a positive impact on financial performance (Baum 
et al., 2006; Uzzi & Spiro, 2005).   
2.5.2 Small worlds and insurgent vs. control partnering  
Baum et al. (2003) suggest two network formation mechanisms as alternatives for 
random rewiring. These two mechanisms are insurgent partnering and control partnering. 
Insurgent partnering is a process by which peripheral firms improve their network 
position through pursuing competitive information strategies (Moldoveanu et al., 2003) 
that aim at leveraging the information asymmetry between peripheral and core firms. 
Peripheral firms can shift their network position by exploiting the information 
asymmetry between the core firms, who generally are part of cliques with closed 
positions, and the peripheral firms’ access to new and diverse information. Hence, they 
have access to valuable information that the core firms need and therefore are able to 
make the bridging ties that reduce the average path length in the network: this creates 
“small world” properties.  
Control partnering is a homophilious argument (“birds of a feather flock 
together”) stating that firms with similar attributes such as status (Podolny, 1993), are 
more likely to partner with each other. Peripheral firms that do not possess similar 
attributes are less desirable network partners and have more difficulty in shifting their 
network position. The core firm has more discretion in selecting the partner firms and 
therefore is more able to establish the bridging ties that connect the different cliques. 
Peripheral firms are responsible in the insurgent scenario for creating the small world; 
these firms initiate the bridging ties in order to improve their network position. Baum et 
al. (2003) state that all three scenario’s, random rewiring, insurgent partnering and control 
partnering play a role in the evolution of an interfirm network: they believe that the main 
question is which scenario dominates at a particular point of time.  
2.5.3 Scale free networks and preferential attachment 
An often-cited network formation mechanism is preferential attachment 
(Barabási & Albert, 1999). Preferential attachment (Barabási & Albert, 1999) or 
accumulative advantage (Powell et al., 2005) is based on the idea that as networks grow, 
new nodes have a predisposition to connect with the node with the highest degree 
centrality. This leads to the formation of a few large hubs and the other nodes having a 
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limited number of links. This is commonly referred to as a scale free degree distribution. 
 Preferential attachment has been proposed to explain the existence of scale free 
networks. A scale free network has a highly skewed degree distribution in contrast with a 
random graph where the degree is uniformly distributed; each node has the same 
probability of maintaining links with n firms. This mechanism implicitly assumes that 
each node is fully aware of the network structure and the creation of a tie has marginal 
costs of – or close to - zero. Although this mechanism does create a scale free network, it 
is not clear whether the causal mechanism is applicable to other contexts where there are 
costs associated with the creation of ties.  
2.5.4 Follow-the-trend 
The follow-the-trend network formation mechanism suggests that firms will 
mimic other firms when partnering with new firms and deciding what type of 
relationships they should maintain (Haunschild, 1993; Powell et al., 2005). Thus, a firm 
entering a network and behaving according to the follow-the-trend mechanism will 
partner with other firms according to the dominant logic of the network. It will choose 
the same firms and same type of relationships as other firms do. For example, if the 
dominant logic is to be part of a clique then this mechanism predicts that the new firm 
will try to join a clique as soon as possible. Firms adhering to a dominant logic will 
legitimize themselves because they signal to the incumbent firms that they know ‘how 
things work’.  
2.5.5 Past and referral partnering 
The final network formation mechanism we describe is past and referral 
partnering (Gulati, 1995a; Uzzi, 1996). Past and referral partnering reflects risk-adverse 
behavior by firms in their partner selection process. Partner selection is surrounded with 
uncertainty, for example Shipilov et al. (2006) distinguish three types of uncertainty: 
partner capability uncertainty, partner competitiveness uncertainty, and partner reliability 
uncertainty. A firm is more likely to continue a relationship with a current partner to 
mitigate these concerns about potential partners. Referral partnering is the process when 
a firm introduces a current network partner to another network partner and these two 
unconnected firms establish a relationship. Such behavior in effect closes a structural 
hole. Past and referral partnering reinforce the current network structure and lead to 
dense cliques.  
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2.6 Critique on the Literature of Network Position Dynamics 
The previous section assessed the dynamics of network positions from a network 
and firm level. The drivers of change and forces of inertia are summarized in Figure 2-8. 
Both Burt (2006) and Salancik (1995) argue that we should develop network explanations 
for network phenomena instead of relying on traditional theories to explain network 
phenomena. This has remained largely underdeveloped in the current literature on 
network position dynamics.  
There are two main critiques on the current literature on network position 
dynamics. First, the literature takes account of drivers of change at the environmental, 
relational, and firm level but does not consider the network itself as an important source 
for a firm to change its network position. By incorporating the network as a driver for 
change, we can develop network explanations for network position dynamics. Some 
literature on environmental scanning demonstrates that firms gather information about 
their competitors (Daft & Weick, 1984; Hambrick, 1982) and use this information to 
decide whether a firm should respond to the strategic actions of a competitor (Chen, 
Smith, & Grimm, 1992). If firms in a non-networked environment respond to each 
other, why would firms not respond to each other in a networked environment (i.e. 
within the interfirm network)? Changes in network positions of rival firms mean that 
resources are likely to flow differently in the altered network and this can have favorable 
or detrimental consequences for the focal firm (Baum & Korn, 1999; Silverman & Baum, 
2002). A strong bridging position can evaporate because partner firms initiate new ties 
that reduce their dependence on the bridging firm. Changes in the network structure 
result from changes in network positions of partner firms and can be an important 
necessity for the focal firm to change its network position.  
Second, studies on network position dynamics have rarely taken into account 
how a particular, firm-specific network position changes. The focus has been on the 
establishment, or abandoning of ties: not whether it is a bridging or embedded tie, or 
how one type of position evolves into another type of position. There are some 
exceptions. Baum et al. (2005) study how aspiration performance levels increase the 
probability of establishing non-local or bridging ties. Rowley and Baum (2002) have 
studied the structural holes spanned by an investment bank. By explicitly taking into 
account what kind of relationships are being established or dissolved, we get a more 
detailed understanding of the dynamics of network positions. 
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2.7 Focus on Bridging Positions to Assess the Dynamics of 
Network Positions  
In Chapter 1, we raised our overall research question: “Why does the network 
position of a firm change? and which firm, partner firm, and network factors accelerate 
or slow down this change process?” In order to answer the overall research question, we 
will narrow down the type of network position we will study. In this section, we will 
argue that the bridging position is an appropriate network position to study in order to 
increase our understanding of the dynamics of network positions. The bridging position 
seems to be the most appropriate network position to study for the following four 
reasons: 1) bridging positions are an important source of value creation (see for example 
Table 2-1 and Burt (2000)), 2) information about the network structure beyond the ego is 
needed to purposefully strengthen a bridging position, 3) bridging positions are 
particularly applicable to transaction networks and 4) bridging positions are more 
dynamic compared with closed positions.  
2.7.1 Bridging positions are an important source of value creation 
Bridging positions create value through information and control benefits: this 
gives the focal firm discretion as to whom to include or exclude, to determine the terms 
of a transaction and to make partners dependent. Structural holes are generally between 
actors from different groups. Differences between groups are likely to be greater than 
differences within a group (Burt, 2000). Thus, occupying a bridging position between 
groups is a source of value creation because information brokered between different 
groups is more likely to be additive than overlapping. Network closure may sometimes 
be needed to coordinate within the group but that is often a second step after bridging. 
Burt (2000: 416) concluded in his extensive review of structural holes and network 
closure that: “brokerage is the source of added value, but closure can be critical to 
realizing the value.”  
2.7.2 Bridging positions benefit from information beyond the ego 
network 
The second reason why we choose bridging positions as the unit of analysis is 
that a firm requires a (part of the) blueprint of the network (the network “map”) to 
detect brokerage opportunities. This is in contrast with the closed position, which is 
created through past and referral partnering, and hence firms have a smaller need for 
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information about the network structure. The difference between these two extreme 
positions (bridging versus embedded) relates to information about the network structure. 
Bridging actors are keen to keep valuable information on the network structure to 
themselves, especially when they are pursuing a tertius gaudens strategy in order to 
maximize the information asymmetry. While closure actors want to share information 
among their partners in order to increase the effectiveness of the sanction and reputation 
mechanisms in order to minimize information asymmetry. Information on the alter-
network, the alters' alters network, etc., or in general the complete network structure, is a 
decisive factor to acquire and sustain a favorable network position.  
Without information beyond the ego network (i.e. the alter, or alter-firm network, 
the alters' alters, and so on), it is not possible for a firm to create bridging ties other than 
by chance. Information about the network can range from none to complete. If all firms 
in a network are without any information about the network structure then strengthening 
or weakening of bridging positions will be completely random.  
Author(s) Quotes about the information actors have about the network structure  
Cook & Emerson 
(1978: 726) 
“In the experiments in this series the subjects have no knowledge about structural 
arrangements remote from their own location.”  
Cook, Emerson & 
Gillmore (1983: 280) 
“An important feature of our laboratory research is that the actors located in the 
structure have no knowledge of the network beyond their own opportunity set.” 
Hite & Hesterly 
(2001: 279) 
“Emerging firms [] are less likely to know of the full range of potential market ties. 
Perhaps more importantly, however, newer firms are less likely to be seen as 
potential ties by other firms [] because they lack visibility.” 
Skvoretz & Willer 
(1993: 814) 
“Finally, future research should use weak power networks to systematically 
explore the relationship between information and the development of power []. 
Yet theorists have long suspected that information available to actors can 
influence power differentials []. Our experiments were conducted in an open 
information context in which actors knew how their positions were connected in 
the larger network. With this information, subjects could make a cognitive 
assessment of their chances of exclusion and calibrate their behavior accordingly.” 
Gould (2002: 1152) “…assume a closed and finite population of individuals, each of whom can direct 
attachments in any way he or she chooses across others in the population.” 
Table 2-3 Quotes about the information actors have about the network structure 
   Purposeful partnering with the intention to strengthen a bridging position is 
not possible because without information about the network structure it is not possible 
to detect brokerage opportunities. Networks with complete information about the 
network structure will evolve towards an equilibrium where each firm has an optimal 
position given the costs of maintaining ties. Firms will not shift their position anymore 
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because there will be no opportunities left to strengthen their bridging position. Table 
2-3 gives an overview of scholars who have made explicit assumptions about the 
available information about the network structure but who did not study the impact of 
this assumption. The two extremes (either complete or none information on network 
structure) may be necessary for analytical reasons but they rarely match with empirical 
reality. In reality, given limited resources available for environmental scanning (Peteraf & 
Bergen, 2003), it is likely that a firm only has information on a subset of the overall 
network structure. This information is what we refer to as a firm’s network horizon7.  
 
Definition 19: network horizon: the number of firms and their relationships 
that the focal firm (definition 7) knows to exist in an interfirm network 
(definition 1) as a percentage of the total number of firms and relationships in the 
interfirm network.  
 
This definition excludes firms that the focal firm is aware of but the focal firm 
does not know how these firms are embedded in the overall network structure. The 
network horizon includes information includes who is connected with who, what 
changes, and when changes happen like creation of new ties or disbanding old ties.  
In IS research it is common to distinguish three dimensions of the quality of 
information: 1) completeness, 2) timeliness, and 3) accurateness (Zmud, 1978). Our 
definition of network horizon is primarily focused on the completeness of information 
but timeliness and accurateness are important as well although we will not consider these 
two aspects explicitly in the remainder of this study. However, there are two arguments 
why we do not explicitly focus on timeliness and accurateness. First, one of the benefits 
of the bridging position is that information is received in a timely manner (Burt, 1992) 
thus the timeliness aspect of information is implicitly accounted for by our focus on 
bridging positions.  Second, previous research on network cognition has demonstrated 
that individuals have difficulty in accurately interpreting information about the network 
structure (Casciaro, 1998; Krackhardt, 1990). Firms have more resources at their disposal 
compared with individuals for collecting, screening, and interpreting information that 
makes the risk of acting on inaccurate information smaller. Nevertheless, accuracy of 
                                                 
7 The concept of network horizon was first coined by Anderson, Hakansson & Johanson (1994). 
These authors use the network horizon to delineate a firm’s environment from the parts of its 
network that are relevant for decision-making.  
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information is an important topic and will be suggested as a theme for future research in 
Chapter 7.  
Network horizon manifests itself at both the firm and network level. 
Heterogeneously distributed information about the network structure means that a firm 
enjoys a relative advantage rather than an absolute advantage in improving its network 
position. A focal firm’s direct alters are not the only actors that can influence its network 
position, obviously other (non-alter) firms can do so as well but this depends on their 
network horizons. As argued previously, firms are likely to differ in their ability and 
efforts to collect information about their environment and the opportunities they 
recognize (Daft, Sormunen, & Parks, 1988; Denrell, Fang, & Winter, 2003; Makadok & 
Barney, 2001), i.e. different firms will have different network horizons. At the network 
level, this creates a distribution of network horizons over the different firms in the 
network, and this distribution determines the network horizon heterogeneity of the network.  
 
Definition 21: network horizon heterogeneity: the interfirm differences in 
 network horizon (definition 20) between firms.  
2.7.3 Bridging positions are especially applicable to transaction 
networks 
Previous research on the benefits of bridging positions has demonstrated that 
structural holes are generally not valuable when measuring performance in terms of the 
innovation output (Ahuja, 2000a; Obstfeld, 2005; Walker et al., 1997). Bridging ties and 
structural holes have been found to be especially valuable in transaction networks like, 
for example, investment banks syndicates (Baum, Rowley, & Shipilov, 2004; Baum et al., 
2006), venture capital syndicates (Echols & Tsai, 2005) and the television industry (Soda 
et al., 2004). Walker et al. (1997: 188) suggest: “structural hole theory may apply more to 
networks of market transactions than to networks of cooperative relationships.” 
Hence, we choose bridging ties as the unit of analysis because we will conduct 
our research in the context of transaction networks (we will discuss this in more detail in 
Chapter 3).  
2.7.4 Bridging positions are more dynamic than closed positions 
We have distinguished between drivers of change and forces of inertia in the 
section about motivations for a firm to shift its network position. Previous research on 
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closed network positions and cliques (Rowley et al., 2004; Rowley et al., 2005) has shown 
that cliques are remarkable stable over time. It is suggested that past and referral 
partnering (Gulati, 1995a; Uzzi, 1996) are partly responsible for the stability or inertia of 
this type of network position. This is in contrast with research on bridging positions that 
suggests that these positions are inherently more unstable (Burt, 2002). Thus, closed 
positions are often associated with network inertia and stability while bridging positions 
exhibit more dynamics. Therefore, the fourth reason to focus on bridging positions is 
that these positions are better suited to study network position dynamics.  
2.8 Introduction Detailed Research Questions 
So far, we have argued that bridging positions are an important source of value 
creation and that the interplay between drivers of change and forces of network inertia 
combined with the dominant network formation logic determine the probability that a 
firm will shift its network position. However, we have not yet dissected the overall 
research question into smaller sub questions. In this section, we will raise three detailed 
research questions that will be answered in Chapters 4, 5, and 6.  
The dynamics of a network position refers to changes in a firm’s network 
position. We distinguish quantitative and qualitative changes. A quantitative change 
means that the current network position of a firm either strengthens or weakens. For 
example, a firm occupying a bridging position establishes new bridging ties and thereby 
strengthens its current position. A qualitative change concerns the transformation of one 
type of network position to another type of network position. For example, a bridging 
position evolves to a closed position; or a peripheral position evolves towards a central 
position. A qualitative change of a network position means that how a firm creates value 
through its network position changes as well. Qualitative changes in network positions 
have not often been studied and we will address this issue in the future research section 
of Chapter 7. This study focuses on quantitative changes of network positions.  
Based on the literature review of Section 2.3 we identify three types of 
quantitative dynamics of a network position. The drivers of network change can have 
two different repercussions for a network position of a firm: a network position can 
either strengthen or weaken. For example, if a firm performs above its aspiration level 
and therefore starts establishing new interfirm ties to access new sources of information 
then this firm is strengthening its network position. An example of the latter is when 
competitors are shifting their network position and thereby weakening the network 
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position of the focal firm. The third type of dynamics is the absence of dynamics due to 
network inertia (as has been discussed in Section 2.4). Network inertia prevents a firm 
from shifting its network position.  
Author(s) Quotes about the importance of availability of information about potential 
partner firms 
Van de Ven (1976: 
31) 
“Firms must be aware of possible sources in other agencies where their needed 
resources can be obtained; otherwise organizational directors are likely to conclude 
that the goal or need which motivates the search for resources cannot be attained. 
[…] Awareness is therefore a predictor of the formation of inter-agency relations. 
[…] This level of awareness identifies the number of potential alternatives for 
obtaining needed resources.”  
Gulati (1995b: 622) “Discovering new alliance opportunities and finding an appropriate partner that 
desires an alliance requires very good access to market information. Firms need to 
know about the reliability of potential partners as well. Information thus has a 
twofold purpose: it makes firms aware of viable partners, and it serves as a basis 
for trust between partners. Firms can learn about potential alliance opportunities 
from many sources, and one important source is their network of prior alliances.”  
Uzzi (1997: 48) “Embedded ties primarily develop out of third-party referral networks and 
previous personal relations. In these cases, one actor with an embedded tie to two 
unconnected actors acts as their ‘go-between’.” 
Stuart (1998: 671) “Because alliances are volitional relationships, a lack of access to a good set of 
willing exchange partners is a limitation on many firms’ ability to put into place a 
productive cooperative strategy.” 
Gulati (1999: 399-
400) 
“For firms to build alliances… they must first be aware of the existence of 
potential partners.” 
Gulati & Gargiulo 
(1999: 1444) 
“While interdependence may help a firm to orient the search for an adequate 
alliance partner, it cannot offer sufficient cues to determine with whom it should 
build such an alliance.” “Yet, this approach masks the considerable heterogeneity 
of available information on prospective partners across firms, which may influence 
the formation of ties between specific firms…” 
Rowley & Baum 
(2004: 120) 
“The idea that managers are aware of their firms’ networks and the types of 
positions that provide social capital advantages – core assumptions underpinning 
the network strategy perspective – remains largely unexplored.” 
Table 2-4 Quotes about the importance of information about the network structure 
Summarizing, 1) a position can become stronger, 2) a position can be stable in 
strength (due to network inertia), and 3) a position can become weaker. Each of the 
detailed research questions focuses on one of these types of network position dynamics. 
Salancik (1995) argued that the field of network research should move beyond questions 
about the effects of network positions and raise questions that focus on why particular 
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positions exist or do not exist in the first place. Salancik (1995: 349) phrased it as follows: 
“a more telling analysis might explain why the hole exists or why it was not filled before.”  
Having information about the network structure is an important prerequisite for 
a firm to be able to establish bridging ties. Surprisingly, there is a limited research about 
how much information a firm has about the network structure or what the consequences 
are of having information about the network structure although the importance of this 
type of information is acknowledged. Table 2-4 gives an overview for quotes about the 
importance of information about the network structure. Creating or strengthening a 
bridging position requires information about the network structure because without such 
information it is not possible to detect brokerage opportunities. Authors from Table 2-4, 
with the exception of Rowley and Baum, focus on the importance of ‘being aware’ of 
potential partner firms but this information of partner firms is conceptually distinct from 
having information about the network structure. Having information about a potential 
partner firm is sufficient to assess whether a firm has the needed capabilities, resources at 
an acceptable price and quality level. However, such a dyadic assessment of a potential 
partner firm ignores the impact this partnering decision can have on both the ego and 
global network structure and ignores potential leverage strategies by adding a new 
supplier that can potentially add information and control benefits. Thus, information 
about the network structure is required to move beyond a dyadic partner selection 
process but also to take into account the potential leverage strategies within the ego and 
across the global network. Thus, network horizon is not just the number of firms the 
focal firm has information about, but it is the level of completeness of information about 
the relationships between these firms. For example, the focal firm can be aware of ten 
potential partner firms but have no information about how these firms are connected 
(i.e. its network horizon is zero). The focal firm can still partner with any of these ten 
firms but it cannot make any assessment on how partnering with one of these firms will 
impact its own network position. Hence, this is a form of random partnering.  
Some researchers have looked at the extent to which individuals are able to 
accurately map a network (Casciaro, 1998; Friedkin, 1983; Krackhardt, 1990) and 
generally found that individuals have limited resources and understanding of what the 
map of a network looks like and hence are poor in identifying brokerage opportunities. 
In contrast, firms do have the resources to monitor their environment and network and 
environmental scanning is one of the key activities a firm conducts (Hambrick, 1982). 
Thus, firms scanning their environment may be better able in detecting brokerage 
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opportunities that in turn allows these firms to strengthen their bridging position. 
Therefore, the first detailed research question of this study concerns how firms capture 
and strengthen bridging positions:  
 
Detailed Research Question 1: Why do bridging positions strengthen? 
 
Now, we move our focus from the focal firm to the other firms in the network. 
Not just the focal firm is shifting its position but other firms in a network are doing the 
same. The literature on competitive dynamics shows that firms respond to each other’s 
strategic actions (Chen, Su, & Tsai, 2007; Chen, 1996; Chen et al., 1992). We consider 
establishing an interfirm tie as a strategic action. The possibility for the focal firm to 
strengthen its bridging position becomes more limited as more firms are striving for the 
same bridging position. Sorensen and Ryall (2007) argue that the network position alone 
is rarely a sufficient condition for a firm to gain a sustainable competitive advantage. As 
the competition for these positions intensifies then it will be even harder for a firm to 
gain a sustainable competitive advantage from its network position. We get a more 
thorough understanding of why some bridging positions last longer than other bridging 
positions by incorporating the partnering behavior of all the firms in the network. 
Therefore, we raise our second detailed research question:  
 
Detailed Research Question 2: Why do some bridging positions hold longer 
than other bridging positions? 
 
We have argued that structural holes are potentially valuable spots in a network 
and that bridging positions unlock the value buried in these structural holes. However, if 
the structural holes are valuable then it means that the brokered firms have clear 
incentives either to reduce their dependence on the brokering firm, by establishing new 
ties or to connect directly to the firm possessing the required resources instead of relying 
on the brokering firm. This is consistent with the competitive dynamics (Chen et al., 
2007; Chen, 1996; Chen et al., 1992) and resource dependence (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) 
view that firms will initiate actions to break away from a disadvantaged situation. 
Furthermore, there is evidence suggesting that bridging ties are short-lived. For example, 
Burt’s study (2002) on bridging ties of managers showed that 90% of these ties disappear 
Network Positions: Origins, Performance and Dynamics 
 57 
within a year. Hence, the third detailed research question concerns the actions bridged 
firms commence and the implications for the bridging position of the focal firm.  
 
Detailed Research Question 3: Why do bridging positions weaken? 
 
2.9 Summary 
Figure 2-9 gives a schematic overview of how each of the three detailed research 
questions addresses a distinctive phase of the life cycle of a bridging position. Obviously, 
this process does not have to be linear, periods of strengthening can be followed by 
weakening, and a stable phase can be followed by a period of strengthening of the 
bridging position.   
 
Figure 2-9 Detailed research questions cover distinctive phases of a bridging position 
This chapter explained why interfirm networks emerge and how firms occupy 
positions within these networks that generate differential benefits to the firm in question. 
The impact of bridging and closed network positions on firm performance has been 
analyzed. We noted that networks are dynamic and hence these positions are rarely a 
stable source of competitive advantage. Studying network position dynamics has resulted 
in focusing on bridging position. Based on the research assumption that bridging 
positions are favorable network positions - the following are the key detailed research 
questions for this study: 1) why do bridging positions strengthen?, 2) why do some 
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bridging positions hold longer than other bridging positions?, and 3) why do bridging 
positions weaken? Each of these questions has been researched following a multi-
method and multi-level research approach as explained in Chapter 3. The outcome of 
each detailed research question will be presented as separate sub-studies in Chapter 4 
(detailed research question 1); Chapter 5 (detailed research question 2) and Chapter 6 
(detailed research question 3).  
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3 Research Methods and Data 
This chapter8,9 describes the empirical setting of our research and the three 
research methods we applied. Before we introduce our research methods, we will first 
introduce the Dutch insurance industry as empirical setting for and justify this context 
for conducting our research. Then, we move on to explain why we choose these three 
research methods. The three research methods we introduce in this chapter are network 
experiments, a computational model, and a field study. Hence, this chapter gives the 
methodological background of the research methods applied in Chapters 4, 5, and 6.  
3.1 Justification of the Research Methods 
In Chapter 2, we raised three detailed research questions. Why does a bridging 
position strengthen, why does a bridging position weaken and why do some bridging 
positions last longer than other bridging positions. We use three different research 
methods to collect the data to answer these questions. Using multiple methods is referred 
to as method triangulation (Mingers, 2001). Method triangulation is a research strategy 
that aims at compensating an inherent weakness of one method with the strength of 
another method. The research methods we are use are network experiments, 
computational modeling, and field data.  
The study of network position dynamics requires longitudinal data with enough 
variance at the network position level in order to investigate the causal mechanisms that 
potentially explain why a bridging position changes. Furthermore, we want to link the 
decision-making process of organizational decision-makers to their decision of changing 
                                                 
8 Parts of the developments in the Dutch insurance industry have been published in van Liere, D. 
W., Hagdorn, L., Hoogeweegen, M. R., & Vervest, P. H. M. 2004. Embedded Coordination in a 
Business Network. Journal of Information Technology, 19(4): 261-269. 
9 The explanation of the network experiments has been published in Hoogeweegen, M. R., van 
Liere, D. W., Vervest, P. H. M., Hagdorn van der Meijden, L., & de Lepper, I. 2006. Strategizing 
for Mass Customization by Playing the Business Networking Game. Decision Support Systems, 
42(3): 1402-1412. 
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their network position. Collecting data about the partnering decisions raises two issues: 1) 
how to sample firms that are going to make such decisions while they are being studied 
and 2) whether firms are committed to support the research for a longer period in order 
to investigate the dynamics of a network position. Collecting longitudinal network data is 
a resource intensive process (Gibbons, 2004), especially when information about the 
individual firm decisions has to be collected on a recurring basis effectively ruling out 
case studies. This is further complicated by the network boundary specification problem 
(Laumann, Marsden, & Prensky, 1983). This problem relates to the question where to 
draw the boundary of the network, which firms belong or do not belong to the network. 
The network boundary specification problem is especially important when studying 
interfirm networks from a structural embeddedness perspective because how the 
boundary is drawn has implications for the network positions of firms. Inaccurately 
drawing the network boundary can underestimate or overestimate the importance of 
firms in the network. Network surveys have the limitation that collected network data is 
often inaccurate and incomplete (Marsden, 1990) because people have the tendency to 
report frequently used relationships because they remember those relationships better. 
This severely hampers the possibility of constructing reliable network structures. 
Therefore, we chose to conduct network experiments as our first method 
because experiments allow a researcher to manipulate different circumstances and to link 
individual decisions to changing network positions. However, the network experiments 
have two limitations. First, the networks we used during the experiments were small and 
this could potentially limit the generalizability of our findings. Second, the external 
validity is a potential weakness of experiments (Shadish et al., 2002). How representative 
is the behavior from participants in an artificial setting compared with how firms behave 
in a real world situation?  
In order to mitigate these two concerns, we will be using two additional research 
methods. Each method addresses one specific weakness of the network experiments. 
The second method is computational modeling. Using this method, we will be simulating 
the behavior of simplified firms in large networks. Simulation can be seen as a form of 
computerized experiments and therefore we will treat it as if it is an experiment. The 
third research method is a field study of the Dutch insurance network. The field data 
addresses the concern of limited generalizability from both the network experiments and 
simulation. Thus, we adopt three methods to study the three detailed research questions; 
this is an example of method triangulation.  
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Table 3-1 relates the three research questions with the three research methods. It 
is not possible to answer each research question with the three research methods due to 
data limitations. However, there are no fundamental reasons why these research 
questions cannot be addressed by these methods. 
   Research method 
 
 
Research question 
Network 
experiment 
Computational 
modeling 
Field data Chapter 
RQ1: Why does a bridging 
position strengthen? 
   4 
RQ2: Why do some bridging 
positions last longer than 
other bridging positions? 
   5 
RQ3: Why does a bridging 
position weaken? 
   6 
Table 3-1 Relationship between research methods and research questions 
3.2 Generic Modeling of the Network Experiment 
Modeling a network experiment means that we have to abstract a real life 
situation to a simplified model but that model should still capture the essence of a real 
life situation.  
 
Figure 3-1 Generic model of the network experiment 
Firm 1 
Set of capabilities 
Firm 2 
Set of capabilities 
Firm 3 
Set of capabilities 
Firm 4 
Set of capabilities 
Firm 5 
Set of capabilities 
Firm 6 
Set of capabilities 
Firm 7 
Set of capabilities 
Firm 8 
Set of capabilities 
 
 
 
 
 
Con-
sumer 
market 
Firm 9 
Set of capabilities 
Firm 10 
Set of capabilities 
Firm 11 
Set of capabilities 
Firm 12 
Set of capabilities 
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Three important building blocks we use to model our network experiments are a 
firm, its capabilities (consistent with the definition of Amit and Schoemaker (1993) from 
Chapter 2) and its relationships. So far, these building blocks are context free. A firm has 
a set of capabilities and has some relationships. These firms are connected to each other 
in a simple chain network structure (consistent with definition 1 from Chapter 2). The 
capabilities that each firm possesses may be unique in the network but some capabilities 
will be redundant.  
A basic premise of the network experiment is that the network position of a firm 
determines its access to capabilities and this determines how often a firm is needed for 
the production of a particular product. A firm that is more often needed to produce a 
particular product will increase its financial performance. This means that occupying a 
bridging position is beneficial for the financial performance of the firms in the network 
experiments. For example, in Figure 3-1 there are nine bridging positions (firms 1, 2, 3, 5, 
6, 7, 9, 10, and 11 occupy a bridging position). An alternative route to increase a firm’s 
performance is to specialize in a set of capabilities. This increases the attractiveness of 
the specialized firm as a potential partner because it can offer certain capabilities more 
attractively (in the experiment defined as “at a lower price”) than other firms in the 
network can. Therefore, the specialized firm will be more sought after by other firms in 
the network.   
The set of capabilities that a firm possesses at the start of an experiment 
determines its role in the network. In our network experiments, we assume that firms 
have a quick connect capability and are able to quickly establish or disband interfirm 
relationships (see Chapter 2). Although some firms may experience inertial forces that 
inhibit a firm to establish quickly a new interfirm relationship, there are two reasons why 
such a technical infrastructure may overcome some of these network inertia forces. First, 
modularization of a product reduces the uncertainty about the design specifications and 
therefore reduces the uncertainty associated with developing new products (Sanchez & 
Mahoney, 1996). Thus, market level uncertainty will be lower and hence makes it more 
likely that a firm will establish an interfirm relationship. Second, a technical infrastructure 
gains legitimacy as industry leaders adopt such an infrastructure. When prominent firms 
use such a new technology then other firms are more eager to adopt this technical 
infrastructure as well because the perceived uncertainty is reduced or larger firms create 
monetary incentives for smaller firms to adopt a quick-connect capability. In addition, we 
assume that in our network experiments firms have modularized their products (see 
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Chapter 2). Thus, the capabilities the firm possesses can be mixed and matched to create 
a customized product. These two assumptions allow a participant to change its role in the 
network or to stick to its original role. Finally, we developed three distinct strategies 
based on Treacy and Wiersema (1993) to condition the behavior of the participants and 
we will discuss this in more detail in section 3.4.4.  
This generic model can be applied in different industries. The next section 
explains why we have chosen for the Dutch insurance industry to apply this generic 
model. 
3.3 The Dutch Insurance Network as Empirical Background 
CEO Bas de Voogd from Voogd & Voogd Verzekeringen (Voogd & Voogd, 
2006) summarizes the transition the Dutch insurance industry is witnessing as follows: 
 
“Thinking in chains has never attracted me as an entrepreneur. […] It assumes 
loyalty to a system of fixed, sequential elements that cannot exist independent of each 
other. We prefer to think in terms of networks in which highly qualified firms create 
standards that lead to optimal service level to both consumer and business customers.” 
 
The Dutch insurance industry is slowly transforming into a vertical network 
because of the technological and specialization developments that were described in the 
previous chapter. This transition makes the Dutch insurance industry an appropriate 
empirical setting for conducting our research. The insurance industry has been used as a 
context for studying interorganizational relationships in the past; examples include the 
work of Zaheer and Venkatraman (1994; 1995). Furthermore, insurance policies are not 
tangible products but rather it is an intangible service. Services cannot be stored in stock 
but are rendered on demand; this means that there is almost no logistical component 
involved in the production of a service. This makes it easier to use quick connect 
capabilities to connect to other firms because there is no physical flow of goods. In 
addition, a large Dutch insurance firm and a business process outsourcing firm have been 
willing to support and participate in this research. Three developments in particular are 
transforming the insurance industry into a vertical network, which will be discussed in 
the next three sections.  
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3.3.1 Standardization of communication and quick-connect 
capabilities 
Insurance firms develop new insurance products, they market and brand them, 
they accept or reject customers, they handle claims, and they reinsure their risks with 
reinsurance firms. Insurance brokers focus on building personal relationships and 
advising their clients on matters of property insurance, life insurance, and mortgages. 
Insurance brokers are experiencing increased competition from direct writers and banks. 
Direct writers are insurance firms that sell their policies directly to the customer. 
Insurance firms and broker associations have joined hands to develop new standards that 
ease the communication between broker and insurance firm, reduce the number of 
errors, and reduce the lead-time between applying for a new policy and the final 
acceptation or rejection of the customer. Four standards have been developed (van Liere 
et al., 2004): 1) a standard for processes (Process Atlas), 2) a standard for data (All 
Finance Model), 3) a standard for transactions (GIM) and 4) a presentation standard. The 
Process Atlas describes the different processes that invoked during the advice and sales 
phases. The data standard describes how and which customer and insurance policy 
information is recorded. The transaction standard describes how data is communicated 
between a broker and an insurance firm. The presentation standard describes the layout 
of the data. These four standards are part of the chain integration project of SIVI. SIVI 
stands for Standardization Institute for Insurance Policies Sold through Insurance 
Brokers (Standaardisatie Instituut voor Verzekeringen in de Intermediairbranche10). 
Integration of the value chain is a means to improve the efficiency of the insurance sales 
process, to reduce the administrative burden and to make the brokers more competitive 
vis-à-vis the direct writers. SIVI is an industry body that developed and facilitates the 
implementation of these standards. Standardization of communication is an important 
prerequisite for interfirm specialization (Jacobides, 2005). Once these standards are 
implemented it becomes possible for insurance brokers to quickly connect and 
disconnect with insurance firms (Vervest et al., 2004).  
                                                 
10 The website of SIVI can be found at www.sivi.org and it includes, among other things, the 
specification of the four standards.  
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3.3.2 Intrafirm partitioning and interfirm specialization  
The second development is that intrafirm partitioning and interfirm specialization  
(Jacobides, 2005; Jacobides & Billinger, 2006) lead to different roles within the insurance 
industry. The increased standardization within the industry makes it possible for both 
insurance firms and insurance brokers to focus on a particular part of the value chain. 
Some brokers are becoming authorized resellers: they develop capabilities to maintain a 
customer administration themselves and to accept and reject customers. Some insurance 
firms are developing shared service centers that make it possible to simplify the back 
office and reuse processes across different product categories and different brands. While 
these shared service centers mainly handle internal customers, it is believed that soon 
these shared service centers will also handle external customers (i.e. competitors). Finally, 
some industry experts are predicting that the insurance broker will transform itself into a 
‘networked company’ that maintains ties not only with insurance firms or underwriting 
agents but also with other brokers, real estate agents, notaries and ad-hoc experts 
(Telematica Instituut, 2006). 
3.3.3 Horizontal alliances  
The third development is that brokers are organizing themselves in horizontal 
broker alliances to increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis the insurance firms and to get 
access to insurance firms with whom they do not have a direct relationship themselves. 
Besides these horizontal broker alliances, there is also a steady increase of broker 
franchises. These broker franchises operate under a single brand and have standardized 
their administration processes. These franchises make it possible to conduct business 
with more insurance firms because of their economies of scale. These two trends lead to 
an increasing number of broker-to-broker relationships and thereby transforming the 
vertical insurance network into a horizontal network.  
These three developments transform the Dutch insurance network. 
Standardization of communication, interfirm specialization, and horizontal broker 
alliances are transforming the vertical insurance network into a horizontal network. This 
justifies why we have chosen the insurance industry as the empirical background for 
conducting our research. Furthermore, the current transition means that the insurance 
network is dynamic and this gives enough variance in the data to explore the drivers of 
network position dynamics.  
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3.4 Research Method 1 – Network Experiments 
What circumstances drive decision-makers to strengthen their bridging position? 
In order to investigate our first detailed research question we developed a network 
experiment environment. The network experiment environment, called the “The 
Business Networking Engine” (shortened to BNE), is a multi-player computer-based 
management game11 developed by RSM Erasmus University in cooperation with A.T. 
Kearney. Participants play the role of an organizational decision-maker of a simulated 
firm and have the assignment that he/she should try to be the most profitable firm in the 
network in terms of margin and net income. The network experiments are built in such a 
way that bridging positions are beneficial for firm performance: the participants are 
unaware of this. Participants expanding their bridging positions are more likely to win an 
experiment.  
We have simplified the firms in our network experiments. Each firm possesses 
two or three capabilities depending on its role in the business network. A customer 
market generates demand for insurance policies: this demand is defined as a specific set 
of capabilities. An order is awarded to a participant (i.e. one of the firms in the business 
network) if this participant firm can produce the required set of capabilities either by 
producing the set of capabilities itself, or by having access to such capabilities through its 
relationships in the business network (or a combination of firm capabilities and partner 
capabilities). None of the firms possesses the required capabilities to produce these 
insurance policies independently: they need to produce these policies jointly by way of 
establishing a relationship. Therefore, each firm needs to invest in a portfolio of interfirm 
relationships to access the required capabilities in the network. Once a firm has access to 
the capabilities that constitute an insurance policy then it will start receiving orders for 
that particular insurance policy and its profit will increase.  
Each firm can also decide to invest in new capabilities or to specialize in existing 
capabilities. So three investment (and divestment) decisions impact if a participant firm 
will do better than others in the game: invest in / or divest interfirm relationships, invest 
in new capabilities, or invest in specializing existing capabilities, or divest existing 
capabilities. In essence, the two main levers to increase the financial performance of a 
                                                 
11 The Business Network Engine is available at bne.rsm.nl and includes tutorials, software to 
evaluate a session and a tool to check the compatibility of the browser.  
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firm are either to invest / divest in new interfirm relationships or to invest / divest in 
capabilities.  
3.4.1 Order allocation process 
A simulated market generates each time unit (is defined in section 3.4.2) a 
demand defined as a collection of capabilities at a certain price. This collection of 
capabilities becomes an order when a firm has a relationship with the consumer market 
and is able to deliver the required capabilities. Either a firm can deliver these capabilities 
itself or it can establish relationships with other firms in the network that are able to 
deliver the required capabilities, or there can be a combination of these two possibilities. 
If multiple firms can deliver the required order then the firm who offers the lowest total 
price receives the order. If multiple firms offer the same price then a firm with the oldest 
relationship with the consumer market is chosen. If multiple firms have the same age for 
their relationship with the consumer market then a firm is randomly chosen. Thus, a firm 
receives an order if it can deliver the required capabilities and if it can do so at the lowest 
possible price. The demand is stable over time and the consumer market does not 
respond to changes in the network structure.  
A role is based upon the capabilities a firm possesses at the start of a network 
experiment. The essence of the Business Network Engine is that participants of the firms 
can change their starting role by investing in new capabilities or in new interfirm 
relationships. The starting roles are insurance advice, sales, customer acceptation, service 
center, and customer service. There are different capabilities within each role. Table 3-2 
summarizes which role each firm has at the start of an experiment and with which 
capabilities it starts. Firms at the start of an experiment do not offer capabilities in italics 
but participants can decide to invest in these capabilities. The number in parentheses 
behind the capability indicates the id number.  
The network contains at the start of an experiment 15 firms and this number will 
stay fixed throughout the experiment. However, we also have a scenario of 14 firms. In 
this scenario, the firms Pluto and Hermes have been merged to one firm Hermes that 
possesses both the generic advice and product bronze capability. The reason was that 
due to space limitations it was not always possible to use 15 computers. 
An order contains from each role one capability. This means that these thirteen 
unique capabilities can be combined into 36 different orders (2 * 3 * 3 * 2 = 36). The 
reason that there are only 36 unique orders and not 108 is because once an order has a 
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customer acceptation capability then the accompanying service center capability is 
determined as well. Customer acceptation and service center capabilities are dependent 
on each other. For example, it is not possible to have an insurance policy with a car 
acceptation capability and a travel settlement capability. Figure 3-2 illustrates the initial 
distribution of capabilities and initial network structure.  
Firms Roles Capabilities  
Apollo 
Jupiter  
Pluto 
Insurance advice Generic advice (1) 
Specific advice (2) 
Miracle 
Diamond 
Hermes 
Sales Product line bronze (3) 
Product line silver (4) 
Product line gold (5) 
Archimedes 
Blazer 
Saturn 
Customer acceptation Accept car policy (6) 
Accept home policy (7) 
Accept travel policy (8) 
Phoenix 
Rainbow 
Delphi 
Service center Claims settlement car (9) 
Claims settlement home (10) 
Claims settlement travel (11) 
Crystal 
Cosimo 
Star 
Customer service Customer care online (12) 
Customer care call center (13) 
Table 3-2 Relationship between firms – roles and capabilities 
We have not modeled capacity constraints for the production of insurance 
policies in our experiments. Although firms clearly do have a capacity constraint, we 
think that in this particular context it is less relevant. The production of an insurance 
policy is fully automated, due to the embedded coordination of the quick connect 
capability (van Liere et al., 2004) and production times are measured in minutes or hours 
rather then weeks or months, and thus the daily production of insurance policies will 
always surpass the daily demand for insurance policies.  
Thus, at the start of the experiment, ‘network 1’ can only fulfill insurance policies 
consisting of capabilities 1, 3, 6, 9, and 12. Likewise, ‘network 2’ can only fulfill insurance 
policies consisting of capabilities 1, 3, 7, 10, and 12 and ‘network 3’ can only fulfill 
insurance policies consisting of capabilities 1, 3, 8, 11, and 12. 
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Figure 3-2 Initial network structure and distribution of the capabilities  
This means that at the start of each experiment each network can only satisfy 
1/36 of the total number of orders. The networks will be able to satisfy a wider range of 
orders as the number of offered capabilities in the network increases. When a firm is 
more often involved in the production of a particular insurance policy then it will 
increase its financial performance. The financial performance is measured with two 
metrics: net income (defined as turnover – fixed costs – variable costs) and gross margin 
(defined as 100%*
turnover
costs) variablecosts (fixed +
. Participants should score high on both 
metrics in order to become the winner of an experiment. How often a firm is part of the 
production depends on two factors: the capabilities it can access through a firm’s 
network position and the capabilities a firm possesses itself. The consumer market 
generates customer orders for car, home, and travel insurance policies at a stable rate. An 
insurance policy is offered at three different levels: product line bronze, product line 
silver and product line gold. The insurance network consists of fourteen organizational 
units grouped into five separate roles and these roles are represented in the experiment as 
separate organizations. The three brokers (“Apollo”, “Jupiter”, and “Pluto”) have direct 
access to the consumer market. These firms are the insurance brokers. Apollo is the 
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insurance broker for the car insurance policies; Jupiter is the insurance broker for the 
home insurance policies and Pluto is the insurance broker for the travel policies. The 
second firm is called “Miracle” for the car insurance policies and “Diamond” for the 
home insurance policies and “Hermes” for the travel insurance policies and all three of 
them offer product line bronze. These three firms are responsible for the branding and 
marketing of the policies. The third firm is called “Phoenix” for the car insurance policies 
and “Rainbow” for the home insurance policies and “Saturn” for the travel insurance 
policies. They are responsible for the customer acceptation process, that is, screening a 
customer, assessing the risk of the customer and deciding whether the customer is 
accepted or not (in our experiments each customer is always accepted). The fourth firm 
is called “Archimedes” for the car insurance policies and “Blazer” for the home 
insurance policies and “Delphi” for the travel insurance policies. They are responsible for 
the settlement of all damage claims of insured customers. The fifth firm is called 
“Cosimo” for car insurance policies and “Crystal” for the home insurance policies and 
“Star” for the travel insurance policies, and they take care of all administrative processes 
of handling policies and offer customer service either by using a call center or a website. 
3.4.2 Time sequencing 
We have conducted pilot studies to examine how long an experiment should last 
and how much time we should give to the participants to process the information and 
make decisions. Furthermore, these pilot studies revealed that after a certain time the 
network converged to an end state without a lot of variance in the network positions of 
firms. Finally, there are time constraints on how long participants are willing to 
participate. Therefore, we decided that one experiment should last 43 time units (which 
equals to approximately 30 real-time minutes). Those 43 time units are divided in two 
different periods. An experiment starts with an information-gathering period that lasts 
seven time units. A participant can evaluate its current financial performance, evaluate 
past decisions, and formulate new decisions for the coming time units during an 
information-gathering period. An information-gathering period lasts for 3.5 real-time 
minutes. An information-gathering period is continued with a decision point. The 
decision point is used to execute actual decisions: an investment in a new interfirm tie 
can be made or a firm can divest capability or a new capability can be bought. A decision 
point lasts for two real-time minutes. An experiment consists of five information-
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gathering periods, five decision points and three time units to end the experiment. Figure 
3-3 visualizes the structure of an experiment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-3 Sequence of information gathering periods and decision points 
A participant can only make one investment during each decision point. This 
compels participants to envision the possible consequences of the different decisions 
they can take and to make the decision they think will improve their performance the 
most.  
3.4.3 Managing a firm in the Business Network Engine 
Each firm starts with an initial cash position to cover the initial fixed costs of the 
first time units, to pay for outsourced capabilities and to let participants invest in 
capabilities and relationships. For the purpose of the experiments, we set the initial cash 
position at €50.000. This money can be used to invest in a new interfirm relationship to 
increase the access to capabilities or to invest in a new capability or specializing an 
existing capability. There are costs associated with maintaining capabilities, these are so-
called fixed costs and are deducted from the cash position at the end of each time unit. 
Specializing an existing capability means that a firms’ fixed costs increase, but that the 
variable production costs are reduced. Hence, this investment makes sense when a firm 
has a significant market share for a particular capability it has specialized. Figure 3-4 
illustrates the business network and the investment options to start or terminate a 
relationship. This screen, visualizing the network, is used to invest or divest interfirm 
relationships by clicking on the node with whom wants to connect. This representation 
of the network is consistent with Figure 3-2. Figure 3-5 shows the controls to invest in 
capabilities. Figure 3-6 shows how players are updated on their performance at the dyad 
level. Finally, Figure 3-7 gives an overall view of the performance of their firm. To give 
the participants some guidance in the actions to take, we have developed three distinct 
strategies. 
 
DP1 DP2 DP3 DP4 DP5 
IGP1 IGP2 IGP3 IGP4 IGP5 
T=
IGP = Information Gathering Period  
DP = Decision Point 
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Figure 3-4 Screenshot network experiment investing in relationships 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-5 Screenshot network experiment investing in capabilities 
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Figure 3-6 Screenshot network experiment monitoring performance of suppliers 
 
Figure 3-7 Screenshot network experiment monitoring performance of firm 
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3.4.4 Strategies to increase firm performance during the experiments 
We use three strategies as defined by Treacy & Wiersema (1993) to assist 
participants in deciding how to run their simulated firm. Treacy & Wiersema (1993: 84) 
propose that organizations that have taken leadership positions within their industries or 
business networks have focused on “… delivering superior customer value in line with 
one of three value disciplines – operational excellence, customer intimacy, or product 
leadership”. We chose for these three strategies because they can be easily 
operationalized in capabilities and network positions and these three strategies are well 
understood by both business administration students and insurance professionals. These 
strategies are randomly distributed among the participants at the start of an experiment 
but a participant keeps the same strategy card throughout the whole session.  
Operational excellence refers to providing reliable products and services to 
customers against competitive prices and convenience. Customer intimacy refers to the 
ability to meet customized demand by tailoring production to the exact requirements of 
individual customers or market niches. Product leadership refers to the offering of 
innovative, leading-edge products and services to customers that enhance the use or 
application of the product or service; this should offset the value of the competitors’ 
products and services. 
All three strategies are potentially interesting in order to increase the financial 
firm performance. For instance, by specializing production, a firm could become a main 
node within the network and be part of virtually every temporary alignment formed 
within the network (operational excellence). Another focus could be to approach the 
end-customer and act as a “network coordinator” to fulfill its customized demand by 
forming the right temporary alignment (customer intimacy). Yet another option could be 
to innovate and develop new capabilities to meet the customers’ demand for state-of-art 
products and services (product leadership). 
These three strategies are written down on three different strategy cards and 
these strategy cards are randomly distributed among the participants of a network 
experiment.  
3.4.5 Participants of the experiments 
We used three groups of participants to conduct our experiments: middle 
managers of an insurance firm and their insurance brokers, business administration 
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master students, and a fixed team of business administration master students who 
participated frequently. 
The first group of participants is from a large Dutch insurance company. Dutch 
insurance companies are promoting the adoption of quick connect capabilities through 
SIVI (see section 3.3.1). In collaboration with a large Dutch insurance firm, it was 
decided to organize jointly workshops to explore the effect of these SIVI standards on 
the transformation of a vertical network into a horizontal network. These workshops 
were called the SIVI workshops and the results of these workshops will be presented in 
Chapters 4 and 6. The Business Network Engine played an important role during these 
workshops. On the one hand, the Business Network Engine was used to let managers 
and brokers experience the effect of quick-connect capabilities on their business. On the 
other hand, the Business Network Engine was used to collect data to investigate how 
participants make decisions when they are establishing a new interorganizational 
relationship.  
The second group of participants consists of two groups of business 
administration students. First, there are students who participated in a minor about 
business networks as part of their masters in business administrations and second there 
were students that participated at an in-house business course at the same insurance firm.  
The third group of participants was a team of fifteen students who participated 
on a regular basis. This group was used to study whether there are learning effects in 
shifting a firm’s network position. Multiple replications with the same participants 
increases the internal validity of the research design (Shadish et al., 2002). If the same 
type of results are observed compared with participants that only participated once then 
it can be concluded that the one-time participants were not randomly more successful 
but that the experimental treatment had the intended effect.  
3.4.6 Reliability and validation Business Network Engine 
The insurance scenario has been developed in close cooperation with a strategy 
consultancy firm, industry experts, and board members of an insurance firm. We asked 
ninety-eight participants from seven different pilot tests to rate, using a Likert scale, the 
simulation game on various aspects of its modeling of the insurance industry and the 
network aspects. The participants of the pilot tests were senior and middle-level 
managers of Dutch insurance firm and insurance brokers of the same insurance firm.  
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Statement  
asked on a Likert scale from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5)   
Mean 
The modeling of the insurance products in the Business Network Engine is realistic. 4.4 
The modeling of the initial business network is realistic. 4.4 
The Business Network Engine simulates convincingly a business network. 4.3 
The modeling of the trade-off between internal production and outsourcing is realistic.  4.2 
The Business Network Engine provides a valid learning experience about managing a business 
network. 
4.6 
I have confidence in the Business Network Engine results. 4.4 
Table 3-3 Results validation Business Network Engine 
The results indicate that the participants generally agree that the simulation game 
is realistic in both simulating the insurance industry (products and capabilities) and the 
insurance network structure and different roles that are needed to sell an insurance 
policy. 
We conducted numerous tests to validate the Business Network Engine. First, we 
calibrated the insurance scenario by comparing manually calculated firm performance 
with the performance according to the Business Network Engine. This test was 
conducted to make sure there are no bugs in the software that could lead to flawed 
performance results. Second, we conducted numerous computer interface tests to 
investigate whether participants understood the user interface and whether presented 
information was unambiguous. The results of these tests led to improvements of the 
software that were subsequently tested again. Third, we conducted ‘stress’ tests to see 
investigate the stability and performance of the overall software environment. These tests 
led to a redesigned database structure that is more efficient in storing data and software 
that is more robust by incorporating exception handling.  
3.4.7 Software design of the Business Network Engine 
The Business Network Engine consists of five software components that jointly 
create the network experiment environment. The five components are the player client, 
the administrator client, the evaluation client, the simulation game and the scenario. The 
player client is the actual software component that participants use. The player client 
visualizes the network of firms, the current firm performance and provides the graphical 
user interface (GUI) (see Figures 3-4 to 3-7) to execute decisions such as investments in 
capabilities and relationships. The administrator client is used to configure and 
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randomize the independent variables, to configure the order allocation process and the 
time and game play.  
 
Figure 3-8 Screenshot from the administrator client to configure the experiments 
The evaluation client is used to visualize the events that happened during an 
experiment and to give participants feedback on their performance and compare the 
performance across firms. The simulation Game receives its input from the administrator 
client and the various player clients, processes the inputs, and sends the outputs back to 
the player clients. The scenario determines the industry setting, which and many firms 
there are, which capabilities there are, the initial network structure and the costs of 
investing and maintaining relationships and capabilities. Because the scenario is 
adjustable, it means that the Business Network Engine can be easily customized and 
situated in different contexts. The software is built using Java and operates in a Java 
enabled Internet browser, and utilizes an Oracle database for data collection.  
3.4.8 Design decisions and their implications for topics to be 
researched 
A number of design decisions that were made while building the network 
experiment environment exclude a number of topics to be researched. These topics have 
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become endogenous and therefore have become artifacts of the network experiment 
environment. Three design decisions are particularly important to mention. First, the 
network experiment environment is built around a transaction network and does not 
incorporate knowledge sharing, interfirm trust, or joint problem solving and therefore 
this network experiment environment cannot be used to research closed network 
positions or compare the relative benefits of bridging and closed network positions. 
Second, we modularized insurance policies into thirteen distinct capabilities. 
Modularization is an artifact of the network experiment environment and cannot be used 
as an independent variable to investigate what the optimal level of modularization is 
(Hoogeweegen & Vervest, 2004), whether modularization leads to improved firm 
performance and whether networks become more dynamic because of modularization. 
Third, the ability to connect quickly with other firms in the network is endogenously 
given. This means that we cannot investigate the impact of quick-connect capabilities on 
firm performance, how quick-connect capabilities should be implemented or the benefits 
and disadvantages of quick-connect capabilities. Thus, the fact that we explicitly focused 
on transaction networks, modularization of products and the existence of quick-connect 
capabilities exclude some topics to be addressed as we will discuss in the next section.  
3.4.9 Limitations of the Business Network Engine 
Four important limitations of the Business Network Engine have to be 
addressed. First, the network size is limited. The scenario we use consists of fourteen 
firms. Such a small network size limits the diversity of network positions and means that 
a network will soon find an equilibrium if each participant is trying to optimize its 
network position.  
Second, we go at great length to make sure that participants understand how the 
experimental setting functions. However, some participants will have a better grasp of 
how to improve their firm performance and have a better understanding of what it 
means to operate in a network environment. We control for such differences in the 
empirical chapters but we do want to replicate these findings with artificial actors where 
such differences do not play a role. These two reasons combined are the justification for 
building a computational model to replicate the findings of the network experiments.  
Third, a participant of a network experiment cannot reject the creation of a link 
when it is proposed. Nevertheless, a participant can terminate the link during the next 
decision point. This means that the network position of a firm can change without the 
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consent of a participant. However, such changes in the network position will not often 
affect the firm performance negatively. If a firm creates an outsource relationship with 
the focal firm then this means that the focal firm has an extra customer who generate 
extra turnover. If a firm creates an insource relationship then it means that the focal firm 
has an extra supplier that can be used to reduce its procurement costs. The bridging 
position of the focal firm may weaken but if a participant understands the value of its 
bridging position then it is likely that such a relationship will be terminated. Although 
this modeling might not reflect practice, it is often used in research on network 
formation (Bala & Goyal, 2000) and we do not think, because of the abovementioned 
reasons, that it has material consequences for our research.   
Fourth, experiments have as their major strength the ability to establish causality 
through randomization of the treatment and control over the environment (Shadish et 
al., 2002). However, the price of these strengths is that the external validity (i.e. how 
generalizable are the findings to an empirical setting) is limited. Limited generalizability of 
the network experiments is the justification to collect field data and to replicate partly the 
findings of the network experiments. See also Table 3-1 how the different research 
methods overlap or complement each other.  
3.5 Research Method 2 – Computational Modeling 
In contrast to using human subjects for our first research method, we use 
artificial subjects (i.e. agents) for our second research method. This second research 
method is similar to our network experiments except that in this case, we use artificial 
subjects and firms are homogenous (i.e. firms do not possess capabilities as in the 
network experiments). We developed a simulation tool called LINKS12, acronym for 
Large Interfirm Network Simulator. Agents are autonomous entities in a software 
environment that perceive and act upon their environment (Wooldridge, 2000). An 
individual agent can be described using the ‘beliefs-desire-intentions’ model (Bratman, 
1987). According to this system, an agent is modeled to have some information about its 
environment (beliefs), an agent pursues a certain state (desire), and an agent has a 
repertoire of actions (intentions) it can take to try to realize its desire. In our 
                                                 
12 A detailed report on the design and development, including source code, and a working copy of 
LINKS are available at dep01-server02.fbk.eur.nl:8100. Parts of the source code have been 
released as part of the Java Universal Network Graph (JUNG) (jung.sourceforge.net) open source 
visualization project.  
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computational model, we modeled firms as agents. Each firm has a network horizon as 
its belief, the network position it pursues is its desire and the ability to form or terminate 
relationships are its intentions.  
3.5.1 Software design of LINKS  
A network in LINKS consists of nodes, which are firms, and the relations 
between the firms called edges. Each firm has a module (partner selection module) which 
determines the set of firms that the focal firm will consider as potential partners. Once 
the potential partners have been selected, the action selection module uses the utility 
function and capabilities of the firm to determine which capability-partner combination 
yields the highest utility. That capability is executed and as a result, an edge is created, 
deleted, or kept. This process is visualized in Figure 3-9.  
 
Figure 3-9 Simplified class diagram of LINKS 
Building a computational model involves making design decisions that have 
implications for how the model will behave. We highlight the most important design 
decisions and explain why we have taken them.  
First, the computational model is based on a cooperative network formation 
assumption (Watts, 2001) that requires that a link is only established when both actors 
agree. Severing a relationship remains a unilateral decision. We decided to build LINKS 
based upon a cooperative network assumption because this is more similar to how firms 
in a real world situation behave. This is contrast with the network experiments, which  
are a form of non-cooperative network formation (Bala & Goyal, 2000) which means 
that an actor can unilaterally decide to establish or sever a relationship.  
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Second, each actor in the computational model is homogenous. An actor does 
not possess any resources but they are identical. We control for firm differences that 
might explain why some bridging positions last longer than other bridging positions by 
making actors homogenous. The only reason for a simulated firm to establish a tie is to 
improve its network position. In practice, there will be multiple motivations to shift a 
network position but for analytical reasons we make the actors homogenous. A possible 
implication is that we overestimate the effect size of network horizon because in practice 
shifting a network position involves multiple motivations, one of which is possibly the 
network horizon. However, by controlling for firm factors that possibly influence the 
dynamics of network positions, we get a more detailed understanding of how network 
horizon and network horizon heterogeneity affect the dynamics of network positions.  
Third, a relationship that is created is a directed tie (a directed tie is not 
necessarily reciprocated) and thus the networks we simulate are directed as well.  
A directed network has implications for the structural properties of a network compared 
with an undirected network. A directed network leads to greater differences between 
network positions and this gives us a better understanding of how bridging positions 
develop and why they do or do not last.  
Fourth, during each cycle of the simulation a firm can initiate only one action. 
For example, suppose that Firm A has proposed to establish a relationship with firm B 
and firm B declines then firm A cannot propose another relationship with another firm. 
It will have to wait until the next cycle to propose to another firm. If we would allow a 
firm to make multiple partnering decisions during a cycle then this would imply that a 
network evolves quicker to an equilibrium and would make it harder to disentangle the 
causal mechanisms responsible for the dynamics of a network position due to the time 
compression. Therefore, allowing a firm to make one decision each cycle will not 
materially affect our results but will make it easier to analyze the results.  
Fifth, we use a maximizing algorithm in the current set up of the experiment. 
This means that a firm will calculate for each firm in its network horizon how it would 
strengthen its bridging position if it established a relationship. A satisficing algorithm 
would only approach a certain portion of the firms in its network horizon to decide with 
whom to establish a relationship. Such an algorithm would lead to more variation in the 
dynamics of network positions because of the randomness of selecting a portion of the 
firms to approach for establish a tie. This variation is not attributable to network horizon 
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or network horizon heterogeneity and we want to control for this extra explanation of 
network position dynamics.  
3.5.2 Validation of the computational model  
Empirical interfirm networks are often characterized by the fact that they are very 
sparse yet exhibit moderate to high levels of clustering and have low average path lengths 
(Baum et al., 2003). The simulated networks do exhibit this property as well; the average 
density13 is 3.40%. Furthermore, the characteristic path length14 is short (on average 3.05 
links) while the cluster coefficient15 is moderate (25.24%). This suggests that our 
simulated networks exhibit both local clustering and short path lengths that are 
characteristic for interfirm networks (Baum et al., 2003). Furthermore, some networks 
consist of hubs as is evidenced by the maximum observed degree centrality16 of 46, 
however these hubs do not often dominate our network structures since the 
betweenness17,18 and degree centralizations are low (4.7% and 14.2% respectively). 
Betweenness and degree centralization are measures that indicate to what extent a 
network structure is ‘star’ shaped, high values indicate a star shape. Finally, the standard 
deviations are small suggesting that the partnering algorithm is robust. Summarizing, our 
                                                 
13 Density is calculated as: ( ) jinn
xij
≠
−
∑
,
1
 where xij represents the value of a relationship 
between i and j (assuming that xij only takes values of 0 or 1) and n is the number of nodes in the 
network.  
14 Characteristic path length is calculated by averaging the minimum path lengths among all nodes.   
15 Cluster coefficient is calculated as: ( ) jikk
xij
≠
−
∑
,
1
 where k denotes the partners of the focal 
node and xij measures the strength between partners j and k. This fraction is then averaged among 
all nodes in the network.  
16 Degree centrality is calculated as: ∑ +
i
jiij xx or just the sum of relationships a node 
maintains. Degree centralization is calculated by summing this fraction and then dividing by the 
highest observed degree centrality. 
17 Betweenness centrality is calculated as: ∑∑ ≠≠
i j ij
ikj kji
g
g
,  gij is the number of geodesic 
paths from i to j, gikj is the number of geodesic paths that pass along k and a geodesic path is the 
shortest path connecting two nodes in a network. The sum of this fraction is divided by the 
highest observed betweenness centrality to calculate the betweenness centralization.  
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simulated networks are sparse, exhibit both local clustering and relatively short path 
lengths. Therefore, we conclude that our computational model represents interfirm 
networks that are consistent with empirical interfirm networks. Table 3-4 shows 
descriptives of the key variables of the computational model. 
Table 3-4 Calibration of the computational model 
3.6 Research Method 3 – Field Study 
We collected archival data to construct the evolution of the Dutch insurance 
network to test our hypotheses regarding the strengthening and weakening of bridging 
positions. We obtained data from ABZ from their Assurantie Data Netwerk translated as 
                                                                                                                                            
18 These measures are taken from Wasserman & Faust (1994).  
19 The number of observations for network level variables is: 15 experimental runs * 26 
observation points = 390 and for firm level variables: 15 experimental runs * 26 observation 
points * 100 firms = 39000. 
20 These values should be interpreted as a percentage (observed value * 100). 
21 These values cannot be negative as is indicated by the minimal observed value. 
22 These values should be interpreted as a number of relationships. 
23 This value should be interpreted as the number of firms.   
24 The maximum number of firms a firm can have information about is n-1 where n is the 
number of nodes (firms) in the network. 
Variable 
(network size is 100 
firms) 
Number of 
ob-
servations19 
Mean S.D. 95% Confidence  
interval 
Min. Max. 
Density20 390 0.0340 0.0210 -0.00821 0.0760 0 0.0969 
Cluster coefficient6 390 0.2524 0.1220 0.0084 0.4964 0 0.75 
Betweenness 
centralization6 
390 0.0466 0.0343 -0.02207 0.1152 0 0.1620 
Degree 
centralization6 
390 0.1415 0.0685 0.0044 0.2786 0 0.2723 
Characteristic path 
length22 
390 3.0514 0.7960 1.4595 4.6433 1 6.2329 
Network horizon 
heterogeneity 
390 0.3786 0.1473 0.0840 0.6732 0 0.7312 
Degree centrality8 39000 6.7949 6.0370 -5.27917 18.8689 0 46 
Effective size8 39000 6.0411 5.1994 -4.35777 16.4399 0 42.7391 
Network horizon23 39000 10.2404 11.7277 -13.2157 33.6958 1 9924 
Utility9 39000 2.0853 1.0690 -0.05277 4.2232 0 6.4997 
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Insurance Data Network (ADN). The AND is an electronic network that is used for 
communication between brokers and insurance firms. The ADN data consists of day-to-
day transactions between insurance firms and brokers. Transactions include the 
prolongation of insurance policies and the applications for policies by new customers. 
We built a Java tool to process the data to build the database. The original ADN data 
consisted of 48 CD-ROM’s containing zipped ASCII25 EDI26 messages, which totals 
approximately 312 GB of compressed data27. 
Next, we collected data from the SER (Social Economic Council) who 
administrates a database of the registered brokers and insurance firms in the Netherlands 
for the years 2002 - 2005. We obtained from a leading Dutch trade publication the 
‘Captive Guide’ for the years 2003 and 2004. The Insurance Magazine is an independent 
industry journal that weekly informs its subscribers about trends and news in the 
insurance industry. The Captive Guide is a yearly publication aimed at increasing 
transparency in the insurance industry by making publicly available which brokers are 
(partially) owned by insurance firms. Information about the overall industry was obtained 
from the Verbond van Verzekeraars (Dutch Association of Insurers) and their annual 
publication; we collected data from this source for the period 1996 – 2005. The Dutch 
Association of Insurers represents “the interests of private insurance companies 
operating in the Netherlands. The Association’s members represent more than 95 
percent of the insurance market expressed in terms of gross premium income” (Verbond 
van Verzekeraars, 2005: 2). From the Dutch Association of Authorized Resellers 
(NVGA) we obtained a list of brokers that acts as an authorized reseller and which 
insurance firms they represent. From publisher Nijgh we obtained the VVP Adresdisc 
containing information regarding the brokers such as firm size, number of employees, 
diversity in product range, and chamber of commerce number. The database REACH 
provided us with financial performance data for the period 2000 – 2005. Finally, from 
the GRC Database Information Company we obtained the geo-code information to 
convert zip codes into longitudes and latitudes needed to construct the resource 
                                                 
25 ASCII is the acronym for American Standard Code for Information Interchange and is the 
standard for character representation in computers; it is commonly referred to as ‘plain text’.  
26 EDI is the acronym for Electronic Data Interchange and is a set of standards for structuring 
information to be electronically exchanged between companies.  
27 Manageable is an understatement: building this database took over a year of full time processing 
power of a dedicated server.  
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similarity variable. These data sources combined allowed us to construct a 
comprehensive database of the Dutch insurance industry that contains the network 
structure for the period 2002 – 2005 along with financial performance measures and 
descriptive variables of the individual firms. 
Because of the sheer volume of the data, we choose to import only specific 
variables into the database. The variables that we imported can be divided in two 
categories: 1) network data, describing which firm conducts transactions with which 
other firm and 2) firm level variables describing the firm. We anonymized the data to 
ensure confidentiality. The Java tool was used to parse each EDI message, read the 
appropriate variables, and write them in the database. Processing 48 CD-ROM’s into an 
SQL database took approximately three months continuously. This processing of this 
data resulted in a four-year day-to-day database of the interfirm network between 
insurance brokers and insurance firms. We aggregated this day-to-day data into years to 
make the database manageable. The yearly data was used to calculate the variables as is 
described in Chapter 6. 
3.7  Summary  
This chapter introduced three research methods. First, we introduced a network 
experiment environment to investigate why the bridging position of a firm strengthens. 
Second, we introduced a computational model to investigate both why the bridging 
position of a firm strengthens and why some bridging positions last longer than other 
bridging position. Our third research method is a field study that we use to investigate 
why a bridging position weakens. The following three chapters are three studies; each 
chapter addresses a detailed research question.  
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4 Strengthening of  Bridging Positions: Network 
Horizon and Network Horizon Heterogeneity 
Research on the benefits of structural holes is extensive. A firm occupying a 
bridging position enjoys information and control benefits, through spanning structural 
holes, that are beneficial for firm performance and create a network-based competitive 
advantage (Burt, 1992; Burt, 1997; 2000; McEvily & Zaheer, 1999; Walker et al., 1997). 
However, small world research suggests that interfirm networks are often characterized 
by dense cliques and bridging ties between those cliques (Baum et al., 2003) and 
therefore that some firms have more bridging ties (span more structural holes) than other 
firms do. In this chapter28, 29, we propose an information-based view to explain why some 
firms span more structural holes than other firms do (which is based on Chapter 2). This 
information-based view is based on two key constructs: 1) network horizon, which refers 
to the completeness of information a firm has about the network structure, and 2) 
network horizon heterogeneity that refers to the distribution of information among the 
different firms in the network.  
Understanding why some firms span more structural holes than others is 
important for three reasons. One, it will lead to insight of the dynamics of network 
positions. A network position is not a static given (Madhavan et al., 1998), rather it is the 
result of a firm’s partnering decisions and the subsequent counter actions from its 
competitors. Gulati et al. (2000: 210) observed that “the ties formed or disbanded by any 
actor influence not only their own behavior in subsequent periods but also those of 
others to whom the actor is connected. One actor forms an alliance. Others match this 
                                                 
28 A previous version of this chapter was presented at the Academy of Management conference 
2005 by van Liere, D. W., & Koppius, O. R. 2005. Network Horizon and the Creation of 
Structural Holes. Paper presented at the Academy of Management Honolulu, HI. 
29 This chapter will appear in van Liere, D. W., Koppius, O. R., & Vervest, P. H. M. 2008. 
Network Horizon and the Sustainability of Network-Based Competitive Advantage. In J. A. C. 
Baum, & T. J. Rowley (Eds.), Advances in Strategic Management (Network Strategy), Vol. 
25: JAI/Elsevier. 
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action.” At the network level, we observe changes of the network structure, but we have 
limited understanding of how these changes are enacted by individual firms that try to 
improve their network position.  
Second, it can answer the question how structural the advantage is that a broker 
will enjoy. Recent research suggests that brokers can attain a competitive advantage 
purely based on their network position only in strict circumstances (Sorenson & Ryall, 
2007) and temporarily (Burt, 2002).  
Third, previous research on network positions has predominantly focused on the 
consequences and in particular on the performance enhancing benefits of network 
positions. However, less research has focused on the antecedents of a particular network 
position. The call of Salancik (1995) to explain where structural holes come from is a call 
to study the antecedents of structural holes.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. First, we argue that firms 
differ in how much information they possess about the network structure. Next, we 
introduce the network horizon and network horizon heterogeneity constructs and 
accompanying hypotheses. Subsequently, we first introduce the network experiments and 
results, next we introduce the computational modeling approach, results, and finally we 
conclude with a discussion and future research.  
4.1 Firms Have Different Maps of the Interfirm Network 
Network scholars recognize the importance of having information about 
potential partner firms and the overall network structure. Even though the notion of 
having information about the network structure is often acknowledged, it has received 
little empirical attention. Table 2-3 and Table 2-4 give an overview of the prevalence and 
importance of this assumption in the current interfirm network literature.  
Baum and Rowley (2004: 120) phrase it as follows: “The idea that managers are 
aware of their firms’ networks and the types of positions that provide social capital 
advantages – core assumptions underpinning the network strategy perspective – remains 
largely unexplored”. Both versions of the information assumption (complete and 
incomplete) seem to be strong assumptions. We will focus in particular on interfirm 
information differences and how this affects the ability of a firm to shift its network 
position. It is important to note that information about the network structure has two 
properties: the extent to which information is complete and the extent to which the 
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available information is accurate30. The completeness of information is important for the 
information processing view and resource-based view, the accuracy of information is 
important from a cognitive decision-making perspective.  
The information processing view states that the acquisition and distribution of 
information within an organization is a key organizational activity (Daft & Weick, 1984). 
The organizational boundary functions as a filter of the information that comes to the 
attention of the firm. Even if information circulated freely, it would not always penetrate 
through the organizational boundaries because it is too costly to analyze all the available 
information. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978: 74) observed: “There is a great deal of 
information, but only some of this comes to the attention of the organization and is, 
therefore, relevant for understanding its behavior”. The information that does come to 
the attention of the firm is usually the result environmental scanning and competitor 
analysis although this will be rarely complete or accurate (Sutcliffe, 1994).  
Relationships are often invisible and information about relationships may be 
unavailable or incomplete. Most relationships are not announced publicly, large alliance 
and joint venture relationships are few of the exceptions. Instead, relationships are 
developed over time with no need to broadcast the existence of the relationship, or the 
existence of a relationship is kept low profile to minimize the risk of competitive 
signaling (Moore, 1992). A firm can detect relationships that are not publicly announced 
through observation and environmental scanning but this requires resources that are 
limited and costly. Or as Gulati, Nohria & Zaheer (2000: 208) phrase it “the private and 
                                                 
30 On page 51, we acknowledged three dimensions of the quality of information: completeness, 
timeliness, and accurateness. It is important to note that the network itself is a valuable source of 
information about network members especially because it gives timely and accurate information 
(Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Xi and Rowley, 2002). Most information about changes in the 
network structure is not publicly announced; high profile interfirm relationships such as alliances 
and joint ventures are exceptions. However, before this type of information becomes public, it 
might already circulate privately in the network as confidential information or as a rumor. 
Bridging positions are most likely to pick up these types of information because they span diverse 
unconnected groups of firms. Information is more accurate when the same information is 
received from different sources (triangulation of information). The network becomes even more 
important when a firm wants to obtain information about the dissolution of interfirm 
relationships. While marriages are announced and celebrated (establishing an important interfirm 
relationship), the divorce (dissolution of an interfirm relationship) is kept quiet and the same is 
true for firms; for an exception see Jensen (2006). To obtain this kind of information, the most 
reliable source for a firm is to turn to its partner firms.  
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invisible nature of the ties renders the network inimitable, and thus too the information 
that it provides”. 
The resource-based view stresses firm heterogeneity that contradicts both 
assumptions (complete information and no information) that firms are homogenous in 
how knowledgeable they are about the network structure. An important characteristic of 
firms is that they differ in their resources available to them; this difference in available 
resources is likely to translate into different levels of completeness of information about 
the network structure. For example, a firm may spend more or less resources on 
monitoring the environment compared with other firms in the network. Second, the 
current network position a firm occupies is a network resource (Gulati, 1999) that acts as 
a source of information about possible future partners (Uzzi, 1997). The idiosyncratic 
process that has lead to a particular network position is most likely to lead to differences 
in information about the network structure.  
Research on cognitive decision-making processes has shown that individuals have 
a bounded perception of their environment and it seems too strong an assumption that 
firms are completely knowledgeable or uninformed about the network structure. 
Krackhardt (1990) demonstrated that managers occupying central positions in an 
organization have more accurate maps of the network structure than peripheral 
members. This stream of literature focuses on situational and personal factors that 
influence the ability of an individual to perceive the network accurately. For example, 
Casciaro (1998) finds that personality characteristics such as need for affiliation and need 
for achievement positively influences the perception of the network structure while a 
situational factor such as being part-time employed negatively influences the perception 
of the network structure.  
Summarizing, based upon information processing theory, the resource based 
view, and cognitive decision-making we conclude that firms differ in their information 
about the network structure.  
4.2 Network Horizon 
Purposeful shifting of a network position requires that a firm has information 
about the network structure. A firm that only knows (randomly) of the existence of a 
potential partner but does not know how this firm is embedded in the overall network 
cannot accurately assess how partnering with that firm will influence its network position. 
One of the sources firms use to gather information about the network is to use their 
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network position to gather information about the network structure. Information about 
the network is a network resource (Gulati, 1999), the information is scattered among 
partner firms and the partners’ partner firms. In Chapter 2, we introduced the network 
horizon construct and defined it as “the number of firms and their relationships that the 
focal firm knows to exist in an interfirm network as a percentage of the total number of 
firms and relationships in the interfirm network”. The better the firm is in gathering 
information about the network structure, the more aware it will be of valuable network 
positions. The current network position of a firm is an important determinant of the 
network horizon because the network position is an important source of new and novel 
information (Burt, 1992; Reagans & McEvily, 2003).  
Network horizon is distinct from previous work on network perception 
(Freeman, 1992). Network horizon is a construct that captures the completeness of 
information about the network structure while network perception focuses on the extent 
to which an individual is able to map accurately the existing network structure. In the 
remainder of this dissertation, we will focus on the effect of completeness of information 
about the network structure. Inaccurate information about the network structure is most 
likely to be not aware of a relationship while in fact it does exist. The other way around, 
thinking that a relationship exist while in fact it does not is less likely to happen because 
this requires distorted information that is at least semi-private. However, if a firm makes 
a partnering decision based upon inaccurate information about the network structure 
then this information will be updated after the relationship has been established and this 
information will be updated to accurate information. The consequence of such 
partnering action is that the expected benefits of the network position are smaller than 
the actual benefits of the network position. Concluding, we acknowledge the importance 
of information accuracy but it is outside the scope of this study.  
The network horizon construct resembles Friedkin’s notion of horizon of 
observability (1983). The horizon of observability is reached when observability approaches 
zero, e.g. an individual does not have any information beyond the horizon of 
observability. Friedkin (1983) observed in the context of informal control of role 
performance that the horizon of observability is generally two steps. Consider a chain of 
four nodes (A-B-C-D) then A can monitor B and C but cannot monitor D. Anderson et 
al. (1994) used network horizon to delineate the business network from the environment, 
firms that fall within the network horizon are deemed to be relevant for managers’ 
decision-making while firms that fall outside the network horizon belong to the 
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environment. This is consistent with the definition of network horizon, the firms that are 
part of the network horizon are being monitored or have gained the attention of the 
firm, and hence this information is part of the decision-making process.  
4.3 Network Horizon Heterogeneity 
While each firm has a network horizon, this network horizon is not equal for 
each firm. Private or sensitive information does not flow freely through the network31; 
rather it might be shared between close partners or partner’s partners. Two aspects of 
information availability are important, first there is the information distribution 
(Moldoveanu et al., 2003). What information about the network structure is available to 
which firm? Second, there is the information heterogeneity (Moldoveanu et al., 2003), to 
what extent is particular information about the network structure shared (common) 
between firms. The heterogeneity aspect of the network horizon is an important 
determinant of the relative advantage of a firm to detect valuable network positions. The 
more common information about the network structure is, the larger the number of 
firms that will be aware of that particular network position. The probability for a given 
firm to compete for a position increases as the number of firms having the same 
information increases. 
The network horizon of a firm is an important determinant of the opportunity 
set of firms to choose from when the focal firm is going to initiate a new interfirm 
relationship. The information a firm has of the entire network structure constrains the 
possible choices regarding establishing new ties, less information means less firms to 
choose from and therefore limits the possibilities of the focal firm to shift the network 
                                                 
31 The network horizon is the codification (Boisot and Child, 1996) of information about the 
network structure. Codifying this information has two conflicting effects. One, codification of 
information about changes in the network is required for managerial action. If this information is 
not codified and processed it cannot communicated along a firm’s hierarchy and this means that 
is less likely that decision-makers will incorporate the network horizon into their decision making 
process. Two, more codified information diffuses easier through a network compared with 
uncodified information and this means that firms will benefit shorter from this information 
because the time that the information was private to the time the information becomes public 
shortens as well. This means that the network horizon heterogeneity decreases over time. Thus, 
the network horizon is the codification of information about the network structure and is 
required for the decision making process but it also means that it will diffuse easier which 
shortens the time a firm can benefit from this information.  
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position. A firm with a more extended network horizon will be aware of more valuable 
network positions and will therefore have an advantage compared with a firm with a 
smaller network horizon in occupying this network position. A firm that is not part of 
the network horizon can still be considered as a potential partner by the focal firm. 
However, since information about the network position of the potential partner firm is 
lacking it is hard for the focal firm to estimate the effect of linking with that potential 
firm on the focal firms’ bridging position. Firms outside the network horizon that are still 
known to the focal firm, so-called randomly known firms, can strengthen the bridging 
position of the focal firm. However, because these firms do not fall within the network 
horizon of the focal firm, it is less likely that these firms represent opportunities to 
strengthen the focal firms’ bridging position because the technological or  product 
distance is too large (Ahuja, 2000a) or other incompatibilities prevent either firm to 
benefit from establishing such an interfirm relationship. Hence, we hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Firms with a more extended network horizon at time t will occupy a 
stronger bridging position at time t+1. 
 
The second advantage of a more extensive network horizon is that a firm is able to span 
structural holes at a faster rate. The reason for this is that structural holes function as a 
source of information about the network structure. A firm occupying this position is 
more likely to detect opportunities to span new structural holes because it knows what 
benefits of a structural hole and is able to recognize similar opportunities in the network. 
Burt (2002: 334) noted in the context of individuals that “people [without structural 
holes] find it more difficult [compared with people who have structural holes] to see the 
structural holes in a network, and those whose own networks contain bridge 
relationships across structural holes more quickly learn new networks that contain 
structural holes”. Network horizon is hypothesize to lead to a stronger bridging position 
(hypothesis 1) but this starts a virtuous cycle in which the firm is able to span new 
structural holes at a faster rate. These structural holes give information benefits in the 
form of awareness of new brokerage opportunities that allows the focal firm to 
strengthen its bridging position even more. As Burt (2002) notes, social capital accrues to 
firms which already possess social capital and this becomes a virtuous cycle. Therefore, 
we hypothesize:  
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 Hypothesis 2: Firms with a more extended network horizon at time t will 
 strengthen their bridging position at a  faster rate at time t+1. 
 
The intensity of competition for structural holes determines how many structural 
holes a single firm will span. Network horizon heterogeneity captures the degree of 
competitiveness in the network for network positions. The more common information is 
within the network about a given opportunity to span a structural hole, the more likely it 
is that more firms will pursue that given opportunity. Because a firm is inherently 
uncertain about the partnering actions its rivals will undertake, it will try to move first to 
occupy a bridging position. However, when multiple firms adhere to this logic then 
multiple firms will ‘jump in’ the structural hole to bridge it and effectively turn the hole 
into a closed position. Figure 4-1 illustrates this situation. Assume that firms A, B, C, and 
D have complete information of the network structure, while firms E, F, G, and H only 
aware are of each other.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-1 Illustration of the effect of network horizon heterogeneity 
Firms A, B, C, and D realize the potential value that can be unlocked by bridging 
with firm E and firms F, G, and H have a limited network horizon that they are not 
   Effective size Constraint 
Firm A  1.500  0.677 
Firm B  1.000  0.681 
Firm C  1.500  0.677 
Firm D  1.000  0.681 
Firm E  5.571  0.303 
Firm F  1.000  1.000 
Firm G  1.000  1.000 
Firm H  1.000  1.000 
D 
B 
A 
C 
F 
G 
H 
E 
D 
B 
A 
C 
F 
G 
H 
E 
Time t  Time t+1 
  Effective size Constraint 
Firm A  1.667  0.840 
Firm B  1.000  0.889 
Firm C  1.667  0.840 
Firm D  1.000  0.889 
Firm E  3.000  0.333 
Firm F  1.000  1.000 
Firm G  1.000  1.000 
Firm H  1.000  1.000 
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aware of the existence of firms A, B, C, and D. Thus, this network is characterized by a 
high level of network horizon heterogeneity. Because firms A, B, C, and D are uncertain 
about the partnering actions each one is going to take, each firm individually decides to 
pursue the bridging position between firm E and firms A, B, C, and D. Furthermore, it is 
not realistic to expect that firms A, B, C, and D are going to coordinate who is going to 
bridge the position because being the tertius gaudens is a more favorable role (in terms of 
autonomy) than being exploited in a structural hole. The right panel illustrates the result. 
All four firms have established a tie with firm E and none of the four firms will enjoy the 
control benefits of the structural hole because that is foregone. Furthermore, because this 
network is highly redundant the information benefits are minimal as well. A reason why 
firm E may want to have more than one tie to the group of firms is to minimize its 
dependence on any one firm. Consequently, we hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 3: A high level of network horizon heterogeneity at time t will result in 
the weakening of the focal firms’ bridging position at time t+1.  
 
The combined effect of network horizon and network horizon heterogeneity 
leads to a moderating effect. A focal firm with an extended network horizon, in a 
network with a heterogeneous distribution of network horizons is able to sustain its 
network position longer since the limited network horizon of non-focal firms implies a 
lack of information regarding the potential location of structural holes and these firms 
are not able to compete for structural holes. This implies that the focal firm’s position is 
more likely to be stronger. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Firms with a more extended network horizon at time t and in a 
network with high network horizon heterogeneity will have a stronger bridging 
position at time t+1. 
 
The final hypothesis concerns the diminishing effect of network horizon. As the 
network horizon increases, the number of potential network positions that can be 
pursued increases as well. This requires the ability to distinguish ‘very valuable’ structural 
holes form ‘valuable’ structural holes. Pollock et al. (2004) observed that not every 
structural hole is as valuable, it takes training to be able to distinguish the very valuable 
from the valuable structural holes. Baum and Rowley (2004) found in the Canadian 
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investment bank industry that managers have difficulty distinguishing unconstrained 
from constrained structural holes. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 5: There is a ∩32 relationship between network horizon and the 
strength of the bridging position.  
4.4 Methodology Study 1 – Network Experiments 
We adopt a multi-method (Brewer & Hunter, 1989) approach for investigating 
the effect of network horizon and network horizon heterogeneity on the number of 
structural holes a firm spans. There are five reasons to adopt a multi-method approach 
(Mingers, 2001), the two most important reasons are increasing the internal validity and 
the generalizability of the study.  
First, we use network experiments to test the hypotheses because it creates an 
environment in which it is possible to manipulate how participants use information in 
their decision-making to improve their network position. Second, we use computational 
modeling to explore the effect of network horizon and network horizon heterogeneity 
and the number of structural holes a firm spans in a large network. In this section of the 
chapter, we will not test the hypotheses but evaluate the effect size of network horizon 
and network horizon heterogeneity. We do not statistical test the hypotheses with the 
generated data from the computational model because given enough replications we will 
find significant results.  
4.4.1 Participants and research design 
We employed a random assigned within-subject design (Shadish et al., 2002). 
Three types of participants participated in the experiments. We had 210 managers from a 
large Dutch insurance firm and their insurance brokers participate as well as 126 students 
from different business administration graduate courses participate. Finally, we used a 
fixed student team (15 participants) that participated in multiple experiments. For the 
managers, insurance brokers, and the student team we used a scenario consisting of 
fifteen firms, for the graduate students we used a scenario of fourteen firms. The 
students participated individually in the experiments, the managers teamed up with an 
insurance broker. We will control for these differences by including dummy variables in 
                                                 
32 The ∩ symbol denotes an inverted U-shaped relationship that suggests diminishing returns.  
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the analysis. We randomly assigned each participant to the condition of either a limited 
network horizon or a complete network horizon. We replicated the experiment fifty-
three times in twenty-four sessions. In order to replicate experiments, we conducted 
multiple experiments in a single session. Table 4-1 summarizes the descriptions of the 
participants. 
Participants Number 
of 
sessions 
Number of 
experiments 
Number of 
participants 
Years of 
industry 
experience  
(average / s. d.) 
Scenario 
used 
Managers & insurance 
brokers 
7 12 210 15.49 /9.19 15 firms 
Students 9 19 126 0.0 / 0.0 14 firms 
Student team 8 22 15 0.0 / 0.0 15 firms 
Total 24 53 351   
Table 4-1 Descriptives of the participants of the experiments 
4.4.2 Network experiments 
Each participant runs a firm in a business network that is situated in the 
insurance industry. A participant becomes the winner by simultaneously optimizing gross 
margin and net income. In order to improve its financial performance a participant has 
two key levers it can pull. First, a participant can change its network position by 
establishing a new tie or terminating an existing tie. Second, a participant can invest in 
new capabilities, specialize in existing capabilities, or dismantle current capabilities. These 
two levers are sometimes referred to as the ‘make or buy’ decision (Jacobides & Hitt, 
2005). The experiments consists of two cycles, each cycle is five times repeated. The first 
cycle is the information-gathering period. A participant can analyze its current financial 
performance and devise alternative strategies (investing in a new relationship or investing 
in a capability) during this phase. The second cycle is called a decision point.  
A participant decides, during a decision point, to invest either in relationships or in 
capabilities. A decision point is succeeded by the next information-gathering period. This 
information-gathering period is used to assess the consequences of the decisions made 
during the previous decision point. These cycles last in total for thirty minutes per 
experiment. We refer for a more extensive description of the network experiments to 
Chapter 3.  
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4.4.3 Experimental procedure 
The participants were seated behind a computer after arrival in the computer lab 
where the experiments were conducted. Before the experiments started, an extensive 
one-and-half hour explanation of the network experiment was given. During this 
explanation, the participants played one round of the network experiment to teach them 
where to find relevant information, how to make decisions, and how to assess the impact 
of their decisions. The data obtained from this practice round was discarded. Participants 
were free to ask the instructors questions about the interface of the network experiment. 
After the exercise round, control questions were distributed to verify whether the 
participants had a sufficient understanding of the network experiment to play it 
independently. Answers to these were checked and if necessary, some additional 
instruction was given to the participant before the experiments started. It was forbidden 
for participants to talk with each other and neither was there any help from the 
instructors during the second and third round, the rounds that were used for data 
collection. There was a debriefing session at the end of the experiments for educational 
purposes. The winner, the participant with the highest gross margin at the end of the 
experiments of a session was awarded with a gift coupon worth $25; the other 
participants received a fixed fee of $10.  
4.4.4 Dependent variables 
Number of structural holes the focal firm spans: we use two measures to 
count the number of structural holes of the focal firm. The first measure is effective size 
and the second measure is constraint. The definition for effective size is (Burt, 1992: 52): 
Definition 20: effective size of firm i = .,,1 jiqmp
j q
jqiq ≠






−∑ ∑  
Sum j is the set of partner firms (alters). piq is the proportion of i's network time 
and energy invested in the relationship with q and mjq is the marginal strength of j’s 
relation with contact q (Burt, 1992: 51).  
piq = 
( )
( )
ji
j
≠






+
+
∑
,
z  z
z  z
jiij
qiiq
 and mjq = 
( )
( ) kj ≠+
+
,
z  zmax
z  z
kjjk
qjjq
 
zjq is the network variable measuring the strength of relation j to q (Burt, 1992: 
51). Effective size measures the extent to which ties in the ego network are non-
redundant and is therefore a measure of the information benefits of a structural hole. 
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When the degree of a firm (the number of ties it has) is equal to its effective size it means 
that every single tie gives access to new information. Effective size can never be greater 
than the degree of a firm. When the effective size is not equal to the degree of a firm 
than ego’s network of the firm is to some extent redundant. Effective size is an 
unstandardized measure with values ranging from one to the network size minus one. 
We use this operationalization for the simulation as well. 
For the robustness test, we calculate for each firm the strength of its bridging 
position by using Burt’s (1992) network constraint measure. Constraint measures the 
extent to which a firm is dependent on its partner firms and is therefore a measure of the 
control benefits of a structural hole. When a firm it highly dependent on its network 
partners it means that it has little autonomy and therefore little control over the outcome 
of its activities. Constraint is a normalized measure with values ranging form zero to one 
where one means that a firm is very constrained and does not span any structural holes 
and zero means a firm is very unconstrained and spans many structural holes. This is 
contrary to the effective size measure, hence to clarify the interpretation of the network 
constraint variable we inverse this measure by taking 1- network constraint. Furthermore, 
we convert it to a percentage by multiplying it by 100. The definition for network 
constraint is (Burt, 1992: 60): 
Definition 21: network constraint of firm i = .,
2
jqippp
q
qjiqij ≠≠






+∑   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-2 Illustration of network constraint  
4.4.5 Independent variables 
We use two different operationalizations for the network horizon independent 
variable. The first operationalization of network horizon is a dummy variable that states 
whether the focal firm has a limited or extended network horizon. This first 
operationalization is according to how we set up the experiment and we will use this 
operationalization for the robustness tests.  
i = focal firm, j = alter 1 firm i, q = alter n of firm i 
ijp = investment of firm i's time and energy in the 
relationship with firm j;  
qjiq pp  = joint investment of time and energy of firm 
i and firm q in a relationship with firm j.  
i j 
q
q 
q
ijp  
iqp qjp
∑
q
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The second operationalization of network horizon is as follows. The concept of 
network horizon has a natural translation to the graph-theoretic concept of 
neighborhood (Bondy & Murty, 1976). To formally define network horizon, let the 
network be modeled as a graph G = (V, E); consisting of a vertex set V (the firms) and 
an edge set E (the ties between firms). Let d(u,v) be the geodesic distance between firms 
u and v, i.e. the smallest number of ties that need to be traveled to reach v from u. The  
k-neighborhood of firm u is then defined as: 
 
Definition 22: k-neighborhood: { }kv)d(u,|V)( ≤∈= vuN k  
 In other words: the k-neighborhood of u consists of all firms v that can be 
reached from u in at most k steps, including u itself33. Firm u’s network horizon is then 
defined as the percentage of firms of the total network that are in firm u’s  
k-neighborhood, formally stated:  
Definition 23: network horizon: %100*
)()(
V
uN
uNH kk = ,  
where )(uN k  and V  denote the number of firms in u’s k-neighborhood and V 
respectively and we will say that v is within u’s network horizon when )(uNv k∈ . Note 
that this definition is general enough to allow for different definitions of distance to 
determine the neighborhood (see Ahuja, Ergun, Orlin, & Punnen, (2002) for an 
overview) as well as varying levels of k (the ‘depth’ of the neighborhood).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33 Strictly speaking, u cannot be a neighbor of itself, but since we want to model formally a 
generalization of the ego network of u, we need to include u and hence adapt the definition of k-
neighborhood accordingly. 
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Figure 4-3 Illustration of the vertices in the k neighborhood for k=1 and k=2 
A firm with a k-step network horizon has information about all the firms and ties 
that can be reached in maximum k steps. A limited network horizon is operationalized as 
a 2-step network horizon. A complete network horizon is operationalized as a network 
horizon that is equal to the longest geodesic distance plus one. A geodesic is the shortest 
path connecting two firms in a network. Suppose there is a fork network structure (see 
Figure 4-4) with four firms (A, B, C, and D). A is connected to B, B is connected to C 
and to D and C and D are connected. When the network horizon of A would be equal to 
the longest geodesic distance from A to D, which is two, then A would be unaware of 
the tie between C and D.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-4 Illustration of k-step network horizon 
Therefore, to have a network horizon that captures the whole network structure, 
the network horizon should be equal to the longest geodesic distance plus one. The 
longest geodesic distance is a path of eight in the network experiment. Thus, the 
complete network horizon in the experimental setting equals nine steps. The 2-step 
operationalization is consistent with Friedkin’s (1983) finding that people have difficulty 
observing the network more than two steps away and is consistent with the local tie 
approach Baum et al. (2005) introduces. The full network horizon is consistent with the 
(implicit) assumption underlying most network literature that firms have complete 
knowledge of the network.  
u 
v w 
x y 
z 
N1(U) 
N2(U) 
A B 
C 
D 
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The second operationalization of network horizon is a continuous variable that 
counts how many firms the focal firm can ‘see’. For firms with a limited network horizon 
we count the number of firms that can be reached within two steps, for firms that have 
an extended (or full) network horizon the number of firms the focal firm sees is equal to 
the network size (depending on the scenario 14 or 15 firms). This variable is updated 
after each decision point.  
The second independent variable is the rate at which the bridging position is 
strengthened. We calculate this by multiplying network horizon and time and use this 
variable to test hypothesis 2 (Singer & Willett, 2003). 
The independent variable network horizon was randomly assigned to the 
participants using the configuration tool belonging to the network experiment 
environment – assigning individual firms a network horizon is an implicit configuration 
of the network horizon heterogeneity. The network horizon heterogeneity was 
determined using the ratio of firms with a limited network horizon and firms with a 
complete network horizon. Figure 4-5 and Figure 4-6 illustrate the effect of having a 
limited or a full network horizon in the network experiment environment. Different 
ratios of individual network horizons translate into different levels of network horizon 
heterogeneity. There are multiple ways to conceptualize this heterogeneity, each with 
different underlying theoretical rationales (see Klein & Harrison (2007) for more detail 
on the different ways). The underlying attribute that is heterogeneous (network horizon) 
represents a socially valued asset or resource of the firms, the appropriate 
conceptualization is of the disparity-type, which can be measured by the inequality or 
relative concentration measures such as the Gini-coefficient or the coefficient of 
variation (Klein & Harrison, 2007). We opt for the Gini-coefficient (Weisstein, 2006), 
which results in the following definition of network horizon heterogeneity (NHH) for a 
given network G (V,E):  
Definition 2434: 
( )
µ22
)(
)(
V
vNHuNH
GNHH Vu Vv
kk∑∑
∈ ∈
−
=  
where µ represent the average network horizon of all actors in G and k 
represents the number of steps a firm can see in its network. A network horizon 
heterogeneity value of zero indicates that there is perfect equality of the network 
                                                 
34 The Gini coefficient is calculated as the mean difference between every possible pair of firms, 
divided by the mean. 
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horizons among the different firms. A value of one indicates that there is maximum 
inequality: one firm has information about the whole network structure and the other 
firms do not have any information. We use this operationalization for the simulation as 
well. This is the third independent variable.  
 
Figure 4-5 Screenshot network experiment with full network horizon (focal firm Phoenix) 
 
Figure 4-6 Screenshot network experiment with limited network horizon (focal firm Hermes) 
Strengthening of Bridging Positions 
 103 
The fourth independent variable is the network horizon heterogeneity multiplied 
by time (Singer & Willett, 2003), this variable is used to measure the rate of change of the 
strength of a bridging position due to the network horizon heterogeneity. The fifth and 
final independent variable is network horizon squared; we use this variable to measure 
the diminishing returns of network horizon. 
4.4.6 Control variables 
We add the following control variables to rule out alternative explanations for the 
strengthening of a firm’s bridging position: 
Density. A denser network indicates the existence of dense cliques. Brokering 
between such cliques has a positive effect on the strength of a bridging position and thus 
networks with a higher level of density will have firms with stronger bridging positions. 
Density is calculated as: ( ) jinn
xij
≠
−
∑
,
1
 where xij represents the value of a relationship 
between i and j (assuming that xij only takes values of 0 or 1) and n is the number of 
nodes in the network. 
Effective size at t-1 / network constraint at t-1. A firm that spans many 
structural holes at t-1 will span many structural holes at t because the structural holes 
gives information advantages to discover new structural holes.  
Outdegree. A firm with a greater outdegree will span more structural holes 
compared with a firm with a lower outdegree. Outdegree centrality is calculated as: 
∑
i
ijx or the sum of relationships firm i maintains.  
Betweenness centrality. A firm with a greater betweenness centrality is more 
often on the shortest path between any two random chosen firms and will therefore span 
more structural holes. Betweenness centrality is calculated as: ∑∑ ≠≠
i j ij
ikj kji
g
g
,  gij is 
the number of geodesic paths from i to j, gikj is the number of geodesic paths that pass 
along k and a geodesic path is the shortest path connecting two nodes in a network 
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994). 
Number of capabilities owned. The more capabilities a firm owns the less 
dependent this firm becomes on other firms and will therefore span fewer structural 
holes.  
Attractiveness partner firms. Partner firms that posses many capabilities are 
more attractive to partner with compared with partner firms that fewer capabilities. Thus, 
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if the focal firm has access to attractive partners then it is likely that firms will partner 
with a bridging firm that has the most attractive partners. This variable is calculated by 
summing the total number of capabilities possessed by the partner firms and divided by 
the number of partner firms.  
Furthermore, we add dummy variables for each firm, each type of strategy, a 
firm’s initial network position and the size of the network.  
4.5 Analysis and Results – Network Experiments 
We use a multi-level model with random coefficients and random slopes to 
estimate the effect of network horizon and network horizon heterogeneity on the 
number of structural holes a firm spans. We use a multi-level model with random effects 
and random slopes to determine: a) whether there is a difference in the intercept of the 
number of structural holes a firm spans because of a firm’s network horizon and b) 
whether there is a difference in the rate of spanning new structural holes because of a 
firm’s network horizon. Furthermore, the observations are nested in multiple levels: the 
firm observations are nested in the experiment observations; this requires a multi-level 
model to take into account this dependence. We control for the following differences 
between the firms that remain constant throughout the experiment such as different 
strategies (product leadership, customer intimacy and operational excellence), different 
initial network position, different cost structures for the different capabilities, whether 
students or managers were the participants of the experiments and if the scenario 
consists of fourteen or fifteen firms.  
We estimate five models with as dependent variable firm effective size. The first 
mode is the unconditional growth model. This model depicts the general trend we 
observe in the 53 experiments. This model is used as a baseline to calculate to what 
extent the next models improve upon this model. There are no predictor variables in this 
model except for time. Before continuing the analysis, we first test whether the 
experimental treatment (network horizon is limited vs. network horizon is full) leads to 
different averages of the effective size of a firm. Running a one-way ANOVA confirms 
that at each time observation the means are significantly different (p = 0.000). Table 4-2 
summarizes the means, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum for each variable 
(excluding the dummy variables). 
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The second model is a baseline model, this model explains the number of 
structural holes a firm spans based on the control variables. The third model adds the 
network horizon main effect to test hypothesis 1 (network horizon leads to more 
structural holes) and hypothesis 2 (network horizon leads to a faster rate of spanning 
structural holes). In the fourth model, we test hypothesis 3, we add the effect of network 
horizon heterogeneity on the number of structural holes a firm spans and hypothesis 4 
that a greater inequality of network horizon among the firms leads to a faster rate of 
spanning new structural holes. Finally, the fifth model adds the diminishing effects of 
network horizon to test hypothesis 5. The estimates of the coefficients are robust across 
the three models and all three models are significant (p = 0.0000). However, according to 
the AIC information criterion is model 5 the best fitting model and according to the BIC 
information criterion is model 3 the best fitting model. We interpret the results based on 
model 5 because the direction and significance of model 3 and model 5 are compatible. 
The results of these models are presented in Table 4-3.  
The effect of network horizon is positive and significant, confirming hypothesis 1 
that states that firms with a more extended network horizon are more aware of brokerage 
opportunities and hence will span more structural holes. This finding is illustrated in 
Figure 4-7. 
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White indicates that a firm has a full network horizon; black indicates that a firm 
has a limited network horizon. Size of the sphere indicates the effective size; the size of 
the sphere is proportional to the number of structural holes it spans (measured as 
effective size). Hypothesis 2 is confirmed as well; the direction of coefficient is as 
expected and is significant. This finding suggests that firms that have a more extended 
network horizon not only span more structural holes but also at a faster rate compared 
with firms that have a limited network horizon.  
 
Figure 4-7 Network structure at the end of an experiment 
The coefficient for the third hypothesis is negative and significant as we predicted 
in hypothesis 3. The focal firm is worse off because the competition for structural holes 
intensifies when there is a greater heterogeneity between the firms about what they know 
of the network structure. Higher network horizon heterogeneity indicates that a small 
group of firms spot valuable brokerage opportunities that lead to a temporal 
strengthening of the focal firm’s bridging position but the partnering decisions of the 
competing firms are likely to adversely impact the bridging position of the focal firm. 
The sustainability of a bridging position will be further investigated in Chapter 5. The 
coefficient of the fourth hypothesis is positive and significant, in line with hypothesis 4. 
This means that as the competition for valuable brokerage positions intensifies, the firms 
that have a comparative advantage will be able to span at faster rate new structural holes. 
This finding is consistent with the finding in hypothesis 2. Finally, the fifth hypothesis is 
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significant; the direction of the coefficient is coincides with our expectations. This 
finding suggests that there might be a point where too much information about the 
network structure leads to sub-optimal decision-making. This suggests that bounded 
rationality plays a role during the partnering decision-making process. Participants have 
increasingly difficulty to shift their network position and to assess accurately the impact 
of their partnering decision on the strength of their bridging position as more 
information about the network structure becomes available. The participants (in the 
experiments) start to have difficulty with analyzing all the information about the network 
structure and do not recognize the opportunity to span new structural holes while these 
brokerage opportunities do exist. An alternative explanation could be that there is a 
limited information processing capacity of the participants due to the short time given to 
them to make their decisions.  
4.5.1 Robustness tests 
In order to increase the convergent validity of the previous findings, we re-
estimate the previous model using two alternative operationalizations. First, we estimate 
four new models with as dependent variable network constraint; see Table 4-4 for the 
new models. The coefficients are significant and the signs of the coefficients are 
according to our predictions and thus confirming our hypotheses. Second, we estimate 
the full model using effective size as the dependent variable for the sub population of the 
managers and the sub population of the student team (see Table 4-5). The robustness 
tests confirm the previous findings, leading to the overall conclusion that network 
horizon and network horizon heterogeneity are significant predictors of the number of 
structural holes a firm spans.  
Network horizon is a robust predictor of the number of structural holes a firm 
spans. However, what is the magnitude of this effect? Table 4-6 present the effect sizes 
of the network horizon of a firm. The average effective size in the experiments was 
2.8340 structural holes. The focal firm is able to expand its effective size with 1.2594 
firms, which is an increase of 44.44%. Intense competition for structural holes is 
expected to decrease the effective size of the focal firm by 8.49% or a reduction in its 
effective size of -0.2405.  
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Dependent variable is 
effective size  
Hypothesis and 
expected sign 
Model 3 -  
Main effect 
(managers as 
participants) 
Model 3 -  
Main effect  
(student team 
as 
participants) 
Model 5 -  
Main effect  
(student team 
as 
participants) 
Time   -0.353**  -0.092*  -0.123**  
      0.108 0.04 0.045 
Effective size t-1  0.068*  0.116*** 0.126*** 
      0.029 0.02 0.02 
Outdegree   0.455*** 0.549*** 0.550*** 
      0.028 0.018 0.018 
Betweenness centrality   1.700*** 2.292*** 2.221*** 
      0.279 0.21 0.211 
Number of capabilities owned  -0.083 -0.085**  -0.098*** 
      0.045 0.028 0.028 
Attractiveness partner firms   0.278*  -0.062 -0.088 
      0.132 0.062 0.061 
Network horizon  H1: + 0.031* 0.033*** 0.149*** 
      0.016 0.007 0.023 
Rate of change network 
horizon  
H2: + 0.025*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 
      0.007 0.003 0.003 
Network horizon 
heterogeneity 
H3: -           -0.113*** 
                0.032 
Rate of change network 
horizon  
heterogeneity 
H4: +           -0.005*** 
                0.001 
Network horizon2  H5: -           0.024*  
                0.011 
Constant    -0.677 1.838*** 1.672*** 
      0.808 0.305 0.315 
     
AIC  1783.33 2659.28 2630.13 
BIC  1947.899 2841.803 2828.758 
Number of observations  814 1585 1585 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Table 4-5 Re-estimated models for the student team and managers as participants 
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Coefficient Coefficient 
(full model) 
Standard 
deviation 
Effect size Impact on 
effective size 
Network horizon firm i 0.099 4.4890 0.4444 1.2594 
Network horizon x network 
horizon heterogeneity 
-0.063 1.3470 -0.0849 -0.2405 
Table 4-6 Effect size of network horizon on the effective size of a firm 
The previous sections showed that network horizon is a robust predictor of the 
number of structural holes a firm spans. Figure 4-8 visualizes models 3 (panel 1) and 5 
(panel 2) of Table 4-3. Both models are consistent in their prediction that firms with 
limited network horizon (defined as average horizon minus one standard deviation which 
is roughly 5 firms) will see their effective size decrease over time. What is striking about 
panel 1 of Figure 4-8 is that the slope of the line for full network horizon is very gentle. 
This suggests that network horizon is a required but insufficient condition for a firm to 
be able to span structural holes. Even though the information about brokerage 
opportunities is available, participants in the experiments were, on average, not able to 
increase their effective size. The implication of this finding is that participants do not 
understand the benefits of a structural hole ex ante of the experiment. This finding is 
consistent with Burt and Ronchi’s (2007) finding that teaching executives about the 
structure of social capital enhances their performance because of their better 
understanding of how social capital functions.  
Panel 2 illustrates the effect of incorporating network horizon heterogeneity and 
shows that even though individuals may not be able to increase their effective size, they 
can increase their effective size because of the inequality between firms in their network 
horizon.  
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Figure 4-8 Illustration of model 3 and model 5 
Depending on the participant group there is a different explanation why this 
particular group did not span more structural holes even though the information to do so 
was available. There are two reasons why students are able to span more structural holes 
than the managers did. First, students from the student team repeatedly participated with 
the experiments and hence gained a better understanding of how to make a firm 
profitable. Because the experiments were designed in such a way that it is beneficial to 
span structural holes, the students discovered that to be more profitable it is 
advantageous to span structural holes. Although they did not know the concept of a 
structural hole, they did understand that occupying a brokering position helped them in 
winning an experiment. 
Students have less knowledge about how the insurance industry functions and are 
therefore freer to take advantage of the information given to them. Students are not 
constrained by ‘industry rules’ while managers who have worked their entire career in this 
specific industry are more inclined to adhere to the way business is done as they know it. 
Figure 4-9 illustrates how students and managers differ in their capability of spanning 
structural holes. Students from the student team learn how to recognize brokerage 
opportunities and span significant more holes at a faster rate compared with the 
managers as participants. Furthermore, they seem to learn how to mitigate the effect of a 
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limited network horizon and have a less steep decline of their effective size. However, an 
alternative explanation should also be noted: members of the student team become more 
proficient in using and understanding the network experiment. This experience increases 
their ability to strengthen their firms’ bridging positions.  
 
Figure 4-9 Illustration of effect network horizon for managers and students 
4.6 Methodology Study 2 – Computational Modeling 
The second study continues with the conclusion of the first study, namely that 
network horizon is a required but insufficient condition for a firm to shift its network 
position. In the second study, we use a computational modeling approach that 
overcomes two drawbacks of the first study. First, using a computational modeling 
approach allows us to model network behavior in which all the firms are acting in a 
network position optimizing way. In the first study, it was beneficial for participants to 
span structural holes however; it required them to grasp the concept of structural holes. 
With the computational modeling approach, we model the behavior of firms in such a 
way that firms will try to span as many structural holes as possible. Second, a 
computational modeling approach allows us to use larger networks with greater network 
horizon heterogeneity. Therefore, using a computational approach to model explicitly the 
network horizon of individual firms we can investigate under different circumstances the 
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effect of network horizon and the number of structural holes a firm spans. Furthermore, 
simulation studies can be used to create new and novel theories through systematic 
experimentation (Davis, Bingham, & Eisenhardt, 2007). Especially when data are hard to 
obtain (Gibbons, 2004) or non-linear, longitudinal, and multi-level processes are studied 
(Davis et al., 2007). We discuss the computational model and the partnering algorithm in 
detail in Chapter 5 (on page 132) because Chapter 5 is solely based on the simulation. 
The data that are used for the analysis in this chapter are the same as in Chapter 5.  
4.7 Analysis and Results – Computational Model 
We ran fifteen different experimental settings with the simulation. For sake of 
simplicity, we use two groups of firms each with a different network horizon. In the first 
four sessions, we keep the network horizon heterogeneity constant at 0.00 and increase 
the network horizon from 5 firms (5% of entire network structure is known to a firm) in 
session 1 to 50 firms (50% of entire network structure is known to a firm) in session 4.  
 Experimental 
condition 
NHHs,t=0  
Experimental 
condition average 
network horizon (at 
t=0) 
Assigned random 
term  group 1  
(N is number of 
firms, α = random 
term) 
Assigned random 
term group 2 
Session 1  .000 5 firms  N = 100; α = 5 firms  
Session 2 .000 10 firms  N = 100; α = 10 firms  
Session 3 .000 25 firms  N = 100; α = 25 firms 
Session 4 .000 50 firms  N = 100; α = 50 firms  
Session 5 .250 5.47 firms N = 93; α = 4 firms  N = 7; α = 25 firms  
Session 6 .250 10.3 firms N = 78; α = 7 firms N = 22; α = 22 firms  
Session 7 .248 25.28 firms N = 86; α = 18 firms  N = 14; α = 70 firms  
Session 8 .253 53.54 firms N = 27; α = 17 firms  N = 63; α = 75 firms  
Session 9 .521 4.99 firms N = 87; α = 2 firms N = 13; α = 25 firms  
Session 10 .500 12.36 firms N = 84; α = 5 firms   N = 16; α = 51 firms  
Session 11 .499 25.28 firms N = 63; α = 8 firms  N = 37; α = 72 firms   
Session 12 .496 42.3 firms N = 53; α = 9 firms  N = 47; α = 99 firms  
Session 13 .751 6.39 firms N = 89; α = 1 firm  N = 11; α = 50 firms  
Session 14 .750 12.67 firms N = 89; α = 2 firms  N = 11; α = 99 firms  
Session 15 .745 22.56 firms N = 78; α = 1 firm  N = 22; α = 99 firms  
Session 16 It is not possible to have a network with 100 firms, average network horizon of 50 firms and 
network horizon heterogeneity of .75. This can only be achieved by increasing the network 
size. 
Table 4-7 Configuration of computational model 
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In the next four sessions (session 5 to session 8), we keep the network horizon 
heterogeneity constant at .25 and run a session with average network horizon of 5%, 
10%, 25% and 50% (to replicate the first four sessions). Session 9 to session 12 have a 
network horizon heterogeneity of .50 and session 13 to 15 have a network horizon 
heterogeneity of .75. Due to rounding errors, some sessions do not exactly match the 
initial values of the first four sessions. Table 4-7 summarizes the experimental setup of 
the simulation. Figure 4-10 gives a first illustration of the relationship between network 
horizon and the average strength of a bridging position. This figure controls for the 
density of the network. As expected, as the density of the network increases so does the 
average strength of a bridging position. This figure illustrates clearly that as a firm 
expands its network horizon, it strengthens its bridging position. This relationship is even 
more pronounced as the density of the network increases.  
Figure 4-10 Average effective size, density and network horizon 
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The next figure, Figure 4-11, illustrates the relationship between average strength 
of a bridging position, network horizon and network horizon heterogeneity. The average 
strength of a bridging position increases as the network horizon expands from zero firms 
to 56 firms assuming a low level of network horizon heterogeneity. The average effect of 
network horizon diminishes as the network horizon heterogeneity increases but this is 
because this figure represents averages for all the firms in the network. This suggests that 
there are diminishing returns to network horizon. For a given network, there is a certain 
level of completeness of the network horizon within the network that once it has been 
reached, a firm will not benefit from any additional information that leads to further 
improvement of the network position. This finding of diminishing returns is consistent 
with hypothesis 5 of the previous study, which suggested the existence of a ∩-shaped 
relationship between network horizon and the number of structural holes a firm spans. A 
greater heterogeneity indicates that on average most firms have a limited network 
horizon while a few firms have a very extensive network horizon. This means that, on 
average, firms have a weaker bridging position.  
Figure 4-11 Average effective size, network horizon and network horizon heterogeneity 
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Increased levels of network horizon heterogeneity result in more dynamic 
bridging positions as is illustrated by Figure 4-12. Especially firms with a high network 
horizon in a network characterized by a high level of network horizon heterogeneity 
experience increased levels of competitions since the variance of the strength of their  
Figure 4-12 Variance effective size, network horizon and network horizon heterogeneity 
4.8 Conclusion 
This study demonstrates, using both network experiments and computational 
modeling, that the network horizon of a firm is one of the factors that explain why 
certain firms span more structural holes in their network than other firms do. In an 
extensive review on the literature about structural holes done by Burt (2000) he 
concluded that “structural holes are the source of value added, but network closure can 
be essential to realizing the value buried in the holes”. The most rational action from the 
perspective of an individual firm is to maximize the number of structural holes in its 
network. This study indicates that in order to maximize the number of structural holes it 
is important to have an extensive network horizon but this in itself is an insufficient 
requirement. Firms, in essence the people running firms, have to recognize the value a 
brokerage opportunity represents. Only when decision-makers understand the value of a 
brokerage network position and have sufficient information about the network structure 
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then they will be able to span more structural holes and hence improve their firm’s 
network position. Only when these two conditions are satisfied will a firm span more 
structural holes if it has an extensive network horizon.  
The second finding of this study is that the network horizon heterogeneity is a 
robust predictor for the difference in the number of structural holes a firm spans. 
Networks that are more heterogeneous lead to greater differences between firms in the 
strength of their bridging positions.  
This research raises a new challenge for management: given the fact that 
resources are scarce and a more expanded network horizon can be beneficial, which area 
of a network structure should be monitored? As most networks are invisible, it is not 
apparent who has ties with whom; an interesting question becomes how to recognize a 
network structure that has many opportunities to span structural holes without having a 
complete overview of the network. However, the fact that we found diminishing returns 
suggests that a firm does not have to monitor the complete network in order to find an 
efficient network position.  
Network horizon is a dynamic construct, the information a firm has of the 
network can increase or decrease over time. New sources of information are tapped into 
by establishing new non-redundant ties that in turn will increase the available information 
about the network structure, while disbanding ties will result in a loss of information 
about the network structure. Firms can decide to invest more time and energy in 
monitoring the network and thereby expanding the information they have about the 
network structure. By bringing in a firm construct (network horizon) in the explanation 
of network structure properties and the explanation of network structure emergence, we 
move away from a pure structuralist perspective (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994) and take 
into consideration firm attributes. In the next chapter, we will focus on how long a firm 
can benefit from its bridging position. 
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5 The Sustainability of  Bridging Positions  
In the previous chapter, we focused on the effect of network horizon on the 
network position. In this chapter35,36, we will focus whether firms are able to benefit 
longer from a particular network position due to their network horizon.  
Why are some firms able to sustain their competitive advantage longer than 
others? For resources owned or controlled by the firm, the resource-based view (RBV) 
gives a clear answer: the firm's resources should be valuable, rare, inimitable and 
imperfectly substitutable (Barney, 1991). However, when the sources of competitive 
advantage reside outside the boundaries of the firm (Dyer & Singh, 1998), the situation 
becomes less clear (Lavie, 2006). In a networked environment, firms can obtain the 
benefits of resources from partners without controlling the resources themselves and so 
can other firms for the same resources, which makes the inimitability and imperfect 
substitutability conditions of the traditional RBV less applicable (Lavie, 2006). At the 
same time, the burgeoning literature on the effects of network position on performance 
suggests that certain network positions can confer at least a temporary competitive 
advantage (Burt, 1992; Powell et al., 1999; Zaheer & Bell, 2005), especially due to its 
complex, causally ambiguous nature (Wilcox King, 2007). Furthermore, empirical 
observation shows that networks change (Baum et al., 2003; Powell et al., 2005), not just 
through exogenous events (Madhavan et al., 1998), but also endogenously as a result of 
purposeful firm action to improve their position and achieve a competitive advantage. 
For instance, studies in the airline and telecommunication industries show that firms 
respond to alliances of competitors by announcing alliances of their own aimed at 
countervailing the effects of the competitors’ alliances (Gimeno, 2004; Gulati & Singh, 
                                                 
35 A previous version of this chapter was presented as a paper by van Liere, D. W. 2006. The Life 
Span of Structural Holes. Paper presented at the Academy of Management, Atlanta, GA. 
36 This chapter is currently available as a working paper at the Social Science Research Network: 
van Liere, D. W., & Koppius, O. R. 2007a. Network Horizon and the Sustainability of Network-
Based Competitive Advantage. Working Paper at SSRN. Available at: 
http://ssrn.com/paper=963040.  
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1998). Given these and other network dynamics, how can we then explain the 
sustainability of bridging positions? 
In this chapter, we offer one possible explanation. The departure point of our 
explanation is that in order to achieve competitive advantage, firms need to have accurate 
expectations of future resource value (Barney, 1986), because such information is crucial 
for discerning entrepreneurial opportunities (Burt, 1992; Kirzner, 1997; Ozgen & Baron, 
2007). In a networked setting, entrepreneurial opportunities for competitive advantage 
are presented by occupying certain specific network positions in the overall network 
structure (Burt, 1992; 2000). Thus, having information about the network structure 
enables a firm to locate and obtain valuable network positions (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999) 
before others do and potentially achieving a competitive advantage. We therefore 
introduced the construct of network horizon, in Chapter 2, that describes the information 
that a firm has about the network structure it is embedded in (a more formal definition 
will follow in a subsequent section). We expect firms with an extensive network horizon 
to be able to maintain their favorable positions longer. Furthermore, since firms in 
general can be expected to differ in their expectations of future resource value (Makadok 
& Barney, 2001), specifically in a network setting this implies that different firms will 
have different network horizons. These information differences will translate into 
different entrepreneurial opportunities being perceived (Denrell et al., 2003), and hence 
firms with different network horizons will strive for different network positions. The 
resulting dynamics are likely to affect the sustainability of firms’ network positions, and 
we therefore introduced the construct of network horizon heterogeneity, in Chapter 2, which 
describes how the network horizon differs across firms (a formal definition will follow in 
a subsequent section). 
Previous work on the dynamics of network position suggests that firms may shift 
their position for instance due to resource dependence motives (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978), competitive pressure (Bae & Gargiulo, 2004) or competition within (Gimeno, 
2004) or between networks (Gomes-Casseres, 1996). These changes in the network 
structure reflect competitive dynamics between firms that are pursuing a competitive 
advantage. All of these explanations have the assumption in common that firms are 
aware of the changes in the network, have information about their potential partner firms 
and detect opportunities in the network to shift their network position. Investigating 
what happens when we allow for interfirm differences in this information assumption is 
the focus of this chapter. This is also what differentiates us from recent research that 
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looked at the dynamics and sustainability of network positions – structural holes in 
particular – (Bala & Goyal, 2000; Buskens & van de Rijt, 2005; Sorenson & Ryall, 2007), 
who investigate different influences on network dynamics, but assume that all actors 
have complete information of the network. Our focus on information in the form of 
network horizon and network horizon heterogeneity can add substantial empirical and 
theoretical insight to this emerging literature for three reasons. First, we have a limited 
understanding to what extent organizational-decision makers are actually aware of the 
networks their firms are embedded in (Rowley & Baum, 2004), so modeling this 
information aspect is a step towards increased empirical fidelity of the model. Second, 
awareness and information about the network structure is important because it is a first 
prerequisite to respond to or anticipate changes that will affect firm strategy (Chen, 1996; 
Daft & Weick, 1984). Third, the dynamics through which interfirm networks change 
over time are not yet very well understood (Baum et al., 2005; Gnyawali & Madhavan, 
2001), and network horizon (heterogeneity) can shed light on how firms come to obtain 
or maintain a particular network position and hence sustain their network-based 
competitive advantage. 
We employ a computational model of network dynamics to formalize our 
intuitions. Results from a series of controlled experiments indicate that sustainability of a 
bridging position is increased by having a more extensive network horizon, especially 
under conditions of high network horizon heterogeneity. In networks with low network 
horizon heterogeneity, the majority of firms experience lower sustainability overall, 
especially when the average network horizon is high. These findings suggest that an 
explanation for the sustainability of a bridging position can be found in the firms’ 
network horizon.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: in the next two sections, 
we describe the theoretical background behind network positions and the network 
horizon construct and we formulate our propositions. Subsequently, we describe the 
computational modeling environment we use to formally model the effects of network 
horizon and network horizon heterogeneity on the sustainability of a bridging position, 
as well as the design of our computational experiments. Next, we illustrate the results of 
these experiments, finding broad support for our propositions. The discussion and future 
research section concludes by highlighting the implications of our findings for the 
resource-based view of networked organizations and network theory and we close with 
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suggesting some empirical strategies for researching the scanning activities of a firm in a 
business network environment. 
5.1 Network Position and Competitive Advantage 
The benefits of network positions have received considerable attention in the 
strategic management literature. Network positions confer an advantage to a firm by 
providing access to valuable and scarce resources (Burt, 1992; Dyer & Singh, 1998; 
Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001; Maurer & Ebers, 2006; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Pollock et 
al., 2004). The configuration of the set of interfirm relationships with other firms 
determines the network position that a firm occupies. Two well known and often studied 
network positions are the bridging position (Burt, 1992; 2000) and the closed or dense 
position (Coleman, 1988). A firm occupies a bridging position when its partner firms are 
not directly connected to each other, i.e. there are structural holes (Burt, 1992) between 
the partner firms. Contrary, a firm occupies a closed position when its partner firms are 
directly connected to each other, i.e. there are no structural holes between the partner 
firms. The mechanisms by which these two types of network positions create value are 
orthogonal. The bridging firm creates value by exploiting information asymmetries 
between its partner firms such as information and control benefits (Burt, 1992) while a 
firm occupying a closed position creates value by reducing information asymmetries and 
thereby creating effective sanction mechanisms (Coleman, 1988), shared mental maps 
that facilitate knowledge transfer (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000) and effective reputation 
mechanisms (Coleman, 1988). Although both types of positions have their respective 
merits (see for an extensive review Burt (2000)), in this chapter we will focus exclusively 
on bridging positions because previous research suggests not only that bridging positions 
are an important source of value creation (Burt, 2000) but simultaneously decay at a high 
rate (Burt, 2002). Particularly this dynamic aspect of bridging positions as a type of 
network position that can confer competitive advantage37, makes it well suited for 
studying the sustainability of network positions. Closed positions by their very nature are 
much more stable (Rowley et al., 2005) since they depend on strong ties that take time to 
form and hence they are less suited as a baseline starting point. Having said that, focusing 
                                                 
37 In line with findings from the extensive empirical literature on structural holes, we will abstract 
away from issues that may prevent the exploitation of a structural hole, for instance when 
concerns for trust among actors are paramount (Ahuja, 2000), and assume that occupying a 
bridging position is sufficient for a competitive advantage (although not necessarily sustainable). 
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only on a single type of position constitutes a limitation of our model, although the 
model developed here can serve as a useful baseline for more complicated models, in 
particular those where firms can pursue bridging positions as well as closed positions or 
hybrid positions (Baum et al., 2006).  
5.2 Network Horizon and Dynamics of Network Positions 
Given that a network position such as a bridging position can confer significant 
benefits, the question arises how firms get to such positions and how they get there 
before others do. While luck and serendipity may play a role in recognizing valuable 
opportunities (Barney, 1986; Denrell et al., 2003), firms also actively scan the 
environment for information about opportunities (Daft & Weick, 1984). Studies have 
shown that more frequent and broad environmental scanning improves overall 
performance (Daft et al., 1988) and that specifically scanning for market information and 
competitor information is particularly important for sales growth in highly dynamic 
environments (Garg, Walters, & Priem, 2003) as this allows firms to quickly jump on new 
market opportunities (Ozgen & Baron, 2007). 
In a network setting, new market opportunities can be presented by opportunities 
to act as a bridge between two otherwise disconnected actors, i.e. fulfilling a brokerage 
role (Burt, 1992; Fernandez & Gould, 1994; Sorenson & Ryall, 2007), which generates 
control benefits and information benefits that can lead to competitive advantage. 
Recognizing and exploiting such structural holes requires accurate information about the 
network structure. The example in the top row in Figure 5-1 illustrates this. 
In the top row (example 1), firm A spans a structural hole between firm B and 
firm C (situation t=0). Assume that firm B is aware of firm D but firm C is not, and that 
firm B perceives a profitable opportunity to act as a bridge between firm A and firm D. 
Firm B therefore decides to strengthen its network position by establishing a relationship 
between firm A and firm D (situation t=1). The consequences of this partnering decision 
are that the network position of firm B strengthens because of the additional brokerage 
opportunity, resulting in competitive advantage, but the network positions of firm A and 
firm C remain unchanged and the competitive advantage deriving from the bridging 
position of firm A remains sustained38.  
                                                 
38 Theoretically speaking, the definition of sustainable competitive advantage is independent of 
the actual time that the competitive advantage was enjoyed, as it is only determined by whether or 
not the advantage may be duplicated by competitors (Barney, 1991, p.102-103). While we accept 
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Figure 5-1 Two examples of the competitive dynamics of bridging positions 
Thus, differences in information about the network structure translates into 
different  opportunities being perceived, which in turn impacts the network positions 
that firms will occupy. Even though the notion of having information about the network 
structure is often acknowledged (1995b; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999), it has received little 
theoretical or empirical attention. Or as Rowley and Baum (2004: 120) phrase it: “The 
idea that managers are aware of their firms’ networks and the types of positions that 
provide social capital advantages – core assumptions underpinning the network strategy 
perspective – remains largely unexplored”. Most studies thus far either assume that all 
firms know only their direct alters (Cook & Emerson, 1978; Cook et al., 1983) and 
nothing beyond that, or that all firms know the structure of the entire network (Skvoretz 
                                                                                                                                            
this theoretical point, from an empirical point of view it is difficult to establish whether or not a 
given competitive advantage is sustainable, because that assessment is based on a possible (and 
hence unobservable) action of duplication. We therefore take a pragmatic approach and define a 
competitive advantage as sustainable if it remains in existence and focus on factors determining 
longer or shorter periods of sustainability. 
Firm 
A 
Firm 
B 
Firm 
C 
Firm 
D 
Example 2 
T=0 
 
Firm 
A 
Firm 
B 
Firm 
C 
Firm 
D 
T=1 
Firm 
A 
Firm 
B 
Firm 
C 
Firm 
D 
Example 1 
T=0 
 
T=1 
Firm 
A 
Firm 
B 
Firm 
C 
Firm 
D 
Network Horizon and the Dynamics of Network Positions 
128 
& Willer, 1993). In reality, given limited resources available for environmental scanning 
(Peteraf & Bergen, 2003), it is likely that a firm only has information on a subset of the 
overall network structure. This information is what we referred to as a firm’s network 
horizon39.  
5.2.1 Consequences of network horizon 
Firms with an extensive network horizon thus know more other firms in the 
networks and have more information about the network structure. Hence, they are more 
likely to perceive profitable brokerage opportunities and achieve competitive advantage. 
Occupying a bridging position has other benefits as well. As Gulati and Gargiulo (1999) 
argue, the current interfirm network functions as a repository of information about 
partner firm’s capabilities, behavior and network structure. How a firm is embedded in 
the network is an important determinant how fast a firm will receive information. Burt 
(Burt, 1992) calls it the timing benefit. Network horizons being equal, firms occupying 
bridging positions will know sooner about potential opportunities in the network and 
thus have an advantage in shifting their network position compared to firms that do not 
occupy bridging positions. This implies that although bridging position decay (Burt, 
2002), the accompanying information benefits mean that a firm in a bridging position can 
quickly replace lost opportunities with new ones, maintaining its favorable bridging 
position. A more extended network horizon thus has the twin benefits of not only being 
able to occupy a stronger bridging position (i.e. more structural holes) but also a greater 
                                                 
39 The formal definition of network horizon has been introduced in Chapter 2 and 4, here it is 
 repeated for convenience. To formally define network horizon, let the network be modeled as a 
 graph G = (V, E); consisting of a vertex set V (the firms) and an edge set E (the ties between 
 firms). Let d(u,v) be the geodesic distance between firms u and v, i.e. the smallest number of ties 
 that need to be traveled to reach v from u. The k-neighborhood of firm u is then defined as: 
{ }kv)d(u,|V)( ≤∈= vuN k  
 In other words: the k-neighborhood of u consists of all firms v that can be reached from u in at 
most k steps, including u itself. Firm u’s network horizon is then defined as the percentage of 
firms of the total network that are in firm u’s k-neighborhood, formally stated: 
%100*
)()(
V
uN
uNH kk = , where )(uN k  and V  denote the number of firms in u’s k-
neighborhood and V respectively and we will say that v is within u’s network horizon when 
)(uNv k∈ . 
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sustainability of that position, although extending the network horizon further is likely to 
exhibit decreasing marginal returns as the most profitable opportunities are likely to have 
been taken already. We thus have the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1: The more extensive a firm’s network horizon, the more likely a firm 
will sustain its bridging position40. 
 
The previous section focused on how a focal firm’s network position is 
influenced by its own network horizon and its actions, but a firm’s network position is 
also determined by the actions of the other firms in the network, in particular its alters. 
The second row in Figure 5-1 provides an example: here, firm A spans a structural hole 
between firm B and firm C and Firm B spans a structural hole between firm D and firm 
A. Firm B is aware of firm C and perceives a profitable brokering opportunity between C 
and D. Therefore, at t=1, firm B decides to establish a tie with Firm C (who agrees to the 
tie). The effect of this partnering decision is that the strength of the bridging position of 
firm A decreases because the structural hole between firm B and firm C is ‘closed’, as an 
alternative path is now available to connect firm B to firm C. Simultaneously, a new 
structural hole has been spanned, firm B is the bridging firm between firm D and firm C. 
The consequences of this partnering action are that the bridging position of firm B 
strengthens at the expense of the bridging position of firm A, hence the competitive 
advantage of firm A’s previous position is not sustained.  
In this example, firm B established a tie with firm C because it represented the 
most profitable opportunity of the potential firms within its network horizon. Had firm 
B’s network horizon been more extensive, then ceteris paribus firm B would have had 
more potential opportunities to choose from (unless the entire network was already 
within firm B’s horizon), lowering the probability that firm C would have been chosen, 
hence increasing the probability that firm A’s bridging position and competitive 
advantage would have been sustained. The argument from this example that more choice 
options for a firm’s alters benefits the focal firm, is stated as the following proposition: 
 
                                                 
40 In this chapter, we will use propositions instead of hypotheses, which is in contrast with 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 6. The reason is that in Chapter 4 and 6 the hypotheses are tested using 
statistical techniques while in this chapter such relationships are not formally tested.  
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Proposition 2: The more extensive the network horizon of a firm’s alters, the more 
likely a firm will sustain its bridging position. 
5.2.2 Network horizon heterogeneity 
A focal firm’s direct alters are not the only actors that can influence its network 
position, obviously other (non-alter) firms can do so as well but this depends on their 
network horizons. As argued previously, firms are likely to differ in their ability and 
efforts to collect information about their environment and the opportunities they 
recognize (Daft et al., 1988; Denrell et al., 2003; Makadok & Barney, 2001), i.e. different 
firms will have different network horizons. At the network level, this creates a 
distribution of network horizons over the different firms in the network, and this 
distribution determines the network horizon heterogeneity of the network. There are multiple 
ways to conceptualize this heterogeneity, each with different underlying theoretical 
rationales (see Klein & Harrison (2007) for more detail on the different ways). The 
underlying attribute that is heterogeneous (network horizon) represents a socially valued 
asset or resource of the firms, the appropriate conceptualization is of the disparity-type, 
which can be measured by the inequality or relative concentration measures such as the 
Gini-coefficient or the coefficient of variation (Klein & Harrison, 2007). We opt for the 
Gini-coefficient (Weisstein, 2006), which results in the following definition of network 
horizon heterogeneity (NHH) for a given network G (V,E):  
Definition 24: 
( )
µ22
)(
)(
V
vNHuNH
GNHH Vu Vv
kk∑∑
∈ ∈
−
=  
where µ represent the average network horizon of all actors in G. A network 
horizon heterogeneity value of zero indicates that there is perfect equality of the network 
horizons among the different firms. A value of one indicates that there is maximum 
inequality: one firm has information about the whole network structure and the other 
firms do not have any information. 
These four combinations result in different levels of network horizon 
heterogeneity and hence different possibilities for the focal firm to compete for bridging 
positions. A focal firm with an extended network horizon, in a network with a 
heterogeneous distribution of network horizons is able to sustain its network position 
longer since the limited network horizon of non-focal firms implies a lack of information 
regarding the potential location of structural holes and these firms are not able to 
compete for structural holes. This implies that the focal firm’s position is more likely to 
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be sustained. If the focal firm has a limited network horizon and the non-focal firms 
have an extended horizon, the focal firm will find itself in a disadvantaged position, as its 
network position is largely dependent on the actions taken by the non-focal firms. 
Network Horizon Focal Firm 
Limited Network Horizon 
Focal Firm 
Extensive Network Horizon 
Non-Focal Firms 
Limited Network Horizon 
(all identical) 
The network structure has 
potentially many opportunities 
for brokerage but these 
opportunities are not recognized 
because of the inability of firms 
to locate them. 
 
The focal firm is able to improve 
its network position and the 
sustainability of the position is 
expected to be long because the 
competition for favorable 
network positions is small due to  
the inability of the non-focal 
firms to locate brokerage 
opportunities.  
Non-Focal Firms 
Extensive Network Horizon 
(all identical) 
The focal firm is disadvantaged in 
shifting its network position while 
the non-focal firms are 
advantaged.  
Competition for favorable 
network positions is intense and 
many opportunities are 
recognized but their sustainability 
is short.  
Table 5-1 Network horizon heterogeneity and impact on the sustainability of network positions 
Hence, the focal firm is not able to participate in the competition for bridging 
positions, and there is no possibility of sustaining the bridging position. In a network 
with a homogeneous distribution of horizons and all firms having a limited network 
horizon, the focal firm does not have many opportunities for improving its bridging 
position, but so do its alters, which implies that any competitive advantage that the focal 
firm might have, although probably small, is likely to be sustained longer than under a 
heterogeneous network horizon. If on the other hand the network is homogenous and all 
firms have a high network horizon, all firms are quickly able to spot any possible 
opportunities for improving their position, no matter how small, and any competitive 
advantage that the focal firm might have, is likely to be duplicated quickly and hence not 
sustainable. This argument in stated in the following two propositions: 
 
Proposition 3: The higher the network horizon heterogeneity, the more sustainable 
a bridging position will be. 
 
Network Horizon and the Dynamics of Network Positions 
132 
Proposition 4: The effect of network horizon on the focal firm’s sustainability of its 
bridging position will be moderated by network horizon heterogeneity: the higher 
the network horizon heterogeneity, the larger the effect of network horizon. 
5.3 Methodology – Computational Model 
We use a computational modeling approach to investigate our propositions. We 
decided to use a computational modeling approach because our research question calls 
for studying longitudinal processes with interacting between many heterogeneous actors, 
which makes analytical tractability of the model difficult. Furthermore, a computational 
model allows us to experiment with a wide range of settings which fosters the 
development of new theory (Davis et al., 2007). The computational model is built using 
software agents. In the terminology of Davis et al. (2007) is our computational model an 
example of a stochastic process model.  
Agents are autonomous entities in a software environment that perceive and act 
upon their environment (Wooldridge, 2000). An individual agent can be described using 
the ‘beliefs-desire-intentions’ model (Bratman, 1987). According to this system, an agent 
is modeled to have some information about its environment (beliefs), an agent pursues a 
certain state (desire), and an agent has a repertoire of actions (intentions) it can take to try 
to realize its desire. In our computational model, we modeled firms as agents. Each firm 
has a network horizon as its belief, the network position it pursues is its desire and the 
ability to form or terminate relationships are its intentions.  
5.3.1 Model 
Our overall model setup closely follows the actor-driven model of network 
dynamics developed by Snijders (2001), although with a more simplified utility function. 
In our computational model, we assign each firm in our network two characteristics: 1) a 
utility function (which is identical for all the firms in the network) which states that each 
firm tries to span as many structural holes as possible given its network horizon and 2) a 
network horizon (which can differ between firms). In other words, firms are 
homogeneous in every aspect except their network horizon, which allows us to study the 
effects of network horizon (and network horizon heterogeneity) in isolation of all other 
factors that influence the sustainability of competitive advantage. The utility function U 
for firm i at time t is modeled as: 
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A network position is defined as being sustainable when Ui,t –Ui,t+1 >= 0. 
Therefore, as long as a firm is able to maintain or improve its current utility then the 
network position is considered sustainable (see also footnote 38).  
Sum j is the set of partner firms (alters). piq is the proportion of i's network time 
and energy invested in the relationship with q and mjq is the marginal strength of j’s 
relation with contact q (Burt, 1992: 51).  
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zjq is the network variable measuring the strength of relation j to q (Burt, 1992: 
51). We use Burt’s (1992) effective size measure, multiply by the degree, and take the 
square root. We use effective size because it is a measure of non-redundancy of a 
network, less redundancy means a stronger bridging position.  
To model the costs that are associated with establishing and maintaining ties we 
multiply the effective size by the degree and take the square root of the total sum to 
model these costs. We then define a threshold utility level by multiplying this formula 
with 1.10, the substantive interpretation being that the increase in utility should be at 
least 10% in order for the benefits of the tie to outweigh its costs41. Thus, a new tie will 
only be established when there is a reasonable utility increase. We model network 
horizon using its k network neighborhood as defined earlier. In our model, we choose 
k=2 because that is consistent with Friedkin’s notion of horizon of observability (1983) 
who found that individuals have a great difficulty in accurately perceiving the network 
beyond two steps. Lant and Baum’s (1995) found that firms only pay attention to close 
competitors but tend to ignore hardly more distant competitors and Gulati and 
Gargiulo’s (1999) found that firm’s alliance partners tend to come from their partner’s 
alliance networks. In addition, we initialize the network horizon at the start of the 
simulation with a set of fixed size of randomly chosen actors (the size will be varied later 
in the experimental design) that accounts for other sources of information about actors 
                                                 
41 Sensitivity analysis shows that changing this value to 5% or 20% would result in networks with 
properties that are more removed from empirical interfirm networks (see the ‘Validation’ section) 
than the chosen value of 10%.  
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in the network priori to network dynamics taking place. Table 5-1 gives an overview of 
the model parameters and the theoretical foundations.  
Parameter Theoretical Construct Representation in Model 
Initial network 
structure 
 
 
To prevent bias from the initial network structure 
we create an initial network with no ties.  
A completely unconnected 
graph; e.g. the graph consists 
only of isolates. 
Network position A firm will pursue a bridging position Utility function Ui,t.  
Cost of ties 
 
We use a threshold to calculate whether the 
improvement of the utility is significant or not. A 
non-significant improvement of the utility means 
that the tie will not be established. 
The utility improvement is set 
at 10%. 
Network horizon 
(firm level) 
 
A firm has information of a k network 
neighborhood. 
K is set at two which follows 
the suggestion by Friedkin 
(1983).  
Random term Captures other processes that could be responsible 
for transfer of information about the network 
structure. 
Poisson distribution with 
values α. 
Network horizon 
heterogeneity  
(network level) 
 
We use discrete but varying distributions of the 
random term to create different initial levels of 
network horizon heterogeneity.  
To explore the parameter space 
we choose as values for 
network horizon heterogeneity: 
0.00, 0.25, 0.50, and 0.75.  
Table 5-2 Theoretical foundations of the computational model 
5.3.2 Partnering algorithm 
At the start of the model we generate a graph G with one hundred nodes and 
zero edges, this graph effectively consists of only isolates. We do this for two reasons. 
From a methodological standpoint, it prevents bias from the initial starting graph because 
the network position of each firm is non-existing. From a theoretical point of view, an 
empty graph can be thought of as the birth of a new industry, which is characterized by 
the entrance of incumbent firms and the birth of start-ups.  
Each firm knows the subgraph defined by its network horizon, see also Chapter 
2, i.e. [ ])(uNHG k , the subgraph that consists of the alters of the focal firm and the firms 
the focal firm already knew at the start of the simulation due to the initialization of 
network horizon. This subgraph [ ])(uNHG k  is used to compute the current utility a firm 
has (using Ui,t), as well as utility improvements by establishing new ties to [ ])(uNHG k .  
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We run the model for twenty-five cycles (including t = 0) for each experimental 
setting. During one cycle each firm can instantiate a new relationship, after all firms have 
tried to improve their network positions the next cycle starts. A firm is randomly chosen 
at the start of each cycle, which we call firm u. For each firm in the sub graph 
[ ])(uNHG k , firm u will calculate its utility improvement if it established a tie with a firm 
from the sub graph [ ])(uNHG k . Firm u chooses the relationship that has the highest 
utility improvement. Note, although a firm expects that its utility will increase based 
upon its incomplete understanding of the network structure, the actual result might be a 
smaller utility improvement or even a loss of utility. This is illustrated by the following 
example (see Figure 5-1 - example 2). If at t = 1 firm D is not aware of the relationship 
between firm B and firm C and firm D would establish a tie with firm C, then firm D 
believes it is spanning a structural hole between firm B and firm C while in fact firm D is 
weakening the bridging position of firm B. 
The partnering algorithm continues as firm u proposes to establish a tie with firm 
v. An important design assumption of our computational model is that it is based on a 
cooperative network formation assumption (Watts, 2001) that requires that a link is only 
established when both actors agree. Severing a relationship remains a unilateral decision. 
Although this assumption may not apply to all networks (e.g. in citation networks the 
link is unilaterally established), we believe it is a reasonable representation of firm 
behavior in most interfirm networks. After receiving the proposal from firm u, firm v 
then calculates its improvement using its own utility function. If firm v’s utility improves 
as well and firm v perceives the utility improvement to be above the threshold value then 
firm v accepts the proposal and a tie is created, else firm v will reject the proposal and no 
tie will be created. During each cycle of the computational model, a firm can initiate only 
one action (although it can be the recipient of and accept multiple tie proposals). Should 
firm v for instance decline firm u’s tie proposal, then firm u cannot propose another 
relationship with another firm. It will have to wait until the next cycle to propose to 
another firm. This entire sequence is repeated for each firm in the network and then the 
next cycle starts. Although the partnering decisions are sequentially computed, we treat 
the partnering decisions as a simultaneous process because during a cycle the network 
horizon of the firms is not updated. Modeling the partnering process as a simultaneous 
process prevents first-mover advantages. Figure 5-2 summarizes the algorithm in a 
process flow diagram.  
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Determine known subgraph of focal actor
Select a firm
[All selected firms have been analyzed]
[Repeat for all selected firms]
Select an action
Calculate improvement of utility of network position
Select firm / action combination with highest utility improvement
Execute action
[expected utility > current utility]
Calculate current utility of network position
 
Figure 5-2 Process flow diagram of the partnering algorithm 
Once a firm is not able to exceed its threshold utility, it will choose to terminate 
the least valuable tie in order to free resources to create a new tie. Although the 
establishment of a tie implies that new firms may appear within both firms network 
horizon if the distance is two or less, the network horizon of the firms is not updated 
immediately during a cycle. We theoretically model the firms as if they are simultaneously 
strengthening their bridging position but for computational reasons we sequentially loop 
through the firms and update each firm’s network horizon at the end of a cycle.  
5.3.3 Experimental setup 
We ran fifteen different experimental settings with the computational model of 
100 firms. For sake of simplicity, we use two groups of firms each with a different 
network horizon. In the first four sessions, we keep the network horizon heterogeneity 
constant at 0.00 and increase the initial network horizon from 5 firms (5% of entire 
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network structure is known to a firm at the start of the experiment because the graph 
consists of only isolates the k network neighborhood is empty) in session 1 to 10, 25 and 
50 firms (50% of entire network structure is known to a firm) in sessions 2-4. 
Theoretically, this variation models how well entrants in a new industry know other 
players in the industry due to prior knowledge. To take an example from Makadok & 
Barney (2001), the dawn of the personal computer industry was characterized by the 
entrance of a variety of established firms like mainframe manufacturer IBM, consumer 
electronics firm Atari, electronics retailer Tandy, but also the genesis of de novo firms 
such as Apple. Given this diversity, these firms presumably entered with limited 
knowledge of other players in this new field. As an illustration from the other side of the 
spectrum, the firms that first entered the semiconductor industry were all founded by 
people who were familiar with one another from a series of technical seminars at AT&T 
Bell Labs in the early 50s (Holbrook, Cohen, Hounshell, & Klepper, 2000), and were 
thus presumably quite aware of the players in the field. 
In the next four sessions (session 5 to session 8), we keep the network horizon 
heterogeneity constant at .25 and run a session with average network horizon of 5%, 
10%, 25% and 50% (to replicate the first four sessions). We configured session 9 to 
session 12 have an initial network horizon heterogeneity of .50 and session 13 to 15 have 
an initial network horizon heterogeneity of .75. Due to rounding errors, some sessions 
do not exactly match the initial values of the first four sessions. Fifteen different settings 
were configured; Table 5-2 gives an overview of the experimental setup.  
Each network contains one hundred firms. Initially, a firm knows either 5%, 
10%, 25% or 50% of the complete network through the assignment of the random term. 
The network horizon heterogeneity is either 0.00, 0.25, 0.50 or 0.75. We have chosen 
these values they cover the whole parameter space and therefore can be used to test their 
impact on the sustainability of a bridging position. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Network Horizon and the Dynamics of Network Positions 
138 
 Experimental 
condition 
NHHs,t=0  
Experimental 
condition 
average 
network horizon 
(at t=0) 
Assigned random term   
group 1 
(N is number of firms,  
α = random term) 
Assigned random term 
group 2 
Session 1  .000 5 firms  N = 100; α = 5 firms  
Session 2 .000 10 firms  N = 100; α = 10 firms  
Session 3 .000 25 firms  N = 100; α = 25 firms 
Session 4 .000 50 firms  N = 100; α = 50 firms  
Session 5 .250 5.47 firms N = 93; α = 4 firms  N = 7; α = 25 firms  
Session 6 .250 10.3 firms N = 78; α = 7 firms N = 22; α = 22 firms  
Session 7 .248 25.28 firms N = 86; α = 18 firms  N = 14; α = 70 firms  
Session 8 .253 53.54 firms N = 27; α = 17 firms  N = 63; α = 75 firms  
Session 9 .521 4.99 firms N = 87; α = 2 firms N = 13; α = 25 firms  
Session 10 .500 12.36 firms N = 84; α = 5 firms   N = 16; α = 51 firms  
Session 11 .499 25.28 firms N = 63; α = 8 firms  N = 37; α = 72 firms   
Session 12 .496 42.3 firms N = 53; α = 9 firms  N = 47; α = 99 firms  
Session 13 .751 6.39 firms N = 89; α = 1 firm  N = 11; α = 50 firms  
Session 14 .750 12.67 firms N = 89; α = 2 firms  N = 11; α = 99 firms  
Session 15 .745 22.56 firms N = 78; α = 1 firm  N = 22; α = 99 firms  
Session 16 It is not possible to have a network with 100 firms, average network horizon of 50 firms and 
network horizon heterogeneity of .75. This can only be achieved by increasing the network 
size. 
Table 5-3 Configuration of computational model 
5.4  Analysis and Results  
We will not conduct hypothesis testing in this chapter because the data was 
generated using a computational model and hence statistical testing is meaningless 
because we will find significant effects given enough replications. Before moving to the 
results regarding the sustainability of bridging positions, it is illustrative to show the 
influence of network horizon and network horizon heterogeneity on competitive 
advantage per se. Figure 5-3 shows the average utility (based upon the Ui,t function) of a 
firm given different pair wise combinations of the network horizon of a firm and 
network horizon heterogeneity. The interpretation of this figure is as follows: a randomly 
selected firm with a network horizon of 10% (the firm is aware of 10% of the firms in 
the network) in a network with network horizon heterogeneity of 0.25 will have an 
expected utility of 1. The expected utility increases as we increase the network horizon 
(moving left along the left axis). This suggests that firms with a more extended network 
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horizon are better able to detect brokerage opportunities in the network and hence are 
able to strengthen their bridging position. Firms with a moderate to high network 
horizon (30%-50%) and a high level of network horizon heterogeneity (>0.5) have a 
strong bridging position (expected utility is between 4 and 5). This illustrates that our 
starting point of network horizon being important for competitive advantage is plausible.  
Figure 5-3 Network horizon (heterogeneity) and the strength of bridging position 
We use figure 5-5 to assess the sustainability of a network position. For each firm 
in a particular network position, we calculated the difference in utility from t to t+1. As 
described in our model section, if this difference is positive, the network position at time 
t is considered sustainable. The z-axis (labeled utility) depicts the average of these cycle-
to-cycle differences for each combination of network horizon and network horizon 
heterogeneity. A positive value indicates a sustainable network position while a negative 
value indicates an unsustainable network position. The first proposition stated that a firm 
will sustain its network position when the firm increases its network horizon but there 
are decreasing returns of the effect of network horizon on the sustainability of a network 
position. This effect is shown in Figure 5-4 on the right axis. As a firm increases its 
network horizon from 0 to 0.5 (with network horizon heterogeneity being zero), a firm is 
able to improve its utility, however this happens at a decreasing marginal rate as was 
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formulated in proposition 1. Thus, the argument behind proposition 1 is corroborated by 
the results from the formal computational model.  
Figure 5-4 Focal firm network horizon, average partner firm network horizon and sustainability of 
bridging positions  
The second proposition argued that as the network horizon of partner firms 
increases, the network position of the focal firm becomes more sustainable because those 
partner firms are less likely to partner with other partners of the focal firm. Instead, they 
will locate their own brokerage opportunities that do not have a detrimental effect on the 
sustainability of the network position of the focal firm. Figure 5-4 illustrates this effect. 
As the average network horizon of the partner firms increases from 0% to 20% the 
average utility difference of the focal firm increases over large sections of the network 
horizon axis, indicating the expected positive effect on sustainability. However, two 
regions are exceptions to this general conclusion. One, when the focal firms’ horizon is 
lower than 10% the sustainability of the focal firm’s network position decreases with an 
increase in average partner firm network horizon (although its network position remains 
slightly sustainable). This can be explained by the fact that partner firms are gaining a 
network horizon that is increasingly larger than that of the focal firm that has a 
detrimental effect on the sustainability of its network position (the lower left hand cell in 
Table 5-1). The second exception arises when the focal firm has an extensive network 
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horizon of around 40%. As the average network horizon of partner firm increases, 
although still remaining lower than the focal firm’s network horizon, at least some of the 
partner firms will  detect the same set of brokerage opportunities and hence are pursuing 
the same network position as the focal firm. This results in increasing head-to-head 
competition and hence any competitive advantage is unsustainable (consistent with the 
lower right hand cell in Table 5-1). 
Figure 5-5 Network horizon (heterogeneity) and the sustainability of bridging positions 
The third proposition stated that a network position of a firm becomes more 
sustainable as the network horizon heterogeneity increases. This effect is depicted on the 
axis labeled ‘Network horizon’ of Figure 5-5 (with network horizon is zero). This figure 
indicates that the sustainability of a network position increases as the network horizon 
heterogeneity increases, as the average utility difference (z-axis with delta utility) is 
positive. However, this effect diminishes as the network horizon heterogeneity passes the 
0.4 value. This suggests that network horizon heterogeneity is particularly important for 
firms with a low to moderate level of network horizon (0% to 25%). This figure also 
illustrates what happens when many firms have an extended network horizon (network 
horizon is between 40% and 50%) and the heterogeneity is low (between 0.15 and 0.35). 
This is a situation where the competitive dynamics for a favorable network position are 
the strongest (this is the lower right hand cell in Table 5-1). Many firms detect favorable 
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opportunities to improve their network position but none of the firms is able to sustain 
their competitive advantage. Even worse, on average firms will see their network position 
deteriorate and hence this is a situation where any competitive advantage is 
unsustainable.  
The fourth proposition argued that a firm with an extensive network horizon 
would sustain its network position even longer when the network is characterized by a 
high level of network horizon heterogeneity. This can be seen in Figure 5-4 from the 
reversal of the slope along the network horizon axis between low and high network 
horizon heterogeneity: in a heterogeneous network, expanding the network horizon is 
increasingly beneficial as the sustainability increases. In a homogenous network (low 
heterogeneity) expanding the network horizon decreases sustainability and although 
sustainability remains positive for moderate levels of network horizon, it becomes 
negative for high network horizon, again ending up in the head-to-head competition 
observed previously (lower right cell Table 5-1).  
Taken together, these findings suggest that firms are faced with a network variant 
of the tragedy of the commons: for each individual firm an increase of the network 
horizon is generally beneficial for the sustainability of its competitive advantage. The 
resulting dynamic is that all firms end up in a homogenous network all with an extensive 
network horizon, which is precisely the network where competitive advantage is virtually 
unattainable. 
5.5 Conclusion 
The basis of competitive advantage is becoming an interplay of a firm’s unique 
resource endowment and the position it occupies in the overall network structure 
(Shipilov, 2006; Zaheer & Bell, 2005). While previous interfirm research focused 
primarily on how a network position confers a competitive advantage, increasingly 
scholars call for attention to the processes by which a network position changes (Baum et 
al., 2005; Parkhe, Wasserman, & Ralston, 2006) and how this affects a firm’s competitive 
advantage. Our study is positioned at the nexus of the resource-based view and network 
theory and we advance these literatures by introducing two new constructs that can help 
explain the sustainability of bridging positions. Starting from the notion that recognizing 
advantageous network positions is key to obtain and sustain a competitive advantage and 
that exploiting these opportunities requires information about the network structure, we 
introduced the network horizon, and network horizon heterogeneity constructs to model 
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this information at the firm and network level. We demonstrated that the network 
horizon of a firm and the network horizon heterogeneity in a network are important 
determinants for the sustainability of a firm’s network position and hence its competitive 
advantage. Our findings support Makadok and Barney observation (2001: 1623) that  
“the most fundamental type of asymmetry capable of generating competitive advantage 
are interfirm differences in skill at collecting, filtering, and interpreting information about 
the future value of resources”. 
First, network horizon has a positive influence on the ability of a firm to locate 
brokerage opportunities and thereby increasing the sustainability of the network position. 
However, our computational model suggests that there are decreasing returns to the 
completeness of information about the network structure. The ability to shift and sustain 
a network position are greater when a firm increases its network horizon from low to 
high values but the strength of this effect diminishes.  
Second, the network horizon heterogeneity affects the sustainability of the 
competitive advantage of a network position as well. More homogenous distributions of 
the network horizon lead to stronger dynamics of network positions. In such networks, 
firms are more directly competing vis-à-vis each other and this has a negative impact on 
the sustainability of a network position. A more heterogeneous distribution of network 
horizon has a positive impact on the sustainability of a network position of the focal firm 
because there are fewer firms able to detect brokerage opportunities and are therefore 
less likely to threaten the network position of the focal firm.  
Recent research in sociology, economics and strategy (Bala & Goyal, 2000; 
Buskens & van de Rijt, 2005; Sorenson & Ryall, 2007) has found that under certain 
assumptions the competitive advantage from a bridging position is not sustainable. By 
relaxing an assumption that is common to all three studies, namely that firms know the 
entire network structure, we provide a complimentary angle and our results indicate that 
under certain conditions a firms’ competitive advantage can at least be temporarily 
sustained. Whether this represents equilibrium behavior or not is a question we leave 
open for further research. What we can say is that in any case the sustainability is fragile 
because the risk of a tragedy of the commons is real.  
We see two main implications of the network horizon construct for both 
managers and researchers. First, our formal model demonstrates that network horizon 
and network horizon heterogeneity are important determinants of the sustainability of a 
network position. This suggests a fruitful addition to the resource-based view in order to 
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deal with the special nature of network-based resources in explaining competitive 
advantage. Fully in line with the quote by Makadok and Barney (2001) at the beginning 
of this chapter, we view informational differences such as network horizon as 
fundamental to understanding interfirm differences in competitive advantage. Our 
findings also suggests that if we want to understand the dynamics of network positions 
and bridging positions in particular, network theory should incorporate informational 
differences among firms as a key explanatory construct.  
Second, a key managerial implication stems from our finding that firms with 
more information are better equipped in shifting their bridging positions compared with 
firms that have less information. Recent research has raised the question to which extent 
structural holes represent the same information and control benefits (Reagans & 
Zuckerman, 2006). Some bridging positions contain more value (information and control 
benefits) ‘buried’ than in other structural holes. Or as Pollock et al. note “not all 
structural holes are equivalent and equally attractive” (2004: 51). Discerning the more 
valuable network positions from the less valuable network positions requires detailed 
information about the network structure that firms need to incorporate into their 
environmental scanning policies (Yasai-Ardekani & Nystrom, 1996).  
Some of our design choices in our computational model have consequences for 
the generalizability of our findings. We address two limitations we consider particularly 
salient. A first limitation stems from the fact that we chose bridging positions as the 
context for formulating our propositions, as this is a setting where network positions are 
likely to exhibit considerable dynamics. However, networks can also exhibit inertia (Kim 
et al., 2006). In such networks, different kinds of dynamics and positions may become 
important that we have not explored in our study.    
A second limitation of our study is that, although we attempted to keep our 
assumptions as realistic as possible, the model remains a stylized representation of 
interfirm networks. Therefore, our findings would greatly benefit from empirical 
replication, as we will discuss in Chapter 7. 
 
 145 
6 Weakening of  Bridging Positions: An Opportunity 
and Threat Based Explanation 
This final empirical chapter42 of this dissertation addresses the third and final 
research question: why do bridging positions weaken? We offer two complementary 
theoretical explanations why a firm’s bridging position weakens. In the previous two 
chapters, we focused on the partnering decision of the focal firm and its network 
horizon. We demonstrated that the focal firm’s network horizon allows it to strengthen 
its bridging position. We move our focus from the focal firm to its partner firms and 
investigate how the actions taken by partner firms affect the bridging position of the 
focal firm. The partnering decisions of partner firms can potentially affect the network 
position of the focal firm because networks are relational and changes in the network 
position of one firm have consequences for other firms in the network as well. We 
explicitly limit ourselves to opportunities and threats that have their origin in the 
interfirm network and do not consider the impact of threats or opportunities that emerge 
from the overall environment. For example, the introduction of a new technology or the 
deregulation of an industry is outside the scope of this chapter. 
The first explanation is that bridged firms spot an opportunity to strengthen their 
network position at the expense of the bridging firm. We will refer to this explanation as 
the opportunity-based explanation. The second explanation is that bridged firms become 
too dependent on the bridging firm and this dependence constrains the bridged firm in 
its actions. Therefore, the bridged firm decides to reduce its dependence by initiating new 
relationships. We will refer to this explanation as the threat-based explanation. These two 
explanations are built based upon findings from Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, environmental 
scanning literature (Hambrick, 1982), resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
                                                 
42 The paper version of this chapter will be presented by van Liere, D. W., & Koppius, O. R. 
2007b. Why Do Bridging Positions Weaken? Paper presented at the Academy of Management, 
Philadelphia, PA. 
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1978), and the competitive dynamics view (Chen et al., 2007; Chen, 1996; Chen et al., 
1992).  
We assume that the decision to establish a new relationship or to disband an old 
relationship is not a random process, but rather the result of a deliberate action of the 
firm to improve its current network position (Madhavan et al., 1998). If firms are 
improving their network position then there are two possible motives. First, a firm has 
become aware of the fact that there are alternatives to the current network position that 
create as much or more benefits compared with the current network position. For a firm 
to change its network position, it has to be aware of alternative firms to partner with. It is 
not possible for a firm to shift its network position without information about possible 
alternatives (as we demonstrated in Chapter 4). Second, a firm recognizes a threatening 
situation. For example, a firm has become either too dependent on its partner firms or 
too similar, which leads to increased competition. Such threats can be the incentive for 
the focal firm to start looking for new partner firms and to shift its network position in 
order to alleviate the dependence or increased competition.  
Previous research on interfirm networks has predominantly focused on network 
effects rather than network processes. The differential benefits of network positions and 
the contingencies of these benefits have been an important theme in the interfirm 
network literature (Ahuja, 2000a; Burt, 1992; 2000; Walker et al., 1997). In particular, the 
debate has revolved around the benefits of bridging and closed positions. A bridging 
position is one between two unconnected firms (i.e. a sparse position) while a closed 
network position is one in which the partner firms of a firm are also connected to each 
other (i.e. a dense position). However, network processes such as the dynamics of 
network positions have received less attention (Moldoveanu et al., 2003). Interfirm 
network research has often adopted a cross-sectional approach that limits our 
understanding of the origins of these network positions and the reasons that network 
positions decay (Baum et al., 2003; Rowley & Baum, 2004; Salancik, 1995). Focusing on 
the dynamics of network positions is important because some initial research suggests 
that bridging positions decay at a high rate (Burt, 2002) but the reasons why this happens 
remain unclear. Studying the weakening of bridging positions is important for two 
reasons: 1) it will increase our understanding how firms may occupy these positions 
through their partnering actions and 2) it will shed new light on the sustainability of 
network positions.  
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Research on the benefits of network positions has focused on the focal firm that 
creates and appropriates the value that is created by a network position. For example, a 
bridging firm spans structural holes and these holes create information and control 
benefits (2006; Burt, 1992; Burt, 2000). Thus, the bridging firm creates value by 
occupying a structural hole rich position and the value created through the information 
and control benefits is appropriated by the bridging firm. Nonetheless, if certain network 
positions are more valuable than other positions and the value created is appropriated by 
the bridging firm then this creates incentives for the partner firms (i.e. the bridged firms) 
to shift their position possibly at the expense of the network position of the bridging firm.  
Therefore, we move our focus from the bridging firm to the bridged firms and 
investigate how the partnering actions taken by partner firms affect the bridging position 
of the focal firm. The partnering decisions of partner firms can potentially affect the 
network position of the focal firm because networks are relational and changes in the 
network position of one firm have consequences for the network positions of other 
firms in the network as well. The objective of this study is to contribute to the causes and 
consequences of network based competitive advantage. Hence, the research question we 
seek to address in this chapter is: “Why does the bridging position of the focal firm 
weaken?” 
In order to investigate why bridging positions weaken, we will adopt a multi-
method research design (Brewer & Hunter, 1989). We choose to adopt a multi-method 
approach because it increases the internal and external validity of our results. We use 
both network experiments and a field study that are both situated in the insurance 
industry.  
6.1 Motives for the Bridged Firm to Shift its Network Position 
Recent network research is starting to consider partner firms’ network position 
on focal firm performance (Baum et al., 2006) and individuals (Burt, 2007). For example, 
the Baum et al. study (2006) of investment banks shows that banks that are linked to 
banks who occupy bridging positions outperform banks that do not have such partners. 
Therefore, it is not only important to incorporate a partner firms’ network position but 
also to start incorporating the changes in the network position of a partner firm too and 
to study how these change affect the network position of the focal firm. Bridging ties 
represent value by connecting otherwise disconnected regions of a network. These ties 
generate information and control benefits because different unconnected firms of firms 
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in a network are reached and these firms have different information available to them in 
terms of diversity, volume and richness (Koka & Prescott, 2002). This includes 
information about potential partner firms because the network functions as a search and 
monitoring mechanism (Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001) and firms rely on their network as 
source of information about potential partners (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Li & Rowley, 
2002). However, recent research suggests that bridging ties are short lived (Burt, 2002). 
In the organization Burt studied, bridges decayed at a rate of 90% per year.  
A bridged firm has two disadvantages: it does not receive diverse information on 
a timely basis and it cannot counter balance the power of the bridging firm because the 
bridged firm is too dependent on the bridging firm. However, according to Reagans and 
Zuckerman (2006) the information and control benefits are based on different 
assumptions about partner firm characteristics. Information benefits accrue to the focal 
firm when the partner firms are heterogeneous because these firms differ and hence will 
have different information sources. However, this comes at the expense of control 
benefits because it is not possible to play off heterogeneous partners against each other 
because they provide different resources and hence do not compete with each other. 
Control benefits accrue to the focal firm when the partner firms are homogenous 
because the focal firm can play off homogenous firms against each other but this comes 
at the expense of foregoing the information benefits. Homogenous partner firms are less 
likely to have different information sources thus will provide the same information 
benefits. These two mutually exclusive assumptions (partner firms are homogeneous or 
heterogeneous) require different explanations when this leads to a weakened bridging 
position. First, we will develop the situation when the partner firms are homogeneous, 
next we will develop the situation when the partner firms are heterogeneous.  
 
Figure 6-1 Illustration of homogenous vs. heterogeneous partner firms 
A 
D 
C 
B 
E 
Partner firms are homogenous 
(Panel A) 
A 
D 
C 
B 
E 
Partner firms are heterogeneous 
(Panel B) 
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However, both disadvantages (lack of control and lack of information) create an 
incentive for the bridged firm to shift its network position. We will theorize for both 
disadvantages why the bridged firm is likely to initiate new partnering decisions.  
We start with the situation in which the partner firms possess homogeneous 
resources and capabilities (Panel A in Figure 6-1). This situation is detrimental for the 
bridged firm for two reasons. First, it gives the bridging firm the opportunity to play the 
similar partner firms off against each other. For example, suppliers possessing similar 
resources have a weaker bargaining position because the focal firm has more firms to 
choose from as the number of suppliers increases. Second, firms that have similar 
resources are experiencing higher levels of competition compared with firms that possess 
heterogeneous resources (Chen, 1996). The increased competition between the partner 
firms of the focal firm strengthens the focal firm’s network position because it can 
dictate the terms of an exchange. A bridged firm can initiate new interorganizational 
relationships in order to lessen the competitive pressure and to weaken the bridging 
position of the focal firm. As a result, we hypothesize:  
 
Hypothesis 1: A bridged firm that possesses similar resources compared with the 
other partner firms of the focal firm at t leads to a weakened bridging position of 
the focal firm at t+1. 
 
We now move to the situation in which the partner firms are heterogeneous 
(Panel B in Figure 6-1). This situation limits the potential for the focal firm to execute the 
tertius gaudens strategy (Burt, 1992). We refer to the tertius gaudens strategy when the focal 
firm is playing different firms off against each other. In order for the bridged firm to 
access new sources of information, capabilities or resources it needs to partner with new 
firms, preferably with firms from different groups parts of the network. The bridged firm 
gets access to new parts of the network through establishing non-local ties (Baum et al., 
2005). As Burt (2000) noted, information between groups is more heterogeneous than 
within groups. Thus, establishing ties to these new groups is an efficient way of enlarging 
the pool of information or finding new capabilities and resources. To counterbalance the 
control benefits of the bridging firm, the bridged firm can partner with firms that provide 
(access) to similar capabilities and resources as the bridging firm. This is likely to happen 
in the case that the bridged firm is dependent on the bridging firm because the bridged 
firm will have more uncertainty about the input of its resources. Particularly, when these 
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resources are critical for the survival of the firm or when these resources are needed in a 
great magnitude. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) recognize this type of dependence and 
suggest that firms can unilaterally restructure their dependence. A unilateral action is, for 
example, when the bridged firm decides to partner with a new firm. Consequently, we 
hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 2: A high resource dependence of the bridged firm at t leads to a 
weakened bridging position of the focal firm at t+1.  
 
In order for the bridged firm to access new sources of information, capabilities or 
resources it needs to partner with new firms, preferably with firms from different groups 
parts of the network. The bridged firm gets access to new parts of the network through 
establishing non-local ties. As Burt (2000) noted, information between groups is more 
heterogeneous than within groups. Thus, establishing ties to these new groups is an 
efficient way of enlarging the pool of information or finding new capabilities and 
resources. The bridged firm needs to have information about alternative partner firms to 
be able to establish non-local ties. The network horizon of a firm should expand beyond 
the ego network of the bridging firm to detect potential partner firms (as was 
demonstrated in Chapter 4) and will make it more likely that a firm in the searched 
network possesses the sought after capabilities or resources by the bridged firm. More 
specifically, establishing a non-local tie that increases the information diversity requires 
an extended network horizon.  
When a bridged firm shifts its network position then this will have repercussions 
for the network position of the bridging firm. As the bridged firm develops alternative 
relationships that give access to similar capabilities or information compared with the 
bridging firm then this will weaken the bridging firm’s network position. The bridged 
firm increases its discretion about resources and capabilities and diminishes its 
dependence on the bridging firm. This means that the bridging firm can reap fewer 
benefits and this will increase the probability that it will try to strengthen its bridging 
position. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 3: A bridged firm with a high network horizon at t leads to a weakened 
bridging position of the focal firm at t+1.  
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While resource similarity and resource dependence may trigger the bridged firm 
to shift its network position, whether this is possible is partly dependent on its network 
horizon43. Firms experiencing either high levels of resource similarity or resource 
dependence but which have insufficient network horizon are still caught in their current 
network position. Having a more extended network horizon will make it more likely that 
the search for alternative partners is successful (as hypothesized in hypothesis 2). 
Accordingly, we finish with hypotheses four and five (the five hypotheses are illustrated 
in Figure 6-2):  
 
Hypothesis 4: A larger network horizon strengthens the relationship between 
resource similarity and the weakening of the focal firm’s bridging position.  
 
Hypothesis 5: A larger network horizon strengthens the relationship between 
resource dependence and the weakening of the focal firm’s bridging position. 
                                                 
43 Many more factors trigger a firm to shift its network position. In particular, the switching costs 
(Chen & Forman, 2006; Zhu, Kraemer, Gurbaxani, & Xu, 2006) that a firm faces are an 
important factor whether a firm will search for a new supplier or stay with a current supplier. We 
test hypothesis 1 and 2 using field data from an interorganizational information system (IOS) (see 
Methodology Study 2: Field Study in this Chapter). Firms that are part of this IOS face two types 
of switching costs: 1) when a firm switches to a supplier who is also part of the IOS and 2) when 
a firm switches to another supplier that is not a member of the IOS. The first type of switching 
has probably lower switching costs compared with the second type. A firm that switches to a 
supplier who is also part of the IOS uses the same technical infrastructure thus investments in IT 
and training are minimal. However, a firm switching to a supplier who is not part of the IOS can 
incur significant costs. For example, the new supplier uses a different IOS that requires new IT 
investments and new training or the new supplier does not use an IOS at all which means that the 
efficiency gains of an IOS are foregone. The switching behavior that we observe is from firms 
that are part of the IOS and hence have low switching costs; our data set does not allow us to 
assess the costs of the second type of switching. 
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Figure 6-2 Summary hypotheses 
6.2 Methodology Study 1 – Network Experiments 
We will use two different research methods to test our hypotheses. First, we test 
the hypotheses using data that was acquired through network experiments. The design of 
the network experiments and the procedure by which we conducted the experiments has 
been discussed in detail in Chapter 3 and 4. Second, we use field data from the Dutch 
insurance industry to map the network of Dutch insurance firms and their brokers and 
use that setting to test the same set of hypotheses (except for hypotheses 2, 4, and 5 
because data limitations do not permit us to test the network horizon based hypotheses 
in this empirical setting).  
6.2.1 Participants and research design 
We employed a random assigned within-subject design (Shadish et al., 2002). 
Three types of participants participated in the experiments. Managers from a large Dutch 
insurance firm and their insurance brokers, in total two hundred and ten participated. 
Students from different graduate courses participated, in total hundred twenty-six. 
Finally, we used a fixed student team (fifteen participants) that participated in multiple 
experiments. For the managers, insurance brokers, and the student team we used a 
scenario consisting of fifteen firms, for the graduate students we used a scenario of 
fourteen firms. The students participated individually in the experiments, the managers 
teamed up with an insurance broker. We will control for these differences by including 
dummy variables in the analysis. In order to replicate experiments, we conducted 
Resource similarity 
bridged firms 
 
Resource dependence 
bridged firms  
 
Strength bridge position 
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Network horizon 
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multiple experiments in a single session. Table 6-1 summarizes the descriptions of the 
participants 
Participants Number 
of 
sessions 
Number of 
experiments 
Number of 
participants 
Years of industry 
experience  
(average /s.d. ) 
Scenario 
used 
Managers & 
insurance brokers 
7 12 210 15.49 /9.19 15 firms 
Students 14 44 392 0.0 / 0.0 14 firms 
Student team 8 22 15 0.0 / 0.0 15 firms 
Total 24 78 637   
Table 6-1 Descriptives of the participants of the experiments 
6.2.2 Experimental procedure 
The participants were seated behind a computer after arrival in the computer lab 
where the experiments were conducted. Before the experiments started, an extensive 
one-and-half hour explanation of the network experiment was given. During this 
explanation, the participants practiced one round of the network experiment to teach 
them where to find relevant information, how to make decisions, and how to assess the 
impact of their decisions. The data obtained from this practice round was discarded. 
Participants were free to ask the instructors questions about the interface of the network 
experiment. After the practice round, control questions were distributed to verify 
whether the participants had a sufficient understanding of the network experiment to 
play it independently. Answers to these were checked and if necessary, some additional 
instruction was given to the participant before the experiments started. It was forbidden 
for participants to talk with each other and neither was there any help from the 
instructors during the second and third round, the rounds that were used for data 
collection. There was a debriefing session at the end of the experiments for educational 
purposes. The winner, the participant with the highest gross margin at the end of the 
experiments of a session was awarded with a gift coupon worth $25; the other 
participants received a fixed fee of $10.  
6.2.3 Dependent variable 
Bridging position partner firms. For each firm we calculate the strength of a 
firms’ bridging position using Burt’s (1992) network constraint measure. Constraint 
measures the extent to which a firm is dependent on its partner firms, when a firm is 
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highly dependent it means it has little autonomy and therefore little control over the 
outcome of its activities. Therefore, network constraint is a measure of the control 
benefits of a structural hole. Constraint is a normalized measure with values ranging form 
zero to one. Firms without structural holes have a constraint of one while firms with 
many structural holes have a constraint value of zero. The definition of network 
constraint44 is (Burt, 1992: 60): 
Network constraint is: .,
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i = focal firm, j = alter 1 firm i, q = alter n of firm i; ijp = investment of firm i's time and 
energy in the relationship with firm j; qjiq pp  = joint investment of time and energy of 
firm i and firm q in a relationship with firm j.  
Next, we sum the total constraint among all partner firms of the focal firm and 
divide that by the number of partner firms. Finally, we multiply this measure by 100. This 
is the average constraint that the alter firms of a focal firm experience. Burt (2007) used 
this measure for his study on second-hand brokerage of investment bankers. 
Network constraint is a measure that only takes into account the structure of the 
ego network. However, changes in the network position of a partner firm that do not 
affect the structure of the ego network of the focal firm are not considered by this 
measure. We will illustrate with an example (see Figure 6-3) that this can be inaccurate. 
The first illustration shows a bridging position for firm A. Firm A is relatively 
unconstrained (its network constraint measure is 1/3) because it has three partners who 
do not have any other relationships. The partner firms are dependent on firm A and are 
highly constrained (network constraint measure is for each partner firm 1.000). Suppose 
that at t+1 firm B establishes two new relationships: one with firm E and one with firm 
F. What are the implications for the bridging position of firm A? Burt’s network 
constraint measure does not change because the two new firms do not belong to firm A’s 
ego network. However, firm B has improved its network position. It has more bridging 
ties and it has become less dependent on firm A. The position of firm A has become 
weaker even though the network position of firm A has not deteriorated according to the 
network constraint measure. Therefore, we use the average network constraint of the 
partner firms to study when the bridging position of the focal firm weakens.  
 
                                                 
44 See for a graphic illustration of the network constraint measure on page 101. 
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Figure 6-3 Illustration of network constraint for partner firms 
The second dependent variable is effective size as was described op page 119. To 
calculate this measure for the strength of the bridging positions of the alter firms, we 
used the same procedure as described for the network constraint measure.   
6.2.4 Independent variables 
Network horizon. We operationalized network horizon as a continuous variable 
that counts how many firms the focal firm can ‘see’. For firms with a limited network 
horizon we count the number of firms that can be reached within two steps, for firms 
that have an extended (or full) network horizon the number of firms the focal firm sees 
is equal to the network size (depending on the scenario 14 or 15 firms). This variable is 
updated after each decision point. This is consistent with the operationalization in 
Chapter 4. Next, we average the network horizon for all of the partner firms of the focal 
firm. This measure is used for hypotheses 2, 4 and 5.  
Resource similarity. We base this measure on Chen’s (1996) observation that 
resource similarity is an asymmetrical property. To measure the similarity we look at the 
capabilities a firm possesses. To measure the capability overlap of firm i with firm j we 
construct a matrix with on the rows and columns the firms that make up the network. 
Subsequently for row one (firm i) we count the number of capabilities that firm i has in 
common with firm j and divide that by the total number of capabilities firm i has. This 
procedure is repeated for each row, the result is a matrix that shows for each 
combination (firm i, firm j) the percentage of capabilities that firm i has in common with 
firm j. Finally, we sum the percentage of capabilities that firm i has in common with its 
partner firms and divide that by the total number of partner firms. This measure of 
Bridging position firm A at t=1 
(0.333) 
A 
B C 
D 
Bridging position firm A at t=0 
(1.000) (1.000) 
(1.000) 
(0.333) 
A 
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D 
(0.333) (1.000) 
(1.000) 
E F 
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Number in parentheses is 
network constraint 
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resource similarity captures the average percentage of capabilities that are found in the 
network more than once. This measure is used for hypothesis 1.  
Firm 1 2 3 4 5 Sum 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 
2 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 
3 0 0 0 1 0 1.0 
4 0 0 0.5 0 0.5 1.0 
5 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 1.0 
Sum 0.0 0.5 0.5 1.5 1 Resource 
Similarity: 
(3.5+3.5)/25 
= 0.28 
Resource similarity is calculated by 
constructing a resource similarity matrix and 
for each pair of firms determining how many 
capabilities the firms have in common. This is 
summed and subsequently averaged for the 
ego network. The interpretation is as follows: 
two randomly picked firms have an expected 
resource similarity of 28%. 3.5 is the sum of 
the column and the sum of the row; 25 is the 
total number of observations. 
Table 6-2 Example of the calculation of resource similarity 
Resource dependence. A firm that is highly dependent when it outsources 
many of the capabilities it needs to deliver. Resource dependence is measured as the 
number of capabilities outsourced divided by the total number of capabilities that a firm 
should deliver. This is multiplied by 100 to make it a percentage. A value of 100 means 
that a firm does not possess any capabilities itself, but it has to outsource the capabilities 
to its network of suppliers to deliver the required capabilities. A value of 0 means that a 
firm possesses the required capabilities itself. This measure is used for hypothesis 2.  
6.2.5 Control variables 
We use an extensive set of control variables including focal firm characteristics, 
focal firm network position characteristics, alter firm characteristics, and alter firm 
network position characteristics to control for alternative explanations of why a firm 
does (not) change its network position. 
Number of capabilities owned by the focal firm. This variable counts the 
number of capabilities the focal firm possesses. A firm that possesses many capabilities is 
less dependent on its suppliers and is therefore less likely to establish a new relationship.  
Number of capabilities outsourced by the focal firm. This variable counts 
the number of capabilities the focal firm outsources. A firm that outsources many 
capabilities is more dependent on its suppliers and is therefore more likely to switch 
suppliers in case a new supplier offers a capability at a lower price.  
Betweenness centrality of the focal firm. Betweenness centrality is a measure 
of how often a firm is located on the shortest path between two firms. A high value 
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indicates that a firm is more central and has more influence in brokering information and 
resources between those two firms. Betweenness centrality is calculated as: 
∑∑ ≠≠
i j ij
ikj kji
g
g
,  gij is the number of geodesic paths from i to j, gikj is the number of 
geodesic paths that pass along k and a geodesic path is the shortest path connecting two 
nodes in a network (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). 
Average number of capabilities owned by the alter firms. This variable 
counts the average number of capabilities all the alter firms of the focal firm possess. A 
high number of capabilities owned by alter firm means that the focal firm is less inclined 
to establish a new relationship because it already has access to those capabilities. 
Average number of capabilities outsourced by the alter firms. Counts the 
average number of capabilities all the alter firms of the focal firm outsources. A high 
number of capabilities that are being outsourced by alter firms means that the focal firm 
is less inclined to establish a new relationship because there is a maximum number of 
capabilities it can outsource.  
Average betweenness centrality of alter firms. Alter firms that have a high 
betweenness centrality belong to the core of the network. These firms are more attractive 
to partner with, based on their on network position and hence make the focal firm less 
attractive. This variable is calculated by calculating the betweenness centrality for each 
partner firm and then it takes the average among all the partner firms.  
Firms with zero relationships. When a firm has zero relationships then it is not 
possible to calculate the resource similarity because there are no partner firms to calculate 
resource similarity. Hence, for these firms resource similarity will be a missing value. 
These missing values have been replaced with a zero in the resource similarity variable 
and the variable firms with zero relationships were coded by one.  
Furthermore, we add dummy variables for each firm, each type of strategy, a 
firm’s initial network position, and the size of the network.  
6.3 Analysis and Results – Network Experiments 
The dependent variable is a continuous measure ranging from zero to one 
(before transforming the variable to a percentage). The observations are nested in 
different experiments, with different firms with multiple observations per firm leading to 
auto-correlation between observations. An observation of the network constraint of firm 
i at decision point 2 is dependent on the observation of the network constraint of firm i 
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at decision point 1. Our data is nested and therefore observations are dependent, this is a 
violation of a key OLS assumption (Menard, 2002). To correct for this, we will use a 
longitudinal mixed method linear technique that allows for nesting of observations.  
Table 6-3 summarizes the means, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, and 
the variance inflation factors (VIF) for the variables. Although most correlations are 
significant, the size of the correlations is generally small. Before continuing the analysis, 
we first assess to what extent multicollinearity affects our results. The variance inflation 
factors indicate to what extent multicollinearity is present between the variables. VIF 
values greater than 10 are considered problematic and are a strong indication of 
multicollinearity (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998). The VIF values are well 
below the critical value of ten (see Table 6-3). Furthermore, we inspect how well the data 
is conditioned. Poor conditioning of the data is usually an indication of multicollinearity 
that results in imprecise variable estimates. The condition number for these data is 
21.1279, which is well below the advised critical value of 30 (Belsley, 1991). Hence, we 
conclude that multicollinearity is not a significant issue.  
We estimate six models (see Table 6-4) to investigate which partner firm factors 
contribute to the focal firm in changing its network position. We show the main effects 
separate of each other to investigate whether the hypothesized effects exist 
independently and jointly. The first model is a detailed baseline model using the control 
variables. The second model includes the main effect of resource similarity. The third 
model includes the main effect of network horizon. The fourth model includes the main 
effect of resource dependence. The fifth model adds the interaction effects between 
resource similarity and network horizon and resource dependence and network horizon. 
Finally, the sixth model adds includes all the main effects and interaction effects. 
Each model is a significant improvement of the previous model and both the 
AIC and BIC information criteria indicate that model 6 is the most efficient model 
because AIC and BIC have the smallest value compared with the other models 
(Kennedy, 2003). Therefore, we will use model 6 to test our hypotheses. 
The base line model is an extensive control model to account for alternative 
explanations such as focal firm characteristics and characteristics of the focal firm’s 
network position. We have left out the control variables including the firm, strategy, and 
initial network position dummy to improve the readability of the table. We have reversed 
the network constraint variable to facilitate the comparison with effective size: high 
values indicate a strong bridging position while low values indicate a weak bridging 
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position. Thus, we expect positive coefficients because a positive effect indicates that the 
bridging position becomes stronger. The second model adds the first main effect to test 
hypothesis 1. The first hypothesis stated that as partner firms become more similar in 
terms of their capabilities they would experience increased competition. To alleviate this 
competitive pressure those partners will establish ties outside the ego network of the 
focal firm to counter balance the power of the focal firm. We find the coefficient to be 
positive and significant and thus giving support for the first hypothesis. 
The second hypothesis argued that the incentive to establish a new interfirm ties 
increases as partner firms become more dependent on the focal firm. Establishing new 
ties restructures their dependence but comes at the expense of the focal firm. We do find 
support for this hypothesis since the coefficient is positive and significant. The third 
hypothesis stated that as the network horizon of the partner firms increases, it is more 
likely that these partner firms find alternative firms that can substitute for the focal firm 
and thereby weakening the bridging position of the focal firm. The coefficient is positive 
and significant and thereby confirming our hypothesis.   
Finally, we test the two interaction effects. The first interaction effect stated that 
when the network horizon of partner firms is extensive and these firms are facing a high 
level of resource similarity then these firms would have both the incentive and the means 
to shift their network position. Hence, we expect a positive sign for the coefficient. 
Counter to our hypothesis, we find a significant but negative sign. This rejects our 
hypothesis. An explanation for this finding can be that when a firm has an extensive 
network horizon and it still has similar capabilities compared with the other firms in the 
network then it is running out of possibilities. This can especially happen in the 
experiments since the network is rather small and the total number of unique capabilities 
is limited as well. This effect can particularly happen at the end of an experiment since 
the network structures tend to converge to an equilibrium where it is no longer possible 
to shift a firm’s network position. The fifth hypothesis argued that there is a positive 
interaction effect between the average network horizon of partner firm and their average 
resource dependence. We do find support for this finding since the coefficient is positive 
as predicted and significant. 
6.3.1 Robustness tests 
We also conduct alternative methods of testing our hypotheses using three 
methods. First, we will conduct likelihood-ratio tests to check whether the joint effect of 
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independent variables is statistically different from zero (Long & Freese, 2006). The final 
row in Table 6-4 shows the model improvement. Models 2, 3, 4 and 5 are compared with 
the baseline model and model 6 is compared with model 5. Each model is an 
improvement over its predecessor meaning that each model explains more variance 
compared with the previous model. This is emphasized by the decreasing values of both 
the AIC and BIC information criteria. Second, we conduct a Wald test. The Wald test 
tests whether a joint set of variables are different form zero. The Wald test is significant 
(χ2(5) = 834.17; p = 0.0000). (For the purpose of this test, we drop the interaction effect 
between network horizon of the partner firms and resource similarity because the 
expected sign of the coefficient was counter to our hypothesis). This gives further 
support for our findings that resource similarity, the average network horizon of partner 
firms and resource dependence determinants of the weakening of the bridging position 
of the focal firm. 
Third, we rerun the models and use the average effective size of partner firms as 
our dependent variable. Table 6-5 presents the results of the same models as Table 6-4 
but with a different dependent variable. Hypotheses 1, 3, and 5 are supported. 
Hypothesis 2 is not supported although it becomes significant in the model 6. However, 
the main effect without interaction effects is non-significant. We expect that model 
misspecification45 is the cause that the coefficient becomes significant when we introduce 
the interaction effects. Hypothesis 5 is significant but the sign of the coefficient is 
counter to our prediction. This is consistent with the models based on the average 
partner network constraint. Concluding, our robustness tests give additional support for 
our hypotheses that resource similarity, resource dependence, and network horizon of 
partner firms weaken the bridging position of the focal firm. 
 
                                                 
45 Model misspecification is a general term to cover a broad range of modeling errors including 
measurement errors, omitting independent variables (under-specified model), including 
extraneous independent variables (over-specified model), multicollinearity, and sampling 
constraints. In this particular case, however, it is more likely that the significance of the resource 
similarity variable is due to the inclusion of the interaction effect between resource similarity and 
network horizon that results in multicollinearity between resource similarity and the interaction 
effect of resource similarity and network horizon. Although the interaction variable is mean 
centered and the correlation between these two variables is .55 the number of observations is 
large enough to result in this kind error. 
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6.4 Methodology Study 2 – Field Study 
So far, we used experiments to test our hypotheses. However, in order to 
increase the external validity of our findings we try to replicate our findings in an 
empirical setting. We collected archival data for the period 2002 – 2005 to construct the 
evolution of the Dutch insurance network to test our hypotheses regarding the 
weakening of bridging positions. In the Dutch insurance industry, there is an electronic 
network that facilitates the communication of transactions between insurance brokers 
and insurance firms called (in Dutch) the Assurantie Data Netwerk (ADN) or Insurance 
Data Network. We will use this data for our second method of this chapter. Two features 
of the network make this a useful data source: first, these are real transactions and 
therefore used as basis for monetary transactions. The ADN data consists of day-to-day 
transactions between insurance firms and brokers. Transactions include the prolongation 
of insurance policies and the applications for policies by new customers. Second, the 
Insurance Data Network covers approximately 10% of the total number of insurance 
brokers in the Netherlands.  
6.4.1 Network definition 
The network we will study consists of three different types of firms: insurance 
firms, authorized resellers, and insurance brokers. Insurance firms are responsible for 
marketing, product development, acceptation of customer, administration while the 
insurance broker is, mainly, responsible for sales and advice activities. The authorized 
resellers have integrated some activities that traditionally belong to the insurance firm like 
customer acceptation and administration. The network we study is based on buyer – 
supplier relationships, hence an insurance broker has to sell insurance products from one 
or more insurance companies. This applies to the authorized resellers as well. While we 
collected transaction data between insurance broker and insurance firm on a daily basis, 
we aggregated this data to a yearly basis in order to stabilize our results. We did not use a 
moving window approach because the month-to-month variance was too limited to be 
meaningful and is computationally infeasible; hence, we have between one and four 
observation points for each insurance broker (2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005). The number 
of observations differs per year because brokers can exit the Insurance Data Network 
during the window of observation.  
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6.4.2 Selection bias  
It is possible that insurance brokers that have joined the Insurance Data Network 
differ on key firm characteristics compared with insurance brokers that did not join the 
Insurance Data Network. For example, firms belonging to the Insurance Data Network 
are possibly significantly larger in terms of firm size compared with ordinary insurance 
brokers (information was obtained from the REACH database). This can potentially bias 
the results. Therefore, we conduct a t-test and assume different variances for the two 
samples (firms from the REACH database and firm from the ADN network). We tested 
whether the average number of employees of the firms in the Insurance Data Network is 
significantly different from the average number of employees of the firms that do not 
participate with the Insurance Data Network. The t-test indicates that the firms in 
Insurance Data Network are significantly larger (p = 0.0000) in terms of average number 
of employees than ordinary insurance brokers. The implication of this selection bias is 
that the firms in our sample are more likely to shift their network position because larger 
firms have more resources available and have therefore greater discretion in the 
partnering actions they take. Smaller insurance broker firms may not be able to establish 
or terminate relationships with the same flexibility as larger insurance broker firms.  
6.4.3 Dependent variable 
Bridging position partner firms. We use the same dependent variable as in our 
first study of this chapter. Thus, we calculate effective size for each firm (see page 97) 
and network constraint for each firm (see page 98). Next, we sum the network constraint 
for a focal firm’s alter firms and we average those values46.  
6.4.4 Independent variables 
Resource dependence. Resource dependence is an asymmetric construct 
(Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005); therefore, we measure the dependence of a broker on the 
insurance firms and the dependence of insurance firms on brokers independently. We 
calculate the dependence of a broker on its insurance firms by taking the variance of the 
net value of insurance products sold to consumers. A high variance is an indication that 
an insurance broker is selling insurance products from one insurance firm and is 
therefore dependent on that particular insurance firm. A low variance indicates that the 
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broker sells insurance products from different insurance firms and is less dependent on 
any one firm in particular. This variable has a minimum value of zero and is unbounded.  
An insurance firm is dependent on an insurance broker to the extent the broker 
covers exclusively a geographic area. An insurance firm that has a geographic area 
covered by one broker is highly dependent on that broker compared with an insurance 
firm that has multiple brokers covering the same geographic area. This variable ranges 
from 0 (no dependence) to 100 (highly dependent).  
Resource similarity. We measure resource similarity using the following 
procedure. We have collected four digits (out of the six) of the zip codes of each 
customer for each broker in our dataset. These zip codes have been transformed into 
longitude and latitude coordinates. Converting zip codes to longitude and latitude 
coordinates has previously been done by Casciaro and Piskorski (2005). Next, using the 
convex hull algorithm (Weisstein, 2006), we calculate the geographic area a broker 
covers. The convex hull algorithm calculates the coordinates of a polygon that includes a 
set of points. In our case, we have a set of customers with their zip codes that constitute 
a set of points. The convex hull algorithm calculates the polygon that includes all the 
customers. We repeat this for each broker in the dataset. Then, we identify the 
competitors of the focal broker by looking at which brokers are positioned in the 
geographic area of the focal broker. The result of this process is illustrated in Figure 6-4.  
 
Figure 6-4 Illustrative example of calculating resource similarity variable47 
                                                                                                                                            
46 The data collection for the dependent, independent and control variables is described in Section 
3.6.  
47 We built a Google Maps application to visualize the Dutch insurance industry network. The 
application is available at dep01-server02.fbk.eur.nl:8100/adn/. 
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The overlap determines who is competing with whom. Having established the 
competitors of an insurance broker, then we look at the products each broker offers. The 
percentage of overlap in products is resource similarity. For example, if broker A is 
offering car and travel policies and broker B is offering only travel policies then broker A 
has a resource similarity of 50% (1 product in common out of 2 products offered) while 
broker B has a resource similarity of 100% (1 product in common out of 1 product 
offered). Resource similarity ranges from 0% to 100%. This measure is consistent with 
the resource similarity measure we used in the first study of this chapter. Furthermore, 
this measure is consistent with Chen’s (1996) observation that resource similarity is an 
asymmetrical property between two or more firms. 
6.4.5 Control variables 
The number of ties an insurance broker will maintain also depends on a number 
of industry and firm specific factors. Hence, we will construct an extensive baseline 
model based on the following industry and firm specific control variables to control for 
alternative explanations of why a bridging position weakens.  
Number of property insurance firms. This variable counts the number of 
property insurance firms active in the Netherlands. When more insurance firms are active 
then it becomes more likely that insurance brokers will maintain more relationships with 
different insurance firms.  
Number of SER A / SER B / SER GA licenses. These three variables count 
the total number of insurance brokers with either an A, B or GA registration. An A 
license indicates that the advisers of the insurance broker are better qualified and trained 
in selling insurance products compared with a B license. A GA license indicates that a 
broker is authorized to accept new customers independently from the insurance firm and 
to resell insurance products under their own brand. The entry of new brokers might 
increase the competition between them and hence negatively influence the number of 
ties a broker maintains because an insurance firm can choose from more brokers.  
Total industry policies sold. This variable counts the total number of insurance 
policies being sold through insurance brokers and direct writers. This variable is an 
indication of how well the industry is doing in a particular year.  
Furthermore, we use the following firm characteristics to control for alternative 
explanations of the bridging position of a broker. 
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Number of employees. Counts the number of employees (full time equivalent) 
working at a broker. This is a measure of firm size; larger brokers may have more 
resources at their disposal to shift their network position.  
Broker professional memberships. These are three dummy variables that 
indicate whether an insurance broker is a member of one of three professional industry 
organizations that act as independent quality auditor. NVA and stands for Dutch 
Association for Insurance Brokers and Financial Service Firms (Nederlandse Vereniging 
van Assurantieadviseurs en Financiële Dienstverleners). One of the activities of the NVA 
is to participate in different committees to enhance the interests of its members. The 
NVGA stands for Dutch Association of Authorized Resellers (Nederlandse Vereniging 
van Gevolmachtigde Assurantiebedrijven). The NVGA acts as independent quality 
auditor for authorized resellers that can independently of the insurance firm accept new 
customers. The NBVA stands for Dutch Association for Insurance Brokers 
(Nederlandse Bond van Assurantiebemiddelaars) and is an association for independent 
insurance brokers with 900 members.  
Broker qualification. This variable indicates whether a broker has an SER A, 
SER B, or SER GA license.  
Captive. This variable measures the ownership of a broker by an insurance firm. 
Captivity is an indicator of restricted autonomy of the broker and is therefore less likely 
to establish new ties.  
Market area covered by broker. This variable measures the market area (in 
km2) that a broker services. This variable is an indicator of how powerful a broker is vis-
à-vis the insurance firms.  
Number of customers. The number of customers a broker services is an 
indicator of firm size and possibly power vis-à-vis insurance firms. Brokers with more 
customers are more likely to unilaterally shift their network position because of their 
reduced dependence.  
Firm with one relationship. A broker with one relationship is highly dependent 
upon the insurance firm. Most of these firms are captured by the captive variable, 
however this variable is an extra check to control for highly dependent firms.  
Year dummy. Finally, we included year dummies to account for year specific 
events. 
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6.5 Analysis and Results – Field Study 
The collected data are panel data: we have multiple observations per firm, hence 
we need time-series regression analysis to analyze the data. The data of the field study are 
not nested in contrast to the first study of this chapter. To prevent simultaneity problems 
we lag the independent variables one year (Kennedy, 2003). Thus, 2001 observations are 
used to predict the strength or weakness of a firm’s bridging position in 2002.  
Table 6-6 shows the means, standard deviation, range, variance inflation factors 
(VIF), and the correlations. Before continuing the analysis, we first assess to what extent 
multicollinearity affects our results. The variance inflation factors indicate to what extent 
multicollinearity is present between the variables. VIF sizes greater than 10 are 
considered problematic and are a strong indication of multicollinearity (Hair et al., 1998). 
The VIF values are well below the critical value of ten. Furthermore, we calculate the 
conditioning index number (Belsley, 1991), the conditioning number is 13.9401, which is 
well below the critical value of 30. Hence, we conclude that multicollinearity does not 
materially affect our results. 
We estimate four models (see Table 6-7) to investigate which partner firm factors 
contribute to the focal firm in changing its network position. We show the main effects 
separate of each other to investigate whether the hypothesized effects exist 
independently and jointly. The first model is a detailed baseline model using the control 
variables. The second model includes the main effect of resource similarity. The third 
model includes the main effect of resource dependence. Finally, the fourth model 
includes both main effects.  
Each model is a significant improvement of the previous model and both the 
AIC and BIC information criteria indicate that model 4 is the most efficient model 
because AIC and BIC have the smallest value compared with the other models 
(Kennedy, 2003). Therefore, we will use model 4 to test our hypotheses. 
The base line model is an extensive control model to account for alternative 
explanations such as focal firm characteristics and characteristics of the focal firms’ 
network position. We reverse coded network constraint: high values indicate a strong 
bridging position while low values indicate a weak bridging position. Thus, we expect 
positive coefficients because a positive effect indicates that the bridging position 
becomes stronger. The second model adds the first main effect to test hypothesis 1. The 
first hypothesis stated that as partner firms become more similar in terms of their 
capabilities they would experience increased competition. To alleviate this competitive 
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pressure those partners will establish ties outside the ego network of the focal firm to 
counter balance the power of the focal firm. We find the coefficient to be positive and 
significant and thus giving support for the first hypothesis. The second hypothesis argued 
that the incentive to establish a new interfirm tie increases as partner firms become more 
dependent on the focal firm. Establishing new ties restructures their dependence but 
comes at the expense of the focal firm. We do not find support for this hypothesis since 
the coefficient is negative and significant. This suggests that dependent firms, either 
voluntarily or coerced, strengthen their relationship with the bridging party by 
abandoning less important interfirm relationships. This is in contrast with the findings 
from the network experiments, which suggested that dependent firms would search for 
alternative partner firms.   
6.5.1 Robustness tests 
Finally, we also conduct alternative methods of testing our hypotheses using 
three methods comparable with the robustness tests of the network experiments. First, 
we will conduct likelihood-ratio tests to check whether the joint effect of independent 
variables is statistically different from zero (Long & Freese, 2006). The final row in Table 
6-7 shows the model improvement. Models 2, 3, and 4 are compared with the baseline 
model. Each model is an improvement over its predecessor meaning that each model 
explains more variance compared with the previous model. This is emphasized by the 
decreasing values of the AIC, the BIC information criterion is a bit more ambiguous, and 
according to the BIC is model 3 the most parsimonious. Second, we conduct a Wald test. 
The Wald test confirms whether a joint set of variables are different form zero. The Wald 
test is significant (χ2(5) = 86.36; p = 0.0000). This gives further support for our findings 
that resource similarity and resource dependence are determinants of the weakening of 
the bridging position of the focal firm. Third, we rerun the models and use the average 
effective size of partner firms as our dependent variable. Table 6-8 resents the results of 
the same models as Table 6-7 but with the average effective size of partner firms as the 
dependent variable. Hypotheses 1 is not supported but hypothesis 2 is, which is an exact 
replication of the previous findings. Thus, in the field study we find strong support for 
our prediction that resource similarity leads to a weakening of a bridging position while 
resource dependence leads to the strengthening of a bridging position. The last finding is 
counter to our predictions but it could suggest that the dependence is managed not 
through unilateral restructuring (i.e. the dependent firm searches for a new partner firm) 
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but that a dependent firm is more likely to adopt a bilateral strategy (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978) to manage the dependence. In this case, the dependence is managed by the 
dependent firm strengthening its relationship with the bridging firm. A possible 
suggestion for this inconsistent finding is that we used two different operationalizations 
for resource dependence. In the network experiments, we used the number of 
capabilities outsourced while in the field study we used the variance of procured 
insurance policies.  
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6.6 Conclusion 
Salancik (1995) argued that the field of network research should move beyond 
questions about the effects of network positions and raise questions that focus on why 
particular positions exist or do not exist in the first place. Salancik (1995: 349) phrased it 
as follows: “a more telling analysis might explain why the hole exists or why it was not 
filled before.” This chapter addressed the issue under what circumstances the bridging 
position of the focal firm weakens. In order to do so, we moved our focus away from the 
focal partner and looked at the partnering behavior of its alter firms. Next, we identified 
two different situations: 1) partner firms are homogenous which leads to resource 
similarity among the partner firms and 2) partner firms are heterogeneous which leads to 
dependence between the partner and bridging firm (Reagans & Zuckerman, 2006). 
Partner firms of a bridging firm who shift their network position undermine the strength 
of the focal firm’s bridging position because they become less dependent on the bridging 
firm. We argued that resource dependence and resource similarity are two possible 
explanations why the alter firms will partner with other firms. We used two research 
methods to investigate which partner firm characteristics affect the bridging position. 
First, we employed network experiments. The network experiments give robust support 
to our predictions. Partner firms with similar resources compared to other partner firms 
of the bridging party or partner firms that are dependent on the bridging firm are very 
likely to shift their network position by establishing new interfirm ties. The effect of 
these new interfirm ties is that both the control and information benefits of the bridging 
party weaken. The control benefits weaken because the partner firms become less 
dependent and have alternatives to the bridging firm. Furthermore, the partner firms that 
establishes new ties gets access to new parts of the network and thereby creating 
information benefits themselves. Both effects weaken the bridging position of the focal 
firm. Furthermore, we argued that if partner firms have a more extended network 
horizon then they will be more aware of alternative network partners and can more easily 
escape from their disadvantaged position. We also found support for this prediction. 
Finally, we investigated whether there are interaction effects between resource 
dependence and network horizon of the partner firms and resource similarity and 
network horizon of the partner firms. We did find support for the interaction effect 
between resource dependence and network horizon of the partner firms. 
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Second, we conducted a field study in the Dutch insurance industry to increase 
the generalizability of our first findings. This study replicated the resource similarity 
finding from the network experiments and thereby increasing the robustness of the 
previous finding. However, the field study did not support our second hypothesis. A 
possible explanation is that although the bridged firm has the incentive to shift its 
network position because of its high dependence, it cannot shift its position because the 
insurance firms are more powerful and broker firms are afraid that establishing new 
relationships with another insurance firm they may jeopardize their current relationship.  
Our three predictions (resource dependence, resource similarity, and network 
horizon) can be categorized according to the basic motive behind the change of a firm’s 
network position. Firms changing their network position because of resource 
dependence or resource similarity do so because they perceive both factors as threats to 
the performance of their firm. A highly dependent firm has less discretion about the 
actions it can take. This loss of control translates in more uncertainty and accepting 
worse exchange conditions. Firms changing their network position because of resource 
similarity do so because they experience increased competition. Resource similarity 
weakens the bargaining position and increased pressure on prices. However, firms 
changing their network position because they spot alternative partners in the network do 
so because they perceive an opportunity to improve their network position. Threat and 
opportunity categorization is consistent with previous work on how organizational 
decision-makers scan and filter their environment (Hambrick, 1982), interpret (Baum et 
al., 2003; Porac et al., 1995) and categorize the obtained information (Jackson & Dutton, 
1988).   
Our findings suggest that the two most valuable types of bridging positions carry 
their own seeds of demise. The first type of a bridging position is the situation in which 
the bridged firms are homogenous (Reagans & Zuckerman, 2006). This situation leads to 
high levels of resource similarity and thereby creating the incentive for the bridged firms 
to shift their network position. The second type of a bridging position is the situation in 
which the bridged firms are heterogeneous (Reagans & Zuckerman, 2006). This situation 
means that a bridged firm is highly dependent on the bridging firm and this creates the 
incentive for the bridged firm to start partnering with other firms in the network.  
Although we tried to make our results as robust as possible using a multi-method 
research design and different operationalizations of the dependent variable, there remains 
one important limitation. This limitation is that we did not measure the partnering 
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actions of firms directly (for example using a binary variable to code whether a firm has 
established or terminated a tie) but we used the indirect measure of network constraint. 
This raises the possibility that the partnering behavior of the bridged firms confounds 
with the partnering behavior of its partner firms (thus the partners of the partners of the 
focal firm). A shift in the network position of the partner firms may be attributable to the 
partnering actions of the partner firm itself or its partner firms. This possibly obscures 
the causality: did the partner firm shift its network position in response to the focal firm? 
Or did the network position of the partner firm shift due to partnering actions by its 
partners? This constitutes an infinite regress problem; future research should consider 
the firm that initiates the tie to observe more directly changes in network positions to 
address this problem.  
Finally, we think that by incorporating the partnering actions of both the bridging 
and the bridged firms we gain a more comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of 
the bridging network position. Pollock, Porac and Wade noted that “not all structural 
holes are equivalent and equally attractive” (2004:51) and this research suggests that the 
two most valuable types of bridging positions seem to be the ones that will not last long. 
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7 Conclusions 
This research was aimed at increasing our understanding of the dynamics of 
network positions and in particular, the dynamics of bridging positions. A brief summary 
including the main findings of the three empirical chapters is given which we will 
subsequently synthesize in a model of network position dynamics. Next, we discuss the 
generalizability and limitations of the results and in particular the managerial relevance of 
these findings. Finally, we look at some directions for future research. 
7.1 Summary of Main Findings 
This study started with the overall research question of why a firm’s network 
position changes. In order to answer this question, we narrowed down the scope of the 
research and decided to focus exclusively on the bridging position because it is an 
important source of value creation (Burt, 2000) and is the object of strategic action by 
firms (Baum et al., 2003; Rowley & Baum, 2002; Rowley & Baum, 2004). As Salancik 
(1995: 349) noted “Why does a structural hole exist? Why was it not filled before?” This 
dissertation develops a model of the dynamics of network positions based on firm, 
partner firm and network level factors. Our focus on the bridging position led to three 
detailed research questions, each covering a particular aspect of the life cycle of a 
bridging position. The first detailed research question: why does a bridging position 
strengthen? is answered in Chapter 4. Next, we investigate why do some bridging 
positions last longer than other bridging positions? when firms compete for bridging 
positions and thereby answering the second detailed research question in Chapter 5. 
Finally, we address the third detailed research question: why do bridging positions 
weaken? in Chapter 6 which looked at the influence of bridged firm’s partnering actions 
on the bridging position of the focal firm. 
7.1.1 Findings Chapter 4 
The first empirical chapter answers the first detailed research question: why do 
bridging positions strengthen? Chapter 4 argues that firms need to have information 
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about the network structure (i.e. network horizon) to strengthen their bridging position. 
Using both network experiments and computational modeling, we concluded Chapter 4 
with four findings: 
1. Firms with a more extended network horizon will span more structural holes 
 compared to firms with a more limited network horizon. 
2. Having a more extended network horizon in itself is a required but 
 insufficient condition to span more structural holes. Our findings suggested 
 that the participants from the fixed student team were better in strengthening 
 their bridging positions compared with participants who participated only 
 once because they learned to assess the benefits of a bridging position in the 
 context of the network experiments. The implication of this finding is that 
 organizational decision-makers have to understand the value of a particular 
 network position in order to make the proper decisions to arrive at such 
 position (we will discuss this in section about managerial relevance as well).  
3. The network horizon heterogeneity is a determinant of how long a firm can 
 benefit from a particular network position. Greater heterogeneity means that 
 a firm with a more extended network horizon will benefit longer from its 
 position because other firms are not able to make partnering decisions that 
 threaten the network position of the focal firm. 
4. For a given network, there are diminishing returns for the network horizon. 
 After a certain information threshold, there is no utility for a firm to collect 
 even more information about the network because it does not lead to a more 
 favorable network position.  
These findings suggest that the network horizon of a firm is an important and 
robust factor for a firm to strengthen its bridging position. How to collect information 
about the network structure in an empirical setting will be addressed in the Future 
Research section.   
7.1.2 Findings Chapter 5 
Chapter 5 answers the second detailed research question: why do some bridging 
positions last longer than other bridging positions? Chapter 5 presents evidence, using a 
computational model, that the network horizon heterogeneity is an important 
determinant for the intensity of the competition for bridging positions. Network horizon 
heterogeneity is a network level construct, thus we incorporate how the partnering 
Conclusions 
 185 
behavior of other firms in the network affect the bridging position of the focal firm. 
More specifically, we concluded Chapter 5 with three findings: 
1. The sustainability of a bridging position increases as the network horizon 
 heterogeneity increases. Thus, network horizon heterogeneity is a positive 
 moderator of the sustainability of a bridging position for a firm with an 
 extended network horizon. 
2. In addition to the fact that firms with an extended network horizon span 
 more structural holes (consistent with Chapter 4) we find that firms with an 
 extended network horizon are able to profit from these bridging positions are 
 more sustainable because rival firms with a limited network horizon do not 
 detect these valuable brokerage opportunities.  
3. The network horizon of partner firms has a positive influence on the 
 sustainability of the bridging position of the focal firm.  
7.1.3 Findings Chapter 6 
Chapter 6 answers detailed research question three: why do bridging positions 
weaken? We moved the focus from the focal firm to its partner firms, i.e. the bridged 
firms, and investigated how their partnering decisions impact the focal firm’s bridging 
position. The first study of Chapter 6, using network experiments, presents evidence that 
bridged firms will improve their network position because of two basic motives: 1) these 
bridged firms detect opportunities in the network to improve their current network 
position and 2) these bridged firms experience either high levels of competition or 
dependence and then commence partnering actions to alleviate this pressure. The four 
findings of the first study of Chapter 6 are: 
1. Bridged firms with an extensive network horizon improve their network 
 position which weakens the bridging position of the focal firm.  
2. Bridged firms that are dependent on the focal firm will restructure their 
 dependence by establishing new interfirm relationships. These new 
 relationships weaken the bridging position of the focal firm. 
3. Bridged firms that have similar capabilities compared to other partner firms 
 of the focal firm will shift their network position to reduce the similarity. 
 These partnering actions weaken the bridging position of the focal firm. 
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4. Finally, bridged firms with high levels of dependence and an extended 
 network horizon contribute even more to the weakening of the bridging 
 position of the focal firm.  
The second study of Chapter 6 focused in particular on resource dependence and 
resource similarity in the context of the Dutch insurance industry. The two findings of 
the second study are: 
1. Bridged firms with similar capabilities will reduce the level of competitive 
 intensity by shifting their network position and thereby weaken the bridging 
 position of the focal firm. 
2. Bridged firms that are dependent on the bridging firm increase their 
 dependence by abandoning less important relationships and thus strengthen 
 the bridging position.  
7.2 Synthesis of the Findings 
Figure 7-148 integrates the findings of the three empirical studies into a single 
model of the dynamics of a bridging position. Each study addressed factors at a different 
level: Chapter 4 focused primarily on the firm (and to some extent on the network level), 
Chapter 5 focused on the network level, and Chapter 6 focused on the ego network of 
the focal firm. Thus, the findings of the previous section suggest that although the focal 
firm can actively strengthen its bridging position by the partnering decisions it takes, the 
strength also depends on the partnering decisions of its partners (local network effects) 
and the partnering decisions of other network firms (global network effects).  
This suggests that a firm should pay attention to both local and global changes in 
the network to be able to maintain its current network position. At the start of this 
dissertation, we raised the following overall research question:  
 
“Why does the network position of a firm change?  
Which firm, partner firm and network factors accelerate or slow down this change process?” 
 
                                                 
48 In Chapter 2, we illustrated how technology and specialization are drivers of the increased use 
of interfirm networks. We argued that interfirm networks would be more often used as 
technology and specialization progress. This figure illustrates, given the technology and 
specialization developments of Figure 2-1, how within such an interfirm network the bridging 
position is affected by firm, partner firm and network level effects.  
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We can now conclude that the answers to these questions are that a network 
position changes because a firm either identifies opportunities to strengthen its network 
position due to its network horizon or that a firm experiences threats in its environment, 
for example resource similarity, that compel the firm to shift its network position. 
 
Figure 7-1 Model of the strength of a bridging position49 
Network horizon is a firm level attribute, resource similarity is a partner firm level 
attribute, and network horizon manifests itself at the network level as network horizon 
heterogeneity. We have demonstrated that the heterogeneity is an important predictor of 
the level of competition for favorable network positions.  
Network horizon becomes important when competition moves from the firm-
level to the network-level. Industries like airlines, computer, insurance, microprocessors, 
and global technological standards face network-based competition. The resource-based 
                                                 
49 The two arrows from ‘network horizon bridged firms’ to the arrows between resource 
dependence and resource similarity and the strength of bridging position of the focal firm should 
be interpreted as moderators. Thus, network horizons of the bridged firms reinforce these 
relationships. Thus, bridged firms with a high level of resource similarity and an extensive 
network horizon are even more susceptible to weaken the bridging position of the focal firm.  
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view alone cannot explain competitive advantage in such situations and hence the need 
for a network-based view of competitive advantage arises. An extended network horizon 
gives the edge in such competitive environments because changes in the structure and 
composition of rival networks cannot remain hidden. Changes in the structure and 
composition of a rival network predict future strategic actions (Gnyawali et al., 2006) and 
firms with extended network horizons stay aware of these changes and can (re)act more 
decisively to overcome competitors.  
A network-based view of competitive advantage recognizes that not only 
resources controlled by a firm can generate a competitive advantage but that resources 
jointly controlled (Lavie, 2006) and the network position itself become potential sources 
of competitive advantage. These network resources (Gulati, 1999) can be even more 
effectively deployed when a firm expands its network horizon. Firms with extensive 
horizons locate quicker entrepreneurial opportunities compared with “blind-folded” 
firms. While the relational view (Dyer & Singh, 1998) acknowledges that an interfirm 
relationship itself functions as a source of competitive advantage, this research 
contributes by explicating the conditions (network horizon, network horizon 
heterogeneity, resource similarity and resource dependence) under which a network 
position, i.e. the configuration of interfirm relationships, and in particular the bridging 
position create a network-based competitive advantage.  
Stinchcombe stated in his Constructing Social Theories (1968: 3) that “Theory ought 
to have the capacity to invent explanations”50. The network-based view, compromising of 
concepts like network strategy, network resources, network horizon and network 
position open up the possibility of inventing new explanations, as this study has 
demonstrated, and to view and understand firm behavior and performance from a 
network perspective.  
7.3 Model of the Dynamics of Network Positions  
This dissertation investigated several information-based explanations of the 
dynamics of bridging positions. These findings suggest a starting point for a more a 
general theory of the dynamics of network positions. In this section, we outline the 
contours of such a theory. This model consists of four phases. First, the current network 
position and composition of the capabilities of the focal and its partner firms give the 
                                                 
50 Italics in original. 
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incentive for the focal firm to shift. The opportunities and threats that are present in the 
network (as demonstrated in Chapter 6) give the impetus to change. An incentive to 
change is a necessary precondition, but in itself insufficient. Network horizon is required 
to locate potential partner firms as was demonstrated in Chapter 4 and 5. Then, and this 
phase has not been covered by this study, comes the actual phase of partner selection. 
Which firm does the focal firm approach, negotiate with and close a deal with in order to 
establish an interfirm relationship. In our studies, we assumed that the focal firm does 
not face uncertainty about the partner firm it chooses. Recent research suggests that the 
partner selection phase is surrounded with uncertainty (Shipilov et al., 2006). 
Establishing a new interorganizational relationship is surrounded with two types 
of uncertainty (Podolny, 2001). The first type of uncertainty is about the capabilities and 
resources the potential partner firm possesses. Determining the resources and capabilities 
of a firm is a complex process because these resources and capabilities are often hard to 
observe and little public information is available about them. Information about these 
capabilities and resources will often be disclosed after the interfirm relationship has been 
established (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). Firms can turn to their alliance partners to gather 
information about the reliability, competencies, and resources of potential partners 
(Baum et al., 2003).  The second type of uncertainty is how the new partner firm will 
behave in the future after establishing the interorganizational relationship (Gulati & 
Gargiulo, 1999). The uncertainty regarding a firm’s future behavior can be reduced by 
increasing the shadow of the future (Axelrod, 1984), embedding this particular 
relationship within a web of embedded relationships which act as a reputation 
mechanism (Coleman, 1988) or creating an appropriate governance structure (Gulati & 
Singh, 1998).  
These two types of uncertainty can be reduced using different sources of 
information. First, uncertainty about the capabilities and resources of a potential firm can 
be reduced by looking at the partner firms of the new partner firm (Podolny, 2001). This 
view is referred to as the network as prism view. Firms that are similar (in terms of size, 
quality, or status) are more likely to collaborate with each other. If a network functions as 
a prism then other firms can infer from the new collaboration that the new unknown 
partner firm is likely to possess similar characteristics as the known firm. A second 
method to reduce the uncertainty about the capabilities and resources of a potential firm 
is for the focal firm to turn to its network to collect information about its future partner. 
Current partner firms might have interacted with the new partner firm and therefore 
Network Horizon and the Dynamics of Network Positions 
190 
have valuable information for the focal firm about its capabilities, resources, and 
behavior. Gulati and Gargiulo (1999) argue that the current interfirm network functions 
as a repository of information about a firm’s capabilities and behavior, this information 
in turn shapes the decision the focal firm takes with whom to partner and this new 
relationship alters the network structure and changes the information repository. 
Uncertainty and equivocality (Daft & Lengel, 1986), a situation that is open for more 
than one interpretation, stimulate a firm to collect and process information about its 
environment in order to reduce uncertainty and increase clarity and interpretation of its 
environment. 
Potential sources of information about the potential partner’s behavior are the 
network itself because it functions as an information repository (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; 
Li & Rowley, 2002) and environmental scanning activities (Hambrick, 1982) can be used 
to reduce this type of uncertainty. If current partner firms have collaborated with the 
potential new partners then these partner firms are able to provide information about the 
potential partners’ behavior. Second, organizational decision-makers engage in scanning 
and interpreting their firm’s environment51 (Hambrick, 1982) and can use this source of 
information in addition to turning to the network to collect information. Scanning a 
firm’s environment is an important task of organizational decision-makers because it 
provides them with signals and information about the competitive intentions and actions 
of other firms (i.e. the behavior of the potential partner). Opportunities and threats are 
often used categories by organizational decision-makers (Jackson & Dutton, 1988). 
 
Figure 7-2 Information sources to reduce partner selection uncertainty 
                                                 
51 For the purpose of this chapter is the interfirm network of a firm its environment. Obviously, 
the environment of a firm is much more extended than its network, but since the objective of this 
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Figure 7-2 Information sources to reduce partner selection uncertainty 
The information source needed to reduce the uncertainty surrounding the new 
partner firm is moderated by the type of relationship that is established. If the potential 
partner firm will be reached through a local tie, (a firm that can be reached in fewer than 
two steps before the new relationship is established) then the network as information 
repository will suffice for collecting data. Figure 7-3 illustrates the difference between a 
local and non-local tie. 
The network as prism and environmental scanning will not be needed because 
high quality information can be obtained from the focal firm’s current partners. It would 
not be possible to use the network as information repository to collect data about a 
partner firm that will be connected to using a non-local tie because the focal firm’s 
partners do not have any relationship with the non-local partner and therefore do not 
have any experience or any information about this non-local partner. In the end, a firm is 
chosen and the network position of the focal firm changes and so does the composition 
of the capabilities of its partner firms. This will in the short or long run lead to a new 
incentive for the focal firm to change its network position. 
 
Figure 7-3 Illustration of the difference between a local and a non-local tie 
This cycle is of course also applicable to all other firms in the network and 
cumulates into a continuous cycle of changes in the network. Figure 7-4 illustrates the 
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model of network position dynamics. Although the robustness of our findings is 
strengthened by the multi-method multi-level longitudinal research design, there are still 
questions about the generalizability of these findings. Therefore, generalizability is the 
topic of the next section.  
 
 
Figure 7-4 Dynamics of network positions 
7.4 Generalizability and Limitations 
We have findings from three different studies in this dissertation. To what extent 
are the findings of the network experiments and computational model generalizable to 
the insurance industry and to other industries? We employed a multi-method research 
design to increase both the internal and external validity (i.e. generalizability) of our 
results (Mingers, 2001).  
Generalizing a finding beyond the context in which it was found is a major 
concern for organizational scholars. Lee & Baskerville (2003: 233) identify four types of 
generalizability: 1) generalizing from data to description, 2) generalizing from description 
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to theory, 3) generalizing from theory to description and 4) generalizing from concepts to 
theory. The first type of generalizability often involves statistical generalizability when 
descriptives of a sample are used to make statements about a population. We will not 
attempt this type of generalizability in this study (except for the field study of Chapter 6), 
however; we will generalize from description to theory and from theory to description 
(because this is important for managerial relevance and will be done in section 7.4). The 
fourth type of generalizability (generalizing from concepts to theory) is not appropriate 
because this is an empirical study and not a theoretical study.   
While a multi-method research design is aimed at overcoming internal and 
external validity concerns, some generalizability issues need to be addressed. We separate 
issues that apply to the whole study from issues that are particular to an individual 
methodology. We address five issues of generalizability that apply to the whole study, 
namely the focus on bridging positions, the operationalization of network horizon, the 
focus on unilateral dependence restructuring, the exclusive focus on the structural 
embeddedness perspective and an alternative explanation why firms might occupy 
bridging positions. Next, we address specific limitations that are particular to each 
research method.  
The first limitation of this study is that we tested investigated the dynamics of 
network positions only for the bridging position. Chapter 2 also reviewed the benefits of 
a closed network position. Because the bridging and closed network positions differ on 
three crucial dimensions (value creating mechanism, emergence of the position, and the 
boundary conditions as we argued in Chapter 2), it seems premature to generalize our 
findings to other network positions such as the closed network position. At the same 
time, it seems likely that network horizon and interdependence also matter in those 
settings. Although we do expect that network horizon will play a less important role in 
understanding the dynamics of a closed network position because closed positions are 
often the result of past and referral partnering processes.   
Second, we think that network horizon is a useful new construct for 
understanding why firms shift their network position - as the first two empirical chapters 
demonstrate. Our results should not be interpreted in terms of the effect size of the 
coefficients, but should be generalized as theoretical constructs (Lee & Baskerville, 2003) 
that partly explain differences in network positions. Because we have not conducted this 
study in a field setting, it is not possible to make statements about how large the effect is 
of network horizon and network horizon heterogeneity for real world firms. This study, 
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does however, demonstrate that the ability of a firm to shift its network position is partly 
determined by its network horizon and by the network horizon heterogeneity. 
Triangulation of methods challenges the researcher to use different operationalizations of 
the independent variable depending on the researched context. In fact, using different 
operationalizations can significantly increase the internal validity of the research 
(Singleton, Straits, & Straits, 1988). Table 7-1 summarizes how in each context we 
operationalized the network horizon.  
Research Context Operationalization 
Network Experiments Network horizon is operationalized as the number of firms the focal 
firm knows by counting the firms that can be reached in k steps. 
Computational Modeling  Network horizon is operationalized as the number of firms and their 
relationships the focal firm knows by counting the alters and their 
relationships a firm can reach in k steps and a random term. 
Field Study We did not operationalize network horizon. 
Table 7-1 Different operationalizations of network horizon 
The first operationalization is a network-centric operationalization while the 
second operationalization is more firm centric. The network-centric operationalization 
might be easier to replicate in an empirical context compared with the firm-centric 
operationalization. The network-centric operationalization could be translated in an 
empirical context as the percentage of firms of the total network that can be reached in 
two steps, which is consistent with Friedkin’s horizon of observability (Friedkin, 1983). A 
firm-centric operationalization is more time consuming because it entails collecting data 
for each individual firm what it knows about the network structure. This daunting data 
collection process is furthermore complicated through the cognitive embeddedness 
(Baum et al., 2003) of organizational decision-makers. Cognitive embeddedness blurs the 
distinction between perception and information about the network. This can potentially 
result in overestimating the network position of powerful firms because they are more 
visible and underestimating the network position of peripheral firms because of their lack 
of visibility. Theoretically, there is no objection to use this construct in other empirical 
contexts. Although we were not able to measure network horizon for the insurance 
brokers and insurance firms (in Chapter 6), we do believe that this is possible in future 
research. Hence, this raises the question of how to measure network horizon in an 
empirical setting. Previous research suggests that the composition of the top 
management team has a positive impact on the rate a firm establishes new alliances 
(Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996). For example, team size, number of previous 
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employers and previous highest job level have a positive influence on the propensity of a 
firm to enter a new alliance. These three indicators are possible items to measure a firm’s 
network horizon. Once the individual network horizons of firms in an interfirm network 
are measured then it is rather easy to measure network horizon heterogeneity.  
Third, we limited ourselves, in Chapter 2, to focus exclusively on unilateral 
restructuring of resource dependence (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Suppose, we had also 
taken into account bilateral restructuring of resource dependence, how would have that 
affected our results? Bilateral restructuring aims at reducing uncertainty due to 
asymmetric dependence between two firms (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Two broad 
strategies exist: 1) reducing the asymmetric dependence by increasing the focal firm’s 
dependence on its partner or 2) by strengthening the bonds between two firms through 
taking joint seats in the board of directors, strengthening the collaboration through 
formal and informal agreements at multiple levels of the organizations or to take 
minority stakes in one of the companies. These are all strategies aimed at reducing 
behavioral uncertainty and hence to increase the predictability of the future of both 
companies. Such bilateral actions are more likely to result in a closed network position 
because of the increased collaboration compared with unilateral restructuring of resource 
dependence.  
Fourth, we also limited ourselves, in Chapter 2, to the structural embeddedness 
perspective to study interfirm networks while there is a relational and cognitive 
embeddedness perspective as well (Baum et al., 2003). The structural embeddedness view 
focuses exclusively on how firms are connected to each other and does not study what 
flows through these relationships. Hence, if we had studied bilateral restructuring 
strategies then it would have been appropriate to take a relational embeddedness account. 
Relational accounts of interfirm networks are often confined to smaller network studies 
due to the extensive data collection efforts. However, a relational study would have 
uncovered directly the motives of a firm to shift its network position and would have 
made it possible to study what organizational decision makers know of their interfirm 
networks. The cognitive embeddedness perspective emphasizes that decision-makers 
focus their attention on firms with similar characteristics and use information cues from 
the environment to simplify the processing of information. Such a perspective represents 
a promising avenue which we will discuss in more detail in the future research section.  
Finally, a status-based (Podolny, 1993) explanation comes to mind that explains 
why some firms span more structural holes than other firms do. Some industries are 
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characterized by a status hierarchy. Firms with a high status have greater discretion when 
choosing to partner with another firm because such a firm is more attractive. 
Establishing bridging ties is usually associated with uncertainty (Baum et al., 2005). Firms 
with high status can overcome this uncertainty because they are perceived to be more 
trustworthy and reliable. Hence, firms with high status will span more structural holes 
compared with firms with low status. Although this explanation might be applicable in 
some industries, it did not play a role in either the network experiments or the 
simulation. We did not model status hierarchies in the network experiments nor in the 
simulation because the insurance industry is not a status-based industry. In the following 
section, we will address specific generalizability concerns for the individual 
methodologies.  
7.4.1 Limitations of the network experiments 
First, an important limitation of our network experiments is that our simulated 
firms were managed by individuals while in companies decisions are often made by teams 
and these decisions are passed up the hierarchy for an ultimate fiat. For example, theory 
on the upper echelons of organizations (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) predicts that 
demographic characteristics of organizational decision-makers influence the strategic 
actions that will be taken by a firm. Our random assignment of the treatment to the 
participants has effectively ruled out any systematic influence of demographic 
characteristics on the strategic actions taken during the experiments. The results of our 
experiments are not biased in one particular direction due to demographic characteristics 
because we controlled for them but our network experiments do not capture the decision 
making, information filtering, and interpretation processes that are characteristic for top 
management decisions. Decisions in a firm are often made by numerous people at 
different levels that coalesce in joint action. As such, our experiments do not replicate 
firm behavior but assume a hierarchical organizational structure in which decision-
making politics, different constituencies, and intra-group decision making processes do 
not play a role. This limitation can be addressed by conducting on site research that 
investigates how management teams decide on shifting their network position.  
Second, participants of the network experiments could not decline establishing a 
relationship with another firm, this is sometimes referred to as a ‘non-cooperative’ game 
(Bala & Goyal, 2000). This implies that a firm’s network position can shift without the 
consent of the participant. However, we think that the implication of this is marginal. 
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Each participant aims at managing the most profitable firm in the network and thus 
partnering decisions are taken that are expected to improve firm performance. If a firm 
establishes a new relationship with a new supplier (without consent of the supplier) then 
it is safe to assume that the supplier offers capabilities at a lower price then other firms in 
the network. Thus, the firm establishing the relationship is expecting to reduce its 
procurement costs while the supplier expects to increase its turnover. Hence, both firms 
will benefit from this partnering decision even tough the non-focal firm did not give 
explicit permission to establish this relationship. Future network experiments can be 
organized as a cooperative game, by allowing participants to accept a new relationship, to 
study the impact on the dynamics of network positions.  
Third, students without industry knowledge or insurance background may not be 
proper substitutes for real-life managers in conducting our network experiments. We 
tried to minimize the impact of this effect using three solutions: 1) we invited insurance 
brokers and middle managers from an insurance firm to participate in the experiments as 
well, 2) we gave the students monetary incentives to act in a way to maximize the 
financial performance of the firm and hence to stimulate to action as rational as possible 
and, 3) we used a student team with fixed members to control for learning effects.   
7.4.2 Limitations of the computational model 
First, the validation of the simulation model is important. The limitation of a 
computational model is that the model is as strong as it representation of an empirical 
setting. Two steps were taken to increase the external validity. First, we used the roadmap 
for developing theory using simulation methods by Davis et al. (2007) to validate the 
computational model. In particular, we focused on verifying the utility function in the 
computational model in order to create a realistic representation of partnering behavior 
of firms in the real world. Second, we used different utility functions during the test 
phase with different threshold values whether a firm should accept a new tie (see 
Validation of computational model in Chapter 3). We used the utility function where the 
partnering behavior in the computational model results in sparse networks, a feature that 
is common for interfirm networks (see Table 3-4). Furthermore, we replicated the 
simulations to determine whether the findings are robust. We did not find great 
differences compared with the results presented in this chapter.  
Second, an alternative explanation that some firms might span more structural 
holes than other firms is because they possess unique and valuable resources that are 
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scarce and hence they are more attractive to partner with. In the network experiments, 
we did control for resource dependence factors including the focal firm and partner firm 
attractiveness (variables fourteen and fifteen in Table 4-2). In the computational model, 
we modeled each firm as a homogenous actor. There were no firm specific differences 
between the firms in the simulation and hence we controlled for resource dependence 
factors that might influence the number of structural holes a firm spans.  
7.4.3 Limitations of the field study 
First, resource dependence and resource similarity are measures that have often 
been  calculated in diverse empirical contexts (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Chen, 1996; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). However, a limitation is that the indicators we used in this 
research for resource dependence and resource similarity are dependent on firm and 
industry characteristics. For example, we could construct resource similarity matrices 
because the capabilities were relatively easy to decipher. In other industries, were 
products are maybe more integrated, the construction of such resource similarity 
matrices can be more difficult.  
A second limitation is that the insurance brokers we studied in the field study of 
Chapter 6 are significantly larger (in number of employees) compared with insurance 
brokers that do not belong to the Insurance Data Network. This selection bias suggests 
that our findings potentially are only applicable to medium and large insurance brokers. 
Smaller insurance brokers possibly lack the resources to shift their network position but 
this should be investigated before reaching conclusions.  
The final limitation is that we studied a vertical network in the field study. In 
vertical networks is the importance of brokering information negligible while the control 
benefits are much more important. For example, an insurance firm is not brokering 
information between two insurance brokers because if an insurance firm would broker 
information from one broker to another broker it would make the position of the 
brokers stronger because of the increased information availability. However, an insurance 
firm does have control benefits by executing the tertius gaudens.  
Overall, the findings of the three studies are consistent with each other and 
therefore we conclude that network horizon, network horizon heterogeneity, resource 
dependence, and resource similarity are important determinants of the dynamics of 
bridging position. 
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7.5 Contribution to Literature 
This study has three contributions to the existing literature on interfirm networks. 
First, we add a dynamic perspective to the mainly static theory of structural holes. By 
adding a dynamic perspective, we move away from network effects and investigate 
network processes, something network scholars have been advocating for a long time 
(Kilduff et al., 2006; Salancik, 1995). Second, we developed an explanation based on the 
availability and distribution of information about the network structure and how this 
impacts the dynamics of network positions. Such an information-based view of network 
dynamics is consistent with the approach suggested by Moldoveanu et al. (2003). Third, a 
major strength of our research is that we used three different research methods to study 
longitudinal the dynamics of network positions. Furthermore, the research design that 
includes multi-level in combination with the longitudinal data responds to calls for more 
rigorous and longitudinal analysis of network dynamics (Baum et al., 2005; Gulati et al., 
2000; Zaheer & Usai, 2004). Our causal explanations are stronger compared with cross 
sectional research designs due to using experiments that aim at establishing causality and 
lagging our independent variables in the field study. This in combination with advanced 
estimation techniques minimizes the risks of biased parameter estimates.  
The contribution of this research extends beyond the literature on interfirm 
networks, we will also draw two implications for the IS literature. Our information-based 
explanation is especially relevant for the IS field because it represents an opportunity to 
study how information and information technology influences the emergence, 
governance and execution of interfirm networks. First, we argued that communication 
technologies enable a transformation of previous static chains into more dynamic 
networks. In particular, quick connect capabilities have the potential of changing the 
business landscape and future research about this topic is needed (we will go in more 
detail in the future research section about this topic). Second, we argued that 
specialization and modularization would lead to an increased use of interfirm networks. 
Coordinating modular processes and products in an interfirm network will become an 
increasingly important topic of research as is indicated by recent research (Hoetker, 2006; 
Karim, 2006; Pil & Cohen, 2006). A possible suggestion is to adopt actor-network-theory 
(Law, 1992) to study the interaction of social relationships and artifacts and how this 
influences a firm’s network position and the overall network structure.  
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7.6 Managerial Relevance 
We discuss four managerial implications of this research: first the importance of 
network horizon, second the need for a network vocabulary, third the importance of a 
network strategy, and fourth the growing importance of network based competition. 
Network horizon is an important concept for organizational decision-makers because it 
improves locating profitable business opportunities in the network. Firms have limited 
resources to maintain interfirm relationships and once a firm has gained access to 
required resources, it has a smaller incentive to establish new relationships. This in 
combination with the fact that many interfirm relationships are characterized by a 
‘honey-moon’ period (Levinthal & Fichman, 1988) which reduces the probability of an 
interorganizational relationship being terminated early on. Finally, to enter a new 
interorganizational relationship a “firm must have resources to get resources” 
(Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996: 137). Thus, a path dependent process makes it more 
likely that firms that establish an interfirm tie first are more likely to continue reaping the 
benefits from such a relationship. Hence, it is worthwhile to actively monitor and use the 
network to identify potential future partners.  
Second, managers should expand their vocabulary and understanding of 
networks in order to reap the benefits of network horizon and a network strategy. It is 
important for organizational decision-makers to understand that their firm is embedded 
in an interfirm network. The position in the network influences what decision makers 
know of the network and what organizational decision-makers know of the network 
influences their network position. Understanding how a firm is embedded in a network 
has also implications for decision makers for what the kind of actions they can or should 
take, and how this affects firm performance. The make or buy decision increasingly 
becomes the make, buy or ally decision (Jacobides & Billinger, 2006). When a firm 
chooses to ally, it becomes very important for a firm to decide which capabilities to 
specialize in and which capabilities to outsource to partner firms; this requires knowledge 
about the skills and resources of the partner firms. In order to increase their vocabulary, 
managers can use formal research methods. For example, the Business Network Engine 
can be used to increase the network awareness of management, teach managers 
elementary network concepts, and train managers in developing network strategies. This 
can result in real-world strategy development exercises. This is actually not a far-fetched 
suggestion: the Business Network Engine has been used to train middle managers of a 
large Dutch insurance firm in network thinking and this has resulted in the launch of a 
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new business unit that sells car insurance policies using the Internet, designed according 
to the principles of the Business Network Engine.  
Third, the emerging field of network strategy is still in its infancy mainly because 
we have a limited understanding to what extent organizational decision-makers are aware 
of their network position and to what extent they are purposeful when there is a shift in 
the network position (Rowley & Baum, 2004). In some industries, organizational 
decision-makers are very aware of the importance of their networks, for example 
investment banks or biotechnology firms. In other industries, the awareness increasing is, 
for example in the insurance industry. Heightened awareness of the importance of the 
overall network and the particular position a firm occupies in this network will increase 
the need to monitor the network more closely in order to envisage changes in the 
network and the possible consequences.  
A firm is less likely to be surprised by competitor moves when it incorporates the 
interfirm network in the environmental scanning activities. According to the ‘awareness – 
motivation – capability’ perspective (Chen et al., 2007; Chen, 1996) awareness (or 
network horizon in this study) is a crucial first step to be able to respond to competitor 
moves. A firm can prepare itself against these competitor moves by formulating a 
network strategy. Such a network strategy aims at protecting current interfirm 
relationships, identifying and analyzing potential partners and monitoring the interfirm 
network.  
A possible first step in devising such a network strategy is to translate the well-
known operational excellence, product leadership and customer intimacy strategies 
(Treacy & Wiersema, 1993) into their network complements. A network-based version of 
operational excellence could be that a firm specializes in a limited set of capabilities and 
establish links with competitors or with firms from adjacent industries. An example of 
this would be the opening of shared service centers for competitors. A network-based 
customer intimacy strategy could be to become a network orchestrator (Hinterhuber, 
2002) or network architect (Pollock et al., 2004) and build a strong bridging position that 
allows the network orchestrator to fulfill any demand of its customers. Finally, the 
network-based version of product leadership could be to build an effective interfirm 
network that is both highly efficient in the production and refinement of current 
products while simultaneously being able to innovate. A particular suitable network 
position for such a strategy would be the hybrid (Baum et al., 2006) network position: 
this position gives the benefits of bridging (access to new ideas to innovate (Burt, 2004)) 
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and the benefits of embeddedness (transfer of thick information to improve current 
processes (Hansen, 1999)). Such a network may be able to balance the demands for 
exploitation and exploration (Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006). This brings us to the fourth 
point and implication for managers: network-based competition.  
Fourth, competition between networks will become more and more important as 
firms become more dependent on their interfirm network for a competitive advantage 
(Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001; Lavie, 2006). Network-based competition can already be 
witnessed in the airline industry (Gimeno, 2004) with alliances competing against each 
other and the computer industry in, for example, different competing platforms 
(Venkatraman & Lee, 2004) and different competing processors (Gomes-Casseres, 1996; 
Vanhaverbeke & Noorderhaven, 2001). This type of competition will increasingly 
become more important, and to be able to win this type of competition it will become 
crucial to be knowledgeable about the capabilities and resources of the partner firm and 
the strategic actions that the competing networks are initiating. This will make the 
network horizon of a firm even more important. 
Finally, interorganizational information systems (IOS) will increasingly become 
more widespread to manage and monitor interfirm networks. The monitoring of the 
network makes it possible to develop Key Network Performance Indicators (KNPI’s) to 
increase the efficiency and effectiveness. With these KNPI’s an information dashboard 
can be built to monitor continuously the performance of both the firm and the network.  
7.7 Directions for Future Research 
We will conclude this dissertation with some suggestions for future research; 
particularly focusing on the intersection of IS and interfirm networks. Topics that we 
cover in this section are the information architecture of interfirm networks, evolution of 
market and embedded relationships, network cognition, network strategy, network 
position endogeneity, dynamics of interfirm networks and network performance.   
7.7.1 Adoption of quick connect capabilities 
Recent technological developments make it easier and cheaper to maintain, 
electronically, more relationships. Such relationships are very efficient for the 
transmission of standardized transaction. However, these types of relationships possibly 
undermine the more informal relationships between buyers and suppliers because the 
need for personal communication is reduced through Internet self-serve technologies 
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(Schultze & Orlikowski, 2004). Schultze and Orlikowski (2004) argue that previously 
embedded relationships are endangered by the adoption of such technologies and found 
that these self-service technologies threatened the business model of the company they 
studied. From an economic point, there is a strong case to be made to adopt these 
technologies because of higher efficiency and fewer errors in the communication 
between firms (van Liere et al., 2004). From a sociological point, there might be 
drawbacks because previously embedded relationships become weaker and will  function 
less as a source of joint problem solving and thick information transfer (Schultze & 
Orlikowski, 2004). Previous research suggests that these electronic relationships and 
embedded relationships are complimentary (Kraut, Steinfield, Chan, Butler, & Hoag, 
1999). Future research can investigate, from a longitudinal perspective, how the adoption 
of quick connect capabilities impact embedded relationships and investigate under what 
circumstances embedded ties can be maintained while still profiting from the benefits 
from the electronic linkages.  
7.7.2 Information architecture of an interfirm network 
Effectively managing a business network will be a key concern for organizational 
decision makers in the coming years. A key ingredient to manage effectively these 
networks is to define an interfirm network information architecture. This information 
architecture defines which information is available to whom, when and under what 
conditions (Koppius, 2002). As a network grows larger, the need for such an information 
architecture will only increase. A larger network is more complex to manage as the 
number of potential relationships increases exponentially. Who is allowed to have access 
to what information becomes crucial: information should be available to the people who 
need it and vice versa. Studying the antecedents and consequences of an interfirm 
network information architecture can increase our understanding of how to manage 
effectively an interfirm network. 
7.7.3 Evolution of market and embedded relationships 
The previous suggestion for future research leads us to our second and related 
suggestion. Previous research has extensively documented the benefits of market and 
embedded relationships (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1997; Williamson, 1975). However, 
where do embedded and market relationships come from and how is their existence 
related? There are two implicit assumptions underlying the embedded / strong vs. market 
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/ weak relationships. The first assumption is that a tie is always utilized to its fullest 
potential; the second assumption is that there is a continuum from market / weak to 
embedded / strong tie. The view that the strength of a tie is a continuum is debated. 
Some authors argue that it is a continuum (Marsden & Campbell, 1984) while others 
(Rowley et al., 2000; Uzzi, 1996) argue that these are two distinct types of relationships. 
The fact that a tie exists does not necessarily mean that it is always used or is used to its 
fullest potential. The strength of ties debate illustrates this implicit assumption, 
characterizing the form of a tie (strong or weak) does not describe the substance of the 
tie. What kinds of resources or information are actually flowing through this relationship? 
This should be measured separately in order to get results that are more consistent. 
Although form and substance might be correlated, this is not necessarily the case. The 
way Granovetter (1973) defined the strength of a tie is consistent with the continuum 
view. His definition raises the problem that through time there is a natural evolution 
from a weak tie towards a stronger tie and that there is natural regression from strong ties 
to weaker ties unless a continuous effort is put in the relationship to keep its strength. 
Thus, by utilizing a weak tie often to acquire new information would in essence mean 
that the tie evolves to a stronger tie and thereby the information benefits are foregone. 
The best way to keep a weak tie as a weak tie is by not utilizing the weak tie. The same is 
true for a strong tie; by not utilizing the tie frequently the tie would become weaker. 
Taking the view that in fact there is no continuum but we are dealing with two distinct 
types of ties then we do not have the problem of natural evolution or regression. Strong 
ties can become dormant and latent and reactivated when needed (Jack, 2005) without 
becoming a weak tie. Once a tie has a particular strength it remains stable, for example, 
acquaintances stay acquaintances and do not necessarily turn into friends. Hence, an 
interesting future research question is: under what circumstances do weak ties become 
strong ties and strong ties become weak ties? 
7.7.4 Network horizon and network cognition  
We explicitly assumed that the information firms have about their network 
structure is accurate. However, research at the individual level suggests that this might be 
too strong an assumption and that there are cognitive biases in how individuals collect 
and process information about the network structure (Casciaro, 1998). Consequently, our 
third suggestion for future research is to investigate to what extent organizational 
decision-makers have information about the network structure and to what extent they 
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are acting in a strategic way when deciding with whom to partner. Previous research 
suggests that the demographics of the top management team play a role (Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1996; Sutcliffe, 1994). We suggest two avenues to research the network 
horizon of a firm in an empirical setting. First, future research could take a more detailed 
look at the composition of a top management team and their networking activities 
through board interlocks and business associations. Second, researchers can adopt a 
cognitive approach in which organizational decision-makers are interviewed and asked to 
draw a map of the network structure. This is consistent with previous work on cognitive 
models of industry structures (Porac et al., 1995).  
7.7.5 Network strategy 
There is a strong instrumental assumption underlying structural hole theory, Burt 
(1992: 2) phrases it as follows: “players know about, take part in, and exercise control 
over more rewarding opportunities”. Burt weakened this assumption in later work (2005) 
and he seems to be unconvinced that individuals are able to purposefully shift their 
network position. However, firms have more resources available and decisions are made 
after careful consideration of alternatives. Hence, an interesting avenue for further 
research is to what extent firms have a network strategy and the elements that constitute a 
network strategy. This research focused to what extent firms know about more 
rewarding opportunities and showed the implications of different levels of information. 
However, less research has focused on the instrumental aspects of this assumption. Do 
organizational decision-makers think in terms of their network position and the benefits 
they receive? Do organizational decision-makers consider the effect of a partner decision 
on their network position? Do organizational decision-makers monitor the network 
actions of their partners and respond to these actions?  
7.7.6 Endogenous changes in network positions  
Future research could address the important issue of firm position endogeneity. 
Decision-makers do not randomly decide but make decision that they expect will have 
the most positive outcome (Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003). If this is true, then a shift in a 
firm’s network position is a self-selected strategy that is expected to create the greatest 
benefits for the firm. In the context of network research, endogeneity raises the issue 
whether firm performance leads to a strong network position or does a strong network 
position influence firm performance? There is causal ambiguity, and possible reverse 
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causality, between the relationship firm performance and network position. This is an 
important problem because it obscures what firms should do in order to improve their 
network position.  
7.7.7 Interfirm network topology evolution  
A possible extension of the applicability of the network horizon and network 
horizon heterogeneity is to develop an interfirm network formation mechanism based on 
the availability and distribution of information to study the emergence of network 
topologies. For example, two distinct firm characteristics could be hypothesized to be 
mainly responsible for the emergence of a network topology. The first characteristic is 
the individual network strategy of a firm; what type of network position does each firm 
pursue, and what are its organizational partnering tendencies? The second characteristic 
is the multi-level construct network horizon. Different mixes of network strategies and 
different levels of network horizon heterogeneity could lead to different network 
topologies. Such a network formation mechanism is consistent with the approach 
suggested by Moldoveanu et al. (2003). 
7.7.8 Network performance 
Research on network performance is nascent but will become an increasingly 
important topic as competition will be increasingly network based. Future research 
should focus on two aspects of network performance: 1) the definition and 
operationalization of network performance (Straub et al., 2004) and 2) the antecedents 
and consequences of network performance. In particular, the competition within and 
between networks is fascinating since it requires a balance of competition and 
cooperation between firms (also referred to as coopetition (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 
1997)). 
7.8 Concluding Remarks 
In conclusion, studying the dynamics of network positions increases our 
understanding of where bridging positions come from and why structural holes that are 
spanned by bridging positions exist. This increased understanding can benefit both 
network scholars and practitioners alike. With the increasing importance of network-
based competition, network strategies, and the need for a network vocabulary, we can 
only conclude that both scholars and practitioners should keep expanding their horizon.   
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Nederlandstalige Samenvatting (Dutch Summary) 
Het doel van dit proefschrift is om inzicht te verschaffen in de oorzaken van 
dynamiek van netwerk posities van bedrijven. Terwijl de voordelen van netwerk posities 
veel aandacht hebben gehad in de literatuur over bedrijfsnetwerken zijn de processen die 
ten grondslag liggen aan dergelijke posities onderbelicht gebleven. Netwerk posities 
creëren een voordeel doordat ze bedrijf toegang geven tot waardevolle en schaarse 
middelen. De configuratie van interorganisatorische relaties bepaalt wat voor type positie 
een bedrijf inneemt. Twee bekende en vaak bestudeerde posities zijn de brugpositie en de 
gesloten positie. Een bedrijf neemt een brugpositie in wanneer haar partners niet direct 
met elkaar verbonden zijn, er zijn zogenaamde structural holes tussen de partner bedrijven. 
In tegenstelling, een bedrijf neemt een gesloten positie in wanneer haar partner bedrijven 
wel met elkaar verbonden zijn, er zijn geen structural holes tussen de partner bedrijven. Elk 
type positie kan waarde creëren voor een bedrijf, echter deze mechanismen zijn 
tegengesteld aan elkaar. Een bedrijf met een brugpositie creëert waarde door gebruik te 
maken van informatie asymmetrie tussen de partner bedrijven terwijl een bedrijf met een 
gesloten positie waarde creëert door informatie asymmetriën te verminderen en daardoor 
effectieve sanctiemechanismen, gedeelde mentalen kaarten en effectieve reputatie 
mechanismen creëert.  
Veranderingen in netwerk posities, door het aangaan van nieuwe 
interorganisatorische relaties of het verbreken van oude, hebben effect op het gehele 
netwerk en kunnen resulteren in het aangaan van nieuwe interorganisatorische relaties 
van andere bedrijven. Deze constante veranderingen van relaties zijn de motor achter de 
dynamiek van netwerk posities. We nemen de brugpositie als start punt en onderzoeken 
factoren die bijdragen aan het versterken, verzwakken en duurzamer maken van deze 
positie. We maken gebruik van een multi-methode, multi-level, longitudinale 
onderzoeksopzet met als onderzoeksmethoden netwerk experimenten, simulatie, en een 
veld studie.  
Het versterken van een brugpositie vereist informatie van de netwerk structuur 
om een bedrijf in staat te stellen waardevolle brokerage kansen te identificeren. We 
Network Horizon and the Dynamics of Network Positions 
226 
introduceren het concept van netwerk horizon en definiëren het als de mate van informatie 
die een bedrijf heeft over het bedrijfsnetwerk op een gegeven moment. Gebruikmakend 
van netwerk experimenten en simulatie demonstreren we dat bedrijven met meer 
informatie over de netwerk structuur beter in staat zijn brokerage kansen te lokaliseren en 
daarmee in staat zijn hun brugpositie te verstevigen. Daarnaast vinden we dat er 
afnemende meeropbrengsten zijn van een netwerk horizon. Voorbij een bepaald punt 
loont het niet om nog meer informatie over het netwerk te verzamelen omdat het niet 
leidt tot een sterkere brugpositie. Echter, niet alleen het geanalyseerde bedrijf heeft een 
netwerk horizon, de overige bedrijven in het netwerk hebben ook informatie over de 
netwerk structuur hoewel het waarschijnlijk is dat deze bedrijven andere informatie 
bezitten. Daarom introduceren we een tweede concept namelijk dat van netwerk horizon 
heterogeniteit. Netwerk horizon heterogeniteit verwijst naar de verschillen tussen bedrijven 
in de hoeveelheid informatie die ze bezitten over de netwerk structuur. We 
demonstreren, met behulp van een simulatie, dat de netwerk horizon heterogeniteit een 
belangrijke voorspellende factor is voor de duurzaamheid van een brugpositie. In 
tegenstelling, netwerken die worden beschreven met relatief homogene netwerk horizon 
distributies worden gekenmerkt door intensievere concurrentie voor brugposities en 
daarmee wordt de duurzaamheid van een brugpositie verkort.  
Afsluitend laten we zien, met behulp van netwerk experimenten en een veld 
studie, dat resource similarity en resource dependence belangrijke factoren zijn van de dynamiek 
van netwerk posities. Resource similarity verwijst naar de mate substitueerbaarheid tussen 
partner bedrijven, bedrijven met dezelfde middelen zijn meer substitueerbaar dan 
bedrijven met verschillende middelen. Resource dependence verwijst naar de onderlinge 
afhankelijkheid tussen twee bedrijven. Beide studies laten zien dat wanneer de resource 
similarity toeneemt, de concurrentie tussen partner bedrijven ook toeneemt en dat deze 
partner bedrijven nieuwe interorganisatorische relaties aanleggen om de toegenomen 
concurrentie af te zwakken. De veld studie laat zien dat afhankelijke bedrijven hun relatie 
met het bedrijf dat de brug functie vervult nog verder verstevigen, door andere 
interorganisatorische relaties af te breken, en daarmee nog afhankelijker worden van het 
bedrijf met de brugpositie. 
Samenvattend, deze dissertatie draagt bij aan het onderzoek naar 
bedrijfsnetwerken door inzicht te verschaffen wanneer brugposities versterken, 
verzwakken of blijven bestaan. Dergelijke kennis is van belang voor zowel 
wetenschappers als praktijkmensen. Wetenschappers kunnen profiteren van deze kennis 
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omdat het bijdraagt aan een beter begrip van netwerk-gebaseerd concurrentie voordeel. 
Praktijkmensen kunnen profiteren van deze studie omdat deze studie het belang van een 
netwerk strategie onderstreept dat een bedrijf nodig heeft om te overleven in een 
verbonden wereld.  
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Network Horizon and the Dynamics of Network Positions
A Multi-Method Multi-Level Longitudinal Study of Interfirm Networks
Why does the network position of a firm change? Which firm, partner
firm, and network factors accelerate or slow down this change
process? This is the central theme of this dissertation. The causal
mechanisms behind the benefits of network positions have received
considerable attention in academic research on interfirm networks.
However, in most cases this research assumes a more or less static
network. In today’s world of advanced communications, interfirm
networks are not static but highly dynamic where firms pursue
beneficial network positions. A particular beneficial position is the
bridging position that puts the bridging firm in-between its partner
firms. Taking the bridging position as point of departure, this study
investigates the strengthening, weakening and longevity of this posi-
tion. A rigorous triangulation method has been used combining net-
work experiments, simulation, and field data analysis with formal
tools that have been specifically designed – as part of this study – to
study interfirm networks (the Business Network Engine and LINKS).
The concept of network horizon is being introduced to define the
degree of information which a firm holds on the structure of its inter-
firm network at a given point in time. The size of a firm's network
horizon is shown to be a critical determinant of the firm's ability to
strengthen and keep its bridging position. This does not mean that a
firm should always try to expand its network horizon as the study
indicates a passing point: expanding the network horizon beyond this
point gives rapidly diminishing returns. Interfirm differences in their
network horizons, i.e. network horizon heterogeneity, is found to be
an important predictor of the intensity of competition for network
positions. Resource similarity between partner firms weakens the
bridging position; and resource dependence strengthens the bridging
position. In summary, it is being proposed that the most valuable
network positions are ones that will not last long. This study has
provided important tools and methods for rigorous future research
that will be highly relevant for managers to develop successful
network strategies to win the best position in a networked world.
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